This paper uses differential game theory to study the cooperation strategy and cost-sharing of local government and enterprise data integration under central government subsidies. We use differential game theory to build game models under the three modes of cooperative cooperation, noncooperation, and bilateral cost-sharing contracts; design a profit-sharing mechanism to improve the game structure between local governments and enterprises under bilateral cost-sharing contracts; and analyze the results of the model through simulation analysis. We draw the following research conclusions. (1) Under the collaborative cooperation model, the two parties in the game have the highest degree of data integration effort and the highest level of data integration, achieving Pareto optimality. (2) The profit-sharing mechanism can improve the bilateral cost-sharing contract so that the optimal effort of local governments and enterprises to integrate data and the level of data integration reach the level under the cooperative game and benefit the two sides of the game compared with the noncooperative model. This achieves Pareto improvement. (3) The efforts of local governments and enterprises to integrate data is negatively correlated with the cost coefficient of data integration and positively correlated with the social welfare effect. The research conclusions provide a theoretical reference for formulating local government and enterprise data integration policies and improving the level of data integration in China.
Citation: Zifu Fan, Kexin Fan, Wei Zhang. Research on the data integration strategy of local governments and enterprises under central government subsidies[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2022, 7(6): 10143-10164. doi: 10.3934/math.2022564
This paper uses differential game theory to study the cooperation strategy and cost-sharing of local government and enterprise data integration under central government subsidies. We use differential game theory to build game models under the three modes of cooperative cooperation, noncooperation, and bilateral cost-sharing contracts; design a profit-sharing mechanism to improve the game structure between local governments and enterprises under bilateral cost-sharing contracts; and analyze the results of the model through simulation analysis. We draw the following research conclusions. (1) Under the collaborative cooperation model, the two parties in the game have the highest degree of data integration effort and the highest level of data integration, achieving Pareto optimality. (2) The profit-sharing mechanism can improve the bilateral cost-sharing contract so that the optimal effort of local governments and enterprises to integrate data and the level of data integration reach the level under the cooperative game and benefit the two sides of the game compared with the noncooperative model. This achieves Pareto improvement. (3) The efforts of local governments and enterprises to integrate data is negatively correlated with the cost coefficient of data integration and positively correlated with the social welfare effect. The research conclusions provide a theoretical reference for formulating local government and enterprise data integration policies and improving the level of data integration in China.
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Zifu Fan, Kexin Fan, Wei Zhang. Research on the data integration strategy of local governments and enterprises under central government subsidies[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2022, 7(6): 10143-10164. doi: 10.3934/math.2022564
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