Loading [MathJax]/jax/output/SVG/jax.js
Research article

Private governance schemes for green bond standard: influence on public authorities’ policy making

  • This paper considers the guiding impact of private governance schemes on public authorities' policy-making through a case study on green bond standard. Based on theoretical review of the institutional interplay and private governance scheme, two hypotheses are proposed in this paper: horizontal interplay between transnational private governance schemes can make a particular framework prevalent in given governance area; and prevalent private governance scheme can influence policy making of public authorities through vertical institutional interplay. The argument in this paper supports that internationally-accepted private governance schemes could be in a position to influence policy-making by public authorities. Horizontal interplay in the form of alignment between the Green Bond Principles (GBP) and other private green bond standards reinforces the credibility of the overlapping elements of the private standards. As for vertical level, this paper finds that public authorities at national and regional levels take advantage of the private governance scheme, especially GBP, when developing their own standards and policy frameworks. Private institution's expertise on green bond standards effectively function to help develop coherent green bond standards globally by helping with public authorities' policy development. GBP eventually serves as a model regulation for policy makers as public authorities regard them as market best practice. This further strengthens the credibility of GBP since private governance schemes could attract more users by making it clear that those voluntary private standards are linked with standards and policy frameworks created by public authorities.

    Citation: Toyo Kawabata. Private governance schemes for green bond standard: influence on public authorities’ policy making[J]. Green Finance, 2020, 2(1): 35-54. doi: 10.3934/GF.2020003

    Related Papers:

    [1] Congying Wang, Fu Zhao, Carol Handwerker . Transforming and integrating informal sectors into formal e-waste management system: A case study in Guiyu, China. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2022, 2(4): 225-246. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2022012
    [2] Chukwuebuka C. Okafor, Chinelo A. Nzekwe, Nixon N. Nduji, Charles C. Ajaero, Juliet C. Ibekwe . Energy and material recovery potential from municipal solid wastes (MSW) in Nigeria: Challenges and opportunities. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2022, 2(4): 282-307. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2022015
    [3] Glenn Baxter . Towards sustainable airport waste management through the adoption of a "green" airport strategy: The case of Incheon International Airport. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2022, 2(4): 247-278. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2022013
    [4] Kyle Pender, Liu Yang . Glass fibre composites recycling using the fluidised bed: A study into the economic viability in the UK. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2023, 3(3): 221-240. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2023014
    [5] Wilson Uzochukwu Eze, Reginald Umunakwe, Michael Ifeanyichukwu Ugbaja, Mohammed Kabiru Yakubu, Narcillina Nkechi Adegboro, Amina Hassan Bayero, Maryann Ifeoma Uzochukwu . Utilization of commodity plastic wastes in flexible pavement: A review. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2023, 3(1): 71-91. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2023005
    [6] Dmitry Baturkin, Ousmane A. Hisseine, Radhouane Masmoudi, Arezki Tagnit-Hamou, Slimane Metiche, Luc Massicotte . Compressive behavior of FRP-tube-confined concrete short columns using recycled FRP materials from wind turbine blades: Experimental investigation and analytical modelling. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2022, 2(3): 136-164. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2022008
    [7] Ana Cram, Jose Espiritu, Heidi Taboada, Delia J. Valles-Rosales, Young Ho Park, Efren Delgado, Jianzhong Su . Multi-objective biofuel feedstock optimization considering different land-cover scenarios and watershed impacts. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2022, 2(2): 103-118. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2022006
    [8] Yi Ji, Edwin E. Kpodzro, Chad T. Jafvert, Fu Zhao . Direct recycling technologies of cathode in spent lithium-ion batteries. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2021, 1(2): 124-151. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2021007
    [9] Charles C. Ajaero, Chukwuebuka C. Okafor, Festus A. Otunomo, Nixon N. Nduji, John A. Adedapo . Energy production potential of organic fraction of municipal solid waste (OFMSW) and its implications for Nigeria. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2023, 3(1): 44-65. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2023003
    [10] Wilson Uzochukwu Eze, Reginald Umunakwe, Henry Chinedu Obasi, Michael Ifeanyichukwu Ugbaja, Cosmas Chinedu Uche, Innocent Chimezie Madufor . Plastics waste management: A review of pyrolysis technology. Clean Technologies and Recycling, 2021, 1(1): 50-69. doi: 10.3934/ctr.2021003
  • This paper considers the guiding impact of private governance schemes on public authorities' policy-making through a case study on green bond standard. Based on theoretical review of the institutional interplay and private governance scheme, two hypotheses are proposed in this paper: horizontal interplay between transnational private governance schemes can make a particular framework prevalent in given governance area; and prevalent private governance scheme can influence policy making of public authorities through vertical institutional interplay. The argument in this paper supports that internationally-accepted private governance schemes could be in a position to influence policy-making by public authorities. Horizontal interplay in the form of alignment between the Green Bond Principles (GBP) and other private green bond standards reinforces the credibility of the overlapping elements of the private standards. As for vertical level, this paper finds that public authorities at national and regional levels take advantage of the private governance scheme, especially GBP, when developing their own standards and policy frameworks. Private institution's expertise on green bond standards effectively function to help develop coherent green bond standards globally by helping with public authorities' policy development. GBP eventually serves as a model regulation for policy makers as public authorities regard them as market best practice. This further strengthens the credibility of GBP since private governance schemes could attract more users by making it clear that those voluntary private standards are linked with standards and policy frameworks created by public authorities.


    For a convex function f:IRR on I with c,dI and c<d, the Hermite–Hadamard inequality states that [1]:

    f(c+d2)1dcdcf(t)dtf(c)+f(d)2. (1.1)

    The Hermite-Hadamard integral inequality (1.1) is one of the most famous and commonly used inequalities. The recently published papers [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17] are focused on extending and generalizing the convexity, Hermite-Hadamard inequality, and other inequalities for convex functions.

    The situation of the fractional calculus (integrals and derivatives) has won vast popularity and significance throughout the previous five decades or so, due generally to its demonstrated applications in numerous seemingly numerous and great fields of science and engineering [18,19,20].

    Now, we recall the definitions of Riemann-Liouville (RL) and generalized Riemann–Liouville (GRL) fractional integrals given by Sarikaya and Ertuğral.

    Definition 1.1 ([18,19,20]). Let fL1[c,d]. The Riemann–Liouville (RL) fractional integrals RLIνc+f and RLIνdf of order ν>0 with c0 are respectively defined by

    RLIνc+f(x)=1Γ(ν)xc(xt)ν1f(t)dt,c<x, (1.2)

    and

    RLIνdf(x)=1Γ(ν)dx(tx)ν1f(t)dt,x<d, (1.3)

    with RLI0c+f(x)=RLI0df(x)=f(x).

    Definition 1.2 ([21]). Assume that the function :[0,+)[0,+) satisfies the following condition:

    10(t)tdt<+.

    Then, the left sided and right sided generalized Riemann–Liouville (GRL) fractional integrals, denoted by GRLIc+ and GRLId, are defined as follows:

    GRLIc+f(x)=xc(xt)xtf(t)dt,c<x, (1.4)
    GRLIdf(x)=dx(tx)txf(t)dt,x<d. (1.5)

    Remark 1.1. From the Definition 1.1 one can obtain some known definitions of fractional calculus as special cases. That is,

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Definition 1.2 reduces to Definition 1.1.

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν), then the GRL fractional integrals reduce to k–RL fractional integrals [22].

    If (t)=tνexp(1ννt), then the GRL fractional integrals reduce to the fractional integrals with exponential kernel [23].

    If (t)=t(yt)ν1, then the GRL fractional integrals reduce to the conformable fractional integrals [24].

    With a huge application of RL fractional integration and Hermite–Hadamard inequality, many researchers in the field of fractional calculus extended their research to the Hermite–Hadamard inequality, including RL fractional integration rather than ordinary integration; for example see [25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32].

    On the one hand, it is well known that RL and GRL fractional integrals have the same importance in theory of integral inequalities, and the GRL fractional integrals are more convenient for calculation. Therefore it is necessary to study the Hermite-Hadamard integral inequalities by using the GRL fractional integrals while by using the RL fractional integrals. Fortunately, studying the Hermite-Hadamard integral inequalities via the GRL fractional integrations can unify the research of ordinary and fractional integrations. So it is necessary and meaningful to study Hermite-Hadamard integral inequalities via the GRL fractional integrations (see for details [21,33,34,35,36]).

    In this paper, we consider the integral inequality of HHM type that depends on the Hermite-Hadamard and Jensen–Mercer inequalities. For this reason, we recall the Jensen–Mercer inequality: Let 0<x1x2xn and α=(α1,α2,,αn) nonnegative weights such that ni=1αi=1. Then, the Jensen inequality [37,38] is as follows, for a convex function f on the interval [c,d], we have

    f(ni=1αixi)ni=1αif(xi), (1.6)

    for all xi[c,d] and αi[0,1], i=1,2,...,n.

    Theorem 1.1 ([11,38]). If f is convex function on [c,d], then

    f(c+dni=1αixi)f(c)+f(d)ni=1αif(xi), (1.7)

    for each xi[c,d] and αi[0,1], i=1,2,...,n with ni=1αi=1.

    For some results related to Jensen-Mercer inequality, see [39,40,41].

    Based on the above observations and discussion, the primary purpose of this article is to establish several inequalities of HHM type for convex functions by using the GRL fractional integrals.

    Throughout this attempt, we consider the following notations:

    Λ(t):=t0((yx)u)udu<+andΔ(t):=t0((yx2)u)udu<+.

    Theorem 2.1. For a convex function f:[c,d]R, we have the following inequalities for GRL:

    f(c+dx+y2)f(c)+f(d)12Λ(1)[GRLIx+f(y)+GRLIyf(x)]f(c)+f(d)f(x+y2), (2.1)

    and

    f(c+dx+y2)12Λ(1)[GRLI(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+GRLI(c+dx)f(c+dy)]f(c+dx)+f(c+dy)2f(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2. (2.2)

    Proof. From Jensen-Mercer inequality, we have for u,v[c,d]:

    f(c+du+v2)f(c)+f(d)f(u)+f(v)2. (2.3)

    Then, for u=tx+(1t)y and v=ty+(1t)x, it follows that

    f(c+dx+y2)f(c)+f(d)f(tx+(1t)y)+f(ty+(1t)x)2, (2.4)

    for each x,y[c,d] and t[0,1]. By multiplying both sides of (2.4) by ((yx)t)t and integrating the result with respect to t over [0,1], we can obtain

    f(c+dx+y2)Λ(1)[f(c)+f(d)]Λ(1)12[10((yx)t)t[f(tx+(1t)y)+f(ty+(1t)x)]dt]=[f(c)+f(d)]10Λ(1)12[10((yx)t)tf(tx+(1t)y)dt+10((yx)t)tf(ty+(1t)x)dt]=[f(c)+f(d)]Λ(1)12[yx(yw)ywf(w)dw+yx(wx)wxf(w)dw]=[f(c)+f(d)]Λ(1)12[GRLIx+f(w)+GRLIyf(w)].

    This gives the first inequality in (2.1). To prove the second inequality in (2.1), first we have by the convexity of f:

    f(u+v2)f(u)+f(v)2. (2.5)

    By changing the variables u=tx+(1t)y and v=ty+(1t)x in (2.5), we have

    f(x+y2)f(tx+(1t)y)+f(ty+(1t)x)2,t[0,1]. (2.6)

    Multiplying both sides of (2.6) by ((yx)t)t and integrating the result with respect to t over [0,1], we get

    f(x+y2)Λ(1)12[10((yx)t)tf(tx+(1t)y)dt+10((yx)t)tf(ty+(1t)x)dt]=12[yx(yw)ywf(w)+yx(wx)wxf(w)dw]=12[GRLIx+f(y)+GRLIyf(x)],

    which implies that

    f(x+y2)12Λ(1)[GRLIx+f(y)+GRLIyf(x)]. (2.7)

    By adding f(c)+f(d) on both sides of (1.4), we can obtain the second inequality in (2.1).

    Now we give the proof of inequalities (2.2). Since f is convex function, then for all u,v[c,d], we have

    f(c+du+v2)=f(c+du+c+dv2)12[f(c+du)+f(c+dv)]. (2.8)

    Then, for c+du=t(c+dx)+(1t)(c+dy) and c+dv=t(c+dy)+(1t)(c+dx), it follows that

    f(c+du+v2)12[f(t(c+dx)+(1t)(c+dy))+f(t(c+dy)+(1t)(c+dx))]. (2.9)

    for each x,y[c,d] and t[0,1]. Now, by multiplying both sides of (2.9) by ((yx)t)t and integrating the obtaining inequality with respect to t over [0,1], we obtain

    f(c+du+v2)Λ(1)12[10((yx)t)tf(t(c+dx)+(1t)(c+dy))dt+10((yx)t)tf(t(c+dy)+(1t)(c+dx))dt]=12[c+dxc+dy(w(c+dy))w(c+dy)f(w)dw+c+dxc+dy((c+dx)w)(c+dx)wf(w)dw]=12[GRLI(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+GRLI(c+dx)f(c+dy)],

    and this completes the proof of the first inequality in (2.2). To prove the second inequality in (2.2), first we use the convexity of f to get

    f(t(c+dx)+(1t)(c+dy))tf(c+dx)+(1t)f(c+dy), (2.10)
    f(t(c+dy)+(1t)(c+dx))(1t)f(c+dx)+tf(c+dy). (2.11)

    Adding (2.10) and (2.11), we get

    f(t(c+dx)+(1t)(c+dy))+f(t(c+dy)+(1t)(c+dx))f(c+dx)+f(c+dy)2[f(c)+f(d)][f(x)+f(y)]. (2.12)

    Multiplying both sides of (2.12) by ((yx)t)t and integrating the result with respect to t over [0,1], we obtain

    10((yx)t)tf(t(c+dx)+(1t)(c+dy))dt+10((yx)t)tf(t(c+dy)+(1t)(c+dx))dtΛ(1)f(c+dx)+Λ(1)f(c+dy)2Λ(1)[f(c)+f(d)]Λ(1)[f(x)+f(y)].

    By using the change of variables of integration and then by multiplying the result by 12Λ(1), we can obtain the second and third inequalities in (2.2). This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.

    Remark 2.1. Let the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 be satisfied. Then,

    If (t)=t, then Theorem 2.1 reduces to [42,Theorem 2.1].

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Theorem 2.1 reduces to [43,Theorem 2].

    If we set (t)=t, x=c and y=d in (2.2), then (2.2) becomes (1.1).

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(a) in Theorem 2.1 (Eq. (2.2)), we get

    f(c+dx+y2)Γk(ν+k)2(yx)νk[RLI(c+dy)+,kf(c+dx)+RLI(c+dx),kf(c+dy)]f(c+dx)+f(c+dy)2f(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2.

    If we set (t)=tνΓ(ν), x=c and y=d in (2.2), then we have

    f(c+d2)Γ(ν+1)2(ba)ν[RLIνc+f(d)+RLIνdf(c)]f(c)+f(d)2,

    which is derived in [25].

    If we set (t)=tνkkΓk(ν), x=c and y=d in (2.2), then we have

    f(c+d2)Γk(ν+k)2(dc)νk[RLIνc+,kf(d)+RLIνd,kf(c)]f(c)+f(d)2,

    which is derived in [44].

    If x=c and y=d, then inequalities (2.1) reduces to the following inequalities:

    f(c+d2)f(c)+f(d)12Λ(1)[GRLIc+f(y)+GRLIdf(x)]f(c)+f(d)f(c+d2).

    If x=c and y=d, then inequalities (2.2) reduces to [21,Theorem 5].

    Corollary 2.1. For a convex function f:[c,d]R, we have the following inequalities of HHM type for conformable fractional integrals:

    f(c+dx+y2)f(c)+f(d)ν2(yνxν)yxf(t)dνtf(c)+f(d)f(x+y2), (2.13)

    and

    f(c+dx+y2)ν(yνxν)c+dxc+dyf(t)dνtf(c+dx)+f(c+dy)2f(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2. (2.14)

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Theorem 2.1, we can directly obtain the proof.

    Remark 2.2. If we set x=c and y=d in (2.14), then we have the well-known conformable fractional HH integral inequality:

    f(c+d2)νdνcνdcf(t)dνtf(c)+f(d)2,

    which is derived by Adil Khan et al. in [45].

    Corollary 2.2. For a convex function f:[c,d]R, we have the following inequalities of HHM type for fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    f(c+dx+y2)f(c)+f(d)(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx))1][expIνx+f(y)+expIνyf(x)]f(c)+f(d)f(x+y2), (2.15)

    and

    f(c+dx+y2)(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx))1][expIν(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+expIν(c+dx)f(c+dy)]f(c+dx)+f(c+dy)2f(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2. (2.16)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Theorem 2.1, we can easily obtain the proof of Corollary 2.2.

    Remark 2.3. If we set x=c and y=d in (2.16), then we have the HH inequalities for fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    f(c+d2)(ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc))1][expIνc+f(d)+expIνdf(c)]f(c)+f(d)2,

    which is derived by Ahmad et al. in [46].

    Theorem 2.2. For a convex function f:[c,d]R, we have the following inequalities for GRL:

    f(c+dx+y2)12Δ(1)[GRLI(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)+GRLI(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)]f(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2. (2.17)

    Proof. From the convexity of f, we have

    f(c+du+v2)=f(c+du+c+dv2)12f(c+du)+f(c+dv). (2.18)

    By setting u=t2x+2t2y, v=2t2x+t2y, it follows that

    f(c+dx+y2)12[f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))+f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))], (2.19)

    for all x,y[c,d] and t[0,1]. Multiplying both sides of (2.19) by ((yx2)t)t and integrating its result with respect to t over [0,1], we get

    f(c+dx+y2)Δ(1)12[10((yx2)t)tf(c+d(t2x+2t2y))dt+10((yx2)t)tf(c+d(2t2x+t2y))dt]=12[c+dx+y2c+dy(w(c+dy))w(c+dy)f(w)dw+c+dxc+dx+y2((c+dx)w)(c+dx)wf(w)dw]=12[GRLI(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)+GRLI(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)].

    Thus, the first inequality in (2.17) is proved. To prove the second inequality in (2.17), by using the Jensen–Mercer inequality, we can deduce:

    f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))f(c)+f(d)[t2f(x)+2t2f(y)] (2.20)
    f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))f(c)+f(d)[2t2f(x)+t2f(y)]. (2.21)

    By adding (2.20) and (2.21), we obtain

    f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))+f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))2[f(c)+f(d)]f(x)+f(y). (2.22)

    Multiplying both sides of inequality (2.22) by ((yx2)t)t and integrating the result with respect to t over [0,1], we get

    10((yx2)t)tf(c+d(t2x+2t2y))dt+10((yx2)t)tf(c+d(2t2x+t2y))dt2Δ(1)[f(c)+f(d)]Δ(1)[f(x)+f(y)].

    By using change of variables of integration and multiplying the result by 12Δ(1), we can easily obtain second inequality in (2.17).

    Remark 2.4. Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 2.2 are satisfied.

    If (t)=t, then inequalities (2.17) becomes inequalities [42,Theorem 2.1].

    If we put (t)=t,x=c and y=d in Theorem 2.2, then inequalities (2.17) becomes inequalities (1.1).

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Theorem 2.2 reduces to [43,Theorem 3].

    If we put (t)=tνΓ(ν),x=c and y=d in Theorem 2.2, then Theorem 2.2 reduces to [26,Theorem 4].

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν) in Theorem 2.2, we get

    f(c+dx+y2)2νk1Γk(ν+k)(yx)νk[RLI(c+dx+y2),kf(c+dy)+RLI(c+dx+y2)+,kf(c+dx)]f(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2.

    If we put (t)=tνkkΓk(ν), x=c and y=d in Theorem 2.2, then Theorem 2.2 reduces to [44,Theorem 1.1].

    If x=c and y=d, then Theorem 2.2 becomes

    f(c+d2)12Δ(1)[GRLI(c+d2)f(c)+GRLI(c+d2)+f(d)]f(c)+f(d)2.

    Corollary 2.3. For a convex function f:[c,d]R, we have the following inequalities of HHM type for conformable fractional integrals:

    f(c+dx+y2)ν[yν(x+y2)ν]c+dxc+dyf(t)dνtf(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2. (2.23)

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Theorem 2.2, then we have proof of Corollary 2.3.

    Remark 2.5. If we set x=c and y=d in (2.23), then we get

    f(c+d2)ν[dν(c+d2)ν]dcf(t)dνtf(c)+f(d)2.

    Corollary 2.4. For a convex function f:[c,d]R, we have the following inequalities of HHM type for fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    f(c+dx+y2)(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx)2)1][expIν(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)+expIν(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)]f(c)+f(d)f(x)+f(y)2. (2.24)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Theorem 2.2, we get proof of Corollary 2.4.

    Remark 2.6. If we set x=c and y=d in (2.24), then we get

    f(c+d2)(ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc)2)1][expIν(c+d2)f(c)+expIν(c+d2)+f(d)]f(c)+f(d)2.

    In view of the inequalities (2.1) and (2.17), we can generate some related results in this section.

    Lemma 3.1. Let f:[c,d]R be a differentiable function on (c,d) such that fL[c,d]. Then, the following equality holds for GRL:

    f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)212Λ(1)[GRLI(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+GRLI(c+dx)f(c+dy)]=(yx)2Λ(1)10[Λ(t)Λ(1t)]f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))dt=(yx)2Λ(1)10Λ(t)[f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))f(c+d(ty+(1t)x))]dt. (3.1)

    Proof. By the help of the right hand side of (3.1), we have

    (yx)2Λ(1)10Λ(t)[f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))f(c+d(ty+(1t)x))]dt=(yx)2Λ(1)[10Λ(t)f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))dt10Λ(t)f(c+d(ty+(1t)x))dt]=(yx)2Λ(1)[S1S2]. (3.2)

    By applying integration by parts, one can obtain

    S2=10Λ(t)f(c+d(ty+(1t)x))dt=Λ(1)f(c+dy)yx+1yx10((yx)t)tf(c+d(ty+(1t)x))=Λ(1)f(c+dy)yx+1yx=Λ(1)f(c+dy)yx+1yx[GRLI(c+dy)+f(c+dx)].

    Similarly, one can obtain

    S1=10Λ(t)f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))dt=Λ(1)f(c+dx)yx1yx[GRLI(c+dx)f(c+dy)].

    By making use of S1 and S2 in (3.2), we get the identity (3.1).

    Remark 3.1. Let the assumptions of Lemma 3.1 be satisfied.

    If (t)=t, then Lemma 3.1 reduces to [43,Corollary 1].

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Lemma 3.1 reduces to [43,Lemma 1].

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν) in Lemma 3.1, we get

    f(c+dx)+f(c+dy)2Γk(ν+k)2(yx)νk[RLI(c+dy)+,kf(c+dx)+RLI(c+dx),kf(c+dy)]=yx210[tνk(1t)νk]f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))dt. (3.3)

    If x=c and y=d, then Lemma 3.1 reduces to [47,Lemma 2.1].

    Corollary 3.1. Let the assumptions of Lemma 3.1 be satisfied, then the following equality holds for the conformable fractional integrals:

    f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2νyνxνc+dxc+dyf(t)dνt=(yx)2Λ1(1)10[Λ1(t)Λ1(1t)]f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))dt=(yx)2Λ1(1)10Λ1(t)[f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))f(c+d(ty+(1t)x))]dt, (3.4)

    where

    Λ1(t)=yν(tx+(1t)y)νν.

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Lemma 3.1, then we have proof of Corollary 3.1.

    Remark 3.2. By setting x=c and y=d in (3.4), we get

    f(c)+f(d)2νdνcνdcf(t)dνt=(dc)2Λ2(1)10[Λ2(t)Λ2(1t)]f(td+(1t)c)dt=(dc)2Λ2(1)10Λ2(t)[f(td+(1t)c)f(tc+(1t)d)]dt,

    where

    Λ2(t)=yν(tc+(1t)d)νν.

    Corollary 3.2. Let the assumptions of Lemma 3.1 be satisfied, then the following equality holds for the fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx))1]×[expIν(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+expIν(c+dx)f(c+dy)]=(yx)2Λ3(1)10[Λ3(t)Λ3(1t)]f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))dt=(yx)2Λ3(1)10Λ3(t)[f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))f(c+d(ty+(1t)x))]dt, (3.5)

    where

    Λ3(t)=exp(1νν(yx)t)1ν1.

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Lemma 3.1, we get proof of Corollary 3.2.

    Remark 3.3. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.5), we get

    f(c)+f(d)2(ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc))1][expIνc+f(d)+expIνdf(c)]=(dc)2Λ4(1)10[Λ4(t)Λ4(1t)]f(td+(1t)c)dt=(dc)2Λ4(1)10Λ4(t)[f(td+(1t)c)f(tc+(1t)d)]dt,

    where

    Λ4(t)=exp(1νν(dc)t)1ν1.

    Lemma 3.2. Let f:[c,d]R be a differentiable function on (c,d) such that fL[c,d]. Then, the following equality holds for GRL:

    12Δ(1)[GRLI(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)+GRLI(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)]f(c+dx+y2)=(yx)4Δ(1)10Δ(t)[f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))]dt. (3.6)

    Proof. The proof of Lemma 3.2 is similar to Lemma 3.1, so we omit it.

    Remark 3.4. Let the assumptions of Lemma 3.2 be satisfied.

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Lemma 3.2 reduces to [43,Lemma 2].

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν) in Lemma 3.2, we get

    2νk1Γk(ν+k)(yx)νk[RLI(c+dx+y2),kf(c+dy)+RLI(c+dx+y2)+,kf(c+dx)]f(c+dx+y2)=yx410tνk[f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))]dt. (3.7)

    If x=c and y=d, then Lemma 3.2 becomes

    12Δ(1)[GRLI(c+d2)f(c)+GRLI(c+d2)+f(d)]f(c+d2)=dc4Δ(1)10Δ(t)[f(t2c+2t2d)f(2t2c+t2d)]dt.

    Corollary 3.3. Let the assumptions of Lemma 3.2 be satisfied, then the following equality holds for the conformable fractional integrals:

    ν[yν(x+y2)ν]c+dxc+dyf(t)dνt=(yx)4Δ1(1)10Δ1(t)[f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))]dt, (3.8)

    where

    Δ1(t)=yν(y(yx2)t)νν.

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Lemma 3.2, we have proof of Corollary 3.3.

    Remark 3.5. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.8), we get

    ν[dν(d+c2)ν]dcf(t)dνt=(dc)4Δ2(1)10Δ2(t)[f(2t2d+t2c)f(t2d+2t2c)]dt,

    where

    Δ2(t)=dν(d(dc2)t)νν.

    Corollary 3.4. Let the assumptions of Lemma 3.2 be satisfied, then the following equality holds for the fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    (ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx)2)1][expIν(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)+expIν(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)]f(c+dx+y2)=(yx)4Δ3(1)10Δ3(t)[f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))]dt, (3.9)

    where

    Δ3(t)=exp(1νν(yx)t2)1ν1.

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Lemma 3.2, we get proof of Corollary 3.4.

    Remark 3.6. If we put x=c and y=d in (3.9), we get

    (ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc)2)1][expIν(c+d2)+f(d)+expIν(c+d2)f(c)]f(c+d2)=(dc)4Δ4(1)10Δ4(t)[f(2t2d+t2c)f(t2d+2t2c)]dt,

    where

    Δ4(t)=exp(1νν(dc)t2)1ν1.

    Theorem 3.1. Let f:[c,d]R be a differentiable function on (c,d) such that |f| is convex on [c,d]. Then, the following inequality holds for GRL:

    |GRLF(c,d;x,y)|(yx)2Λ(1)[[|f(c)|+|f(d)|]10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|dt[|f(x)|+|f(y)|]10t|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|dt], (3.10)

    where

    |GRLF(c,d;x,y)|:=|f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)212Λ(1)[GRLI(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+GRLI(c+dx)f(c+dy)]|.

    Proof. In view of Lemma 3.1, we have

    |GRLF(c,d;x,y)|(yx)2Λ(1)10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)||f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))|dt.

    Then, by using the Jensen–Mercer inequality, we obtain

    |GRLF(c,d;x,y)|(yx)2Λ(1)10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|[|f(c)|+|f(d)|t|f(x)|(1t)|f(y)|]dt=(yx)2Λ(1)[10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|[|f(c)|+|f(d)|]dt|f(x)|10t|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|dt|f(y)|10(1t)|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|dt]=(yx)2Λ(1)[[|f(c)|+|f(d)|]10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|dt[|f(x)|+|f(y)|]10t|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|dt],

    which completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.

    Remark 3.7. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 be satisfied. Then,

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Theorem 3.1 reduces to [43,Theorem 4].

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν) in Theorem 3.1, we get

    |f(c+dx)+f(c+dy)2Γk(ν+k)2(yx)νk[RLI(c+dy)+,kf(c+dx)+RLI(c+dx),kf(c+dy)]|yxν+k(kk2νk)[|f(c)|+|f(d)||f(x)|+|f(y)|2]. (3.11)

    If x=c and y=d, then Theorem 3.1 reduces to [21,Theorem 6].

    Corollary 3.5. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 be satisfied. Then, we have

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)21yxc+dxc+dyf(x)dx|14[|f(c)|+|f(d)||f(x)|+|f(y)|2]. (3.12)

    Proof. If we set (t)=t in Theorem 3.1, then we have proof of Corollary 3.5.

    Remark 3.8. If we use x=c and y=d in Corollary 3.5, then Corollary 3.5 reduces to [47,Theorem 2.2].

    Corollary 3.6. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 be satisfied. Then, we have the following inequality holds for conformable fractional integrals:

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2νyνxνc+dxc+dyf(t)dνt|ν(yx)2(yνxν)×[[|f(c)|+|f(d)|]10|Λ1(t)Λ1(1t)|dt[|f(x)|+|f(y)|]10t|Λ1(t)Λ1(1t)|dt]. (3.13)

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Theorem 3.1, we have proof of Corollary 3.6.

    Remark 3.9. If we set x=c and y=d, then we have

    |f(c)+f(d)2νdνcνdcf(t)dνt|ν(dc)2(dνcν)[[|f(c)|+|f(d)|]10t|Λ2(t)Λ2(1t)|dt].

    Corollary 3.7. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 be satisfied. Then, we have the following inequality for fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx))1]×[expIν(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+expIν(c+dx)f(c+dy)]|(ν1)(yx)2[exp(1νν(yx))1][[|f(c)|+|f(d)|]10|Λ3(t)Λ3(1t)|dt[|f(x)|+|f(y)|]10t|Λ3(t)Λ3(1t)|dt]. (3.14)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Theorem 3.1, we get proof of Corollary 3.7.

    Remark 3.10. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.14), then we have

    |f(c)+f(d)2(ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc))1][expIνc+f(d)+expIνdf(c)]|(ν1)(dc)2[exp(1νν(dc))1][[|f(c)|+|f(d)|]10t|Λ4(t)Λ4(1t)|dt].

    Theorem 3.2. Let f:[c,d]R be a differentiable function on (c,d) such that |f|q is convex on [c,d] for some q>1. Then, the following inequality holds for GRL:

    |GRLF(c,d;x,y)|(yx)2Λ(1)(10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|pdt)1p×(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q2)1q, (3.15)

    where 1p+1q=1.

    Proof. In view of Lemma 3.1 and the well–known Hölder's inequality, one can obtain

    |GRLF(c,d;x,y)|(yx)2Λ(1)(10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|pdt)1p(10|f(c+d(tx+(1t)y))|qdt)1q.

    We can apply the Jensen–Mercer inequality due to the convexity of |f|q, to get

    |GRLF(c,d;x,y)|(yx)2Λ(1)(10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|pdt)1p×(10[|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q(t|f(x)|q+(1t)|f(y)|q)]dt)1q=(yx)2Λ(1)(10|Λ(t)Λ(1t)|pdt)1p(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q2)1q,

    which completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.

    Corollary 3.8. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 be satisfied, then we have

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)21yxc+dxc+dyf(x)dx|(yx)2(1+p)1p×(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q2)1q. (3.16)

    Remark 3.11. If we use x=c and y=d in Corollary 3.8, then Corollary 3.8 reduces to [47,Theorem 2.3].

    Proof. By using (t)=t in inequality (3.15), we can obtain inequality (3.16).

    Corollary 3.9. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 be satisfied, then we have the following inequality holds for RL:

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2Γ(ν+1)2(yx)ν[RLIν(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+RLIν(c+dx)f(c+dy)]|(yx)2(νp+1)1p(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q2)1q. (3.17)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνΓ(ν) in inequality (3.15), we obtain inequality (3.17).

    Remark 3.12. If we set x=c and y=d in Corollary 3.9, then we have

    |f(c)+f(d)2Γ(ν+1)2(dc)ν[RLIνc+f(d)+RLIνdf(c)]|(dc)2(νp+1)1p(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q2)1q.

    Corollary 3.10. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 be satisfied, then we have for k–RL:

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2Γk(ν+k)2(yx)νk[RLIν(c+dy)+,kf(c+dx)+RLIν(c+dx),kf(c+dy)]|(yx)2(νkp+1)1p(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q2)1q. (3.18)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνkkΓk(ν) in inequality (3.15), we can obtain inequality (3.18).

    Remark 3.13. If we set x=c and y=d in Corollary 3.10, then we obtain

    |f(c)+f(d)2Γk(ν+k)2(dc)νk[RLIνc+,kf(d)+RLIνd,kf(c)]|(dc)2(νkp+1)1p(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q2)1q.

    Corollary 3.11. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 be satisfied, then we have the following inequality for the conformable fractional integrals:

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2νyνxνc+dxc+dyf(t)dνt|ν(yx)2(yνxν)×(10|Λ1(t)Λ1(1t)|pdt)1p(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q2)1q. (3.19)

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Theorem 3.2, we get proof of Corollary 3.11.

    Remark 3.14. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.19), then we have

    |f(c)+f(d)2νdνcνdcf(t)dνt|ν(dc)2(dνcν)(10|Λ2(t)Λ2(1t)|pdt)1p×(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q2)1q.

    Corollary 3.12. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 be satisfied, then we have the following inequality for the fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    |f(c+dy)+f(c+dx)2(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx))1]×[expIν(c+dy)+f(c+dx)+expIν(c+dx)f(c+dy)]|(ν1)(yx)2[exp(1νν(yx))1](10|Λ3(t)Λ3(1t)|pdt)1p×(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q2)1q. (3.20)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Theorem 3.2, we have proof of Corollary 3.12.

    Remark 3.15. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.20), then we have

    |f(c)+f(d)2(ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc))1][expIνc+f(d)+expIνdf(c)]|(ν1)(dc)2[exp(1νν(dc))1](10|Λ4(t)Λ4(1t)|pdt)1p(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q2)1q.

    Theorem 3.3. Let f:[c,d]R be a differentiable function on (c,d) such that |f| is convex on [c,d]. Then, the following inequality holds for GRL:

    |GRLG(c,d;x,y)|(yx)2Δ(1)[|f(c)|+|f(d)||f(x)|+|f(y)|2]10|Δ(t)|dt, (3.21)

    where

    |GRLG(c,d;x,y)|:=|12Δ(1)[GRLI(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)+GRLI(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)]f(c+dx+y2)|.

    Proof. From Lemma 3.2, we have

    |GRLG(c,d;x,y)|(yx)4Δ(1)[10|Δ(t)||f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))|dt+10|Δ(t)||f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))|dt]

    Then, by using the Jensen–Mercer inequality, we get

    |GRLG(c,d;x,y)|(yx)4Δ(1)[10|Δ(t)|(|fc|+|f(d)|(2t2|f(x)|+t2|f(y)|))dt+10|Δ(t)|(|f(c)|+|f(d)|(t2|f(x)|+2t2|f(y)|))dt]=(yx)4Δ(1)[10|Δ(t)|[2|f(c)|+2|f(d)|(|f(x)|+|f(y)|)]dt]=(yx)2Δ(1)[|f(c)|+|f(d)||f(x)|+|f(y)|2]10|Δ(t)|dt,

    which completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.

    Remark 3.16. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 be satisfied. Then, the following special cases can be considered.

    If (t)=t, then Theorem 3.3 reduces to [43,Corollary 2].

    If (t)=t, x=c and y=d, then Theorem 3.3 reduces to [48,Theorem 2.2].

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Theorem 3.3 reduces to [43,Theorem 5].

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν),x=c and y=d, then Theorem 3.3 reduces to [26,Theorem 5] with q=1.

