In the era of big data, facing the data-intensive scientific paradigm shift and the explosion of scientific big data, there is an urgent need for alliance cooperation between heterogeneous research groups to actively open and share scientific big data to support China's economic development, technological innovation and national security. Therefore, the study of scientific big data sharing mechanism has very important practical significance. We think science big data sharing is an ecosystem that is constantly evolving to higher-order ecological evolution. Based on the dual perspectives of psychological contract and contractual contract, the scientific big data sharing strategy evolution mechanism and sharing strategy incentive mechanism are explored.The research finds that the cooperation of scientific research groups is bound by psychological contract and contractual contract; stochastic evolutionary game has stronger explanatory power for sharing strategy evolution, complementarity is positive indicator, random interference and moral risk are negative indicators; two-way principal agent can describe Alliance members are mutually entrusted, and the shared strategy incentive contract consists of fixed wages and incentive wages, which are proportional to risk.
Citation: Wang Zhang, Jingkun Zhang. Stability of scientific big data sharing mechanism based on two-way principal-agent[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2023, 8(8): 18762-18779. doi: 10.3934/math.2023955
In the era of big data, facing the data-intensive scientific paradigm shift and the explosion of scientific big data, there is an urgent need for alliance cooperation between heterogeneous research groups to actively open and share scientific big data to support China's economic development, technological innovation and national security. Therefore, the study of scientific big data sharing mechanism has very important practical significance. We think science big data sharing is an ecosystem that is constantly evolving to higher-order ecological evolution. Based on the dual perspectives of psychological contract and contractual contract, the scientific big data sharing strategy evolution mechanism and sharing strategy incentive mechanism are explored.The research finds that the cooperation of scientific research groups is bound by psychological contract and contractual contract; stochastic evolutionary game has stronger explanatory power for sharing strategy evolution, complementarity is positive indicator, random interference and moral risk are negative indicators; two-way principal agent can describe Alliance members are mutually entrusted, and the shared strategy incentive contract consists of fixed wages and incentive wages, which are proportional to risk.
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