Stochastic evolution game analysis of the strategic coalition of enterprise pollution control

Zuliang Lu; Lu Xing; Ruixiang Xu; Mingsong Li; Junman Li; Zuliang Lu; Lu Xing; Ruixiang Xu; Mingsong Li; Junman Li

doi:10.3934/math.2024452

AIMS Mathematics

2024, Volume 9, Issue 4: 9287-9310. doi: 10.3934/math.2024452

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Stochastic evolution game analysis of the strategic coalition of enterprise pollution control

1.
Key Laboratory for Nonlinear Science and System Structure, Chongqing Three Gorges University, Chongqing 404000, China
2.
Research Center for Mathematics and Economics, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China

Received: 06 January 2024 Revised: 19 February 2024 Accepted: 21 February 2024 Published: 06 March 2024
MSC : 91A22, 91B32

To address pollution control, cooperation among interested parties is essential. This paper examines a stochastic evolution game model involving a strategic coalition of three enterprises for pollution control. The model incorporates decision-making factors to construct a strategic coalition model of enterprise pollution control between enterprises. The study analyzes the evolution process of pollution control strategies within the coalition and determines the final stable strategy. Additionally, numerical simulations are conducted to explore the evolution paths of enterprises under various circumstances. Results from a case-based numerical example validate the theoretical findings, supporting the following insights: (1) the coalition requires an effective mechanism for incentivizing and penalizing actions, (2) the government should establish and improve coordination and management mechanisms, (3) citizens are urged to develop social oversight mechanisms for reporting environmental violation, and (4) a fair and equitable distribution mechanism should be implemented within the coalition.
- stochastic evolution game,
- strategic coalition,
- pollution control
Citation: Zuliang Lu, Lu Xing, Ruixiang Xu, Mingsong Li, Junman Li. Stochastic evolution game analysis of the strategic coalition of enterprise pollution control[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2024, 9(4): 9287-9310. doi: 10.3934/math.2024452

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Abstract

To address pollution control, cooperation among interested parties is essential. This paper examines a stochastic evolution game model involving a strategic coalition of three enterprises for pollution control. The model incorporates decision-making factors to construct a strategic coalition model of enterprise pollution control between enterprises. The study analyzes the evolution process of pollution control strategies within the coalition and determines the final stable strategy. Additionally, numerical simulations are conducted to explore the evolution paths of enterprises under various circumstances. Results from a case-based numerical example validate the theoretical findings, supporting the following insights: (1) the coalition requires an effective mechanism for incentivizing and penalizing actions, (2) the government should establish and improve coordination and management mechanisms, (3) citizens are urged to develop social oversight mechanisms for reporting environmental violation, and (4) a fair and equitable distribution mechanism should be implemented within the coalition.

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