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν) in Theorem 3.3, we get

    |2νk1Γk(ν+k)(yx)νk[RLI(c+dx+y2),kf(c+dy)+RLI(c+dx+y2)+,kf(c+dx)]f(c+dx+y2)|k(yx)2(ν+k)[|f(c)|+|f(d)||f(x)|+|f(y)|2]. (3.22)

    If we set (t)=tνkkΓk(ν),x=c and y=d in Theorem 3.3, then we have

    |2νkkΓk(ν+k)(dc)νk[RLIν(c+d2)+,kf(d)+RLIν(c+d2),kf(c)]f(c+d2)|k(dc)2(ν+k)[|f(c)|+|f(d)|2].

    Corollary 3.13. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 be satisfied. Then, the following inequality holds for the conformable fractional integrals:

    |ν[yν(x+y2)ν]c+dxc+dyf(t)dνt|ν(yx)2[yν(x+y2)ν]×[|f(c)|+|f(d)||f(x)|+|f(y)|2]10|Δ1(t)|dt. (3.23)

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Theorem 3.3, we can get proof of Corollary 3.13.

    Remark 3.17. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.23), then we have

    |ν[dν(c+d2)ν]dcf(t)dνt|ν(dc)2[dν(c+d2)ν][|f(c)|+|f(d)|2]10|Δ2(t)|dt.

    Corollary 3.14. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 be satisfied. Then, the following inequality holds for the fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    |(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx)2)1][[expIν(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)+expIν(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)]]f(c+dx+y2)|(ν1)(yx)2[exp(1νν(yx)2)1][|f(c)|+|f(d)||f(x)|+|f(y)|2]10|Δ3(t)|dt. (3.24)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Theorem 3.3, we can obtain proof of Corollary 3.14.

    Remark 3.18. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.24), then we have

    |(ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc)2)1][[expIν(c+d2)+f(d)+expIν(c+d2)f(c)]]f(c+d2)|(ν1)(dc)2[exp(1νν(dc)2)1][|f(c)|+|f(d)|2]10|Δ4(t)|dt.

    Theorem 3.4. Let f:[c,d]R be a differentiable function on (c,d) such that |f|q is convex on [c,d] for some q>1. Then, the following inequality holds for GRL:

    |GRLG(c,d;x,y)|(yx)4Δ(1)(10|Δ(t)|pdt)1p[(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q3|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q4)1q+(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q(|f(x)|q+3|f(y)|q4))1q], (3.25)

    where 1p+1q=1.

    Proof. From Lemma 3.2 and well-known Hölder's inequality, we obtain

    |GRLG(c,d;x,y)|(yx)4Δ(1)(10|Δ(t)|pdt)1p[(10|f(c+d(2t2x+t2y))|qdt)1q+(10|f(c+d(t2x+2t2y))|qdt)1q].

    By applying the Jensen–Mercer inequality due to convexity of |f|q, we can obtain

    |GRLG(c,d;x,y)|(yx)4Δ(1)(10|Δ(t)|pdt)1p[(10[|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q(2t2|f(x)|q+t2|f(y)|q)]dt)1q+(10[|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q(t2|f(x)|q+2t2|f(y)|q)]dt)1q]=(yx)4Δ(1)(10|Δ(t)|pdt)1p[(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q3|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q4)1q+(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q(|f(x)|q+3|f(y)|q4))1q],

    and this completes proof of the Theorem 3.4.

    Remark 3.19. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.4 be satisfied. Then, the following special cases can be considered.

    If (t)=t, then Theorem 3.4 reduces to [43,Corollary 3].

    If (t)=t,x=c and y=d, then Theorem 3.4 reduces to [48,Theorem 2.3].

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν), then Theorem 3.4 reduces to [43,Theorem 6].

    If (t)=tνΓ(ν),x=c and y=d, then Theorem 3.4 reduces to [26,Theorem 6].

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν) in Theorem 3.4, we get

    |2νk1Γk(ν+k)(yx)νk[RLI(c+dx+y2),kf(c+dy)+RLI(c+dx+y2)+,kf(c+dx)]f(c+dx+y2)|yx4(kνp+k)1p[(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q3|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q4)1q+(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q|f(x)|q+3|f(y)|q4)1q]. (3.26)

    If (t)=tνkkΓk(ν),x=c and y=d, then we have

    |2νkkΓk(ν+k)(dc)νk[RLIν(c+d2)+,kf(d)+RLIν(c+d2),kf(c)]f(c+d2)|(dc)4(kνp+k)1p[(|f(c)|q+3|f(d)|q4)1q+(3|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q4)1q].

    Corollary 3.15. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.4 be satisfied. Then, the following inequality holds for the conformable fractional integrals:

    |ν[yν(x+y2)ν]c+dxc+dyf(t)dνt|ν(yx)4(yν(x+y2)ν)(10|Δ1(t)|pdt)1p×[(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q3|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q4)1q+(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q(|f(x)|q+3|f(y)|q4))1q]. (3.27)

    Proof. By setting (t)=t(yt)ν1 in Theorem 3.4, we can obtain proof of Corollary 3.15.

    Remark 3.20. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.27), then we have

    |ν[dν(c+d2)ν]dcf(t)dνt|ν(dc)4(dν(c+d2)ν)(10|Δ2(t)|pdt)1p[(|f(c)|q+3|f(d)|q4)1q+(3|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q4)1q].

    Corollary 3.16. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.4 be satisfied. Then, the following inequality holds for the fractional integrals with exponential kernel:

    |(ν1)2[exp(1νν(yx)2)1][[expIν(c+dx+y2)+f(c+dx)+expIν(c+dx+y2)f(c+dy)]]f(c+dx+y2)|(ν1)(yx)4[exp(1νν(yx)2)1](10|Δ3(t)|pdt)1p[(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q3|f(x)|q+|f(y)|q4)1q+(|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q(|f(x)|q+3|f(y)|q4))1q]. (3.28)

    Proof. By setting (t)=tνexp(1ννt) in Theorem 3.4, we can obtain proof of Corollary 3.16.

    Remark 3.21. If we set x=c and y=d in (3.28), then we have

    |(ν1)2[exp(1νν(dc)2)1][[expIν(c+d2)+f(d)+expIν(c+d2)f(c)]]f(c+d2)|(ν1)(dc)4[exp(1νν(dc)2)1](10|Δ4(t)|pdt)1p[(|f(c)|q+3|f(d)|q4)1q+(3|f(c)|q+|f(d)|q4)1q].

    In this work inequalities of Hermite-Hadamard-Mercer type via generalized fractional integrals are obtained. It is also proved that the results in this paper are generalization of the several existing comparable results in literature. As future direction, one may finds some new interesting inequalities through different types of convexities. Our results may stimulate further research in different areas of pure and applied sciences.

    We want to give thanks to the Dirección de investigación from Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador for technical support to our research project entitled: "Algunas desigualdades integrales para funciones convexas generalizadas y aplicaciones". This work is partially supported by National Natural Sciences Foundation of China (Grant No. 11971241).

    The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.



    [1] Abbott KW (2012) The transnational regime complex for climate change. Environ Planning C Gov Policy 30: 571-590. doi: 10.1068/c11127
    [2] ACMF (2017) ASEAN Green Bond Standards. Available from: http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/upload/GREENBONDACMF.pdf.
    [3] Andrade J, Puppim de Oliveira JA (2015) The Role of the Private Sector in Global Climate and Energy Governance. J Bus Ethics 130: 375-387. doi: 10.1007/s10551-014-2235-3
    [4] Andonova LB, Betsill MM, Bulkeley H (2009) Transnational Climate Governance. Global Environ Politics 9: 52-73. doi: 10.1162/glep.2009.9.2.52
    [5] Ayling J, Gunningham N (2017) Non-state Governance and Climate Policy: The Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement. Climate Policy 17: 131-149. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2015.1094729
    [6] Bachelet JM, Becchetti L, Stefano M (2019) The Green Bonds Premium Puzzle: The Role of Issuer Characteristics and Third-Party Verification. Sustainability 11: 1-22. doi: 10.3390/su11041098
    [7] Bernstein S, Cashore B (2007) Can non-state global governance be legitimate? An analytical framework. Regul Gov 1: 347-371. doi: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00021.x
    [8] Biermann F (2007) 'Earth system governance' as a crosscutting theme of global change research. Global Environ Change 17: 326-337. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.11.010
    [9] Biermann F, Pattberg P (2008) Global Environmental Governance: Taking Stock, Moving Forward. Annu Rev Env Resour 33: 277-294. doi: 10.1146/annurev.environ.33.050707.085733
    [10] Biermann F, Pattberg P, van Asselt H, et al. (2009) The fragmentation of global governance architectures: a framework for analysis. Global Environ Politics 9: 14-40. doi: 10.1162/glep.2009.9.4.14
    [11] Bulkeley H (2005) Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks. Political Geogr 24: 875-902. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.07.002
    [12] Büthe T (2010a) Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review. Bus Politics 12: 1-38.
    [13] Cashore B (2002) Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority. Governance 15: 508-529. doi: 10.1111/1468-0491.00199
    [14] CBI (2018a) Green Bonds Policy: Highlights from 2017. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/reports/cbi-policyroundup_2017_final_3.pdf.
    [15] CBI (2018b) ASEAN Green Finance State of the Market. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/resources/reports/asean-green-finance-state-market-2018.
    [16] CBI & CCDC (2018) China Green Bond Market 2017. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/China_Annual_Report_2017_English.pdf.
    [17] CBI (2019) Climate Bonds Taxonomy. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/CBI_Taxonomy_Tables-Oct19_Final.pdf.
    [18] CBI & CCDC (2019) China Green Bond Market 2018. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/resources/reports/china-green-bond-market-2018.
    [19] CBI & IISD (2015) Growing a green bonds market in China: Key recommendations for policymakers in the context of China's changing financial landscape. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/Growing%20a%20green%20bonds%20market%20in%20China.pdf.
    [20] Chan S, van Asselt H, Hale T, et al. (2015) Reinvigorating international climate policy: a comprehensive framework for effective nonstate action. Global Policy 6: 466-473. doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12294
    [21] Chen CJ, Srinidhi B, Su X (2014) Effect of auditing: Evidence from variability of stock returns and trading volume. China J Accounting Res 7: 223-245. doi: 10.1016/j.cjar.2014.11.002
    [22] CICERO (2016) Framework for CICERO's 'Second Opinions' on green bond investments. Available from: https://cicero.oslo.no/en/posts/single/CICERO-second-opinions.
    [23] Cutler CA, Haufler V, Porter T (1999) Private Authority and International Affairs, Albany: SUNY Press.
    [24] Cutler CA (2009) Private international regimes and interfirm cooperation. The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23-40.
    [25] Dai W, Kidney S (2016) Climate Bonds Initiative International Institute for Sustainable Development. Aavailable from: https://www.climatebonds.net/resources/Roadmap-for-China/April/2016/Paper1.
    [26] Dingwerth K (2008) Private transnational governance and the developing world: A comparative perspective. Int Stud Q 52: 607-634. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00517.x
    [27] EC (2018) Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097&from=EN.
    [28] EC (2019a) Report of the Technical Expert Group (TEG) subgroup on Green Bond Standard Proposal for an EU Green Bond Standard: Interim Report. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190306-sustainable-finance-teg-interim-report-green-bond-standard_en_0.pdf.
    [29] EC (2019b) Report on EU Green Bond Standard. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190618-sustainable-finance-teg-report-green-bond-standard_en.pdf.
    [30] Flammer C (2018) Corporate Green Bonds. Available from: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3125518.
    [31] Gehring T, Oberthür S (2011) Institutional Interaction: Ten Years of Scholarly Development. Managing Institutional Complexity, Cambridge: MIT Press, 25-58.
    [32] GFS (2015) Preparation Instructions on Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue. Available from: https://www.bourse.lu/documents/brochure-GB_endorsed_project_catalogue_2015.pdf.
    [33] Green JF (2014) Rethinking private authority: agents and entrepreneurs in global environmental governance, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    [34] Green JF, Auld G (2017) Unbundling the regime complex: the effects of private authority. Transnational Environ Law 6: 1-28. doi: 10.1017/S2047102517000012
    [35] Ehlers T, Packer F (2017) Green Bond Finance and Certification. BIS Quarterly Review September 2017. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3042378.
    [36] Hall RB, Biersteker TJ (2002) The emergence of private authority in the international system. The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-22. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491238. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511491238.002
    [37] Hickmann T (2017) The Reconfiguration of Authority in Global Climate Governance. Int Stud Rev 19: 430-451. doi: 10.1093/isr/vix037
    [38] Hicks BL (1999) Treaty Congestion in International Environmental Law: The Need for Greater International Coordination. Unive Richmