Study on the exit strategy selection mechanism of venture capital based on quantum game

Bingji Yuan; Bingji Yuan

doi:10.3934/math.2021403

AIMS Mathematics

2021, Volume 6, Issue 7: 6882-6897. doi: 10.3934/math.2021403

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Research article

Study on the exit strategy selection mechanism of venture capital based on quantum game

Bingji Yuan ^,

School of Economics, Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China

Received: 04 March 2021 Accepted: 13 April 2021 Published: 22 April 2021
MSC : 62C05, 92Axx

Venture capital exit strategy is a key condition of realizing venture capital appreciation and circular operation. Based on the equity sale method of venture capital exit, this paper explores strategic choices of venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs for external investment, and constructs a venture capital exit strategy model with the paradigm of classical game theory and quantum game theory, respectively. A series of experiments demonstrated the proposed method can achieve the unification of Nash equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium. Therefore, this paper expands the basic theoretical support and provide practical support for the choice of venture capital exit strategies.
- game theory,
- quantum games,
- venture capital,
- exit strategies
Citation: Bingji Yuan. Study on the exit strategy selection mechanism of venture capital based on quantum game[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2021, 6(7): 6882-6897. doi: 10.3934/math.2021403

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Abstract

Venture capital exit strategy is a key condition of realizing venture capital appreciation and circular operation. Based on the equity sale method of venture capital exit, this paper explores strategic choices of venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs for external investment, and constructs a venture capital exit strategy model with the paradigm of classical game theory and quantum game theory, respectively. A series of experiments demonstrated the proposed method can achieve the unification of Nash equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium. Therefore, this paper expands the basic theoretical support and provide practical support for the choice of venture capital exit strategies.

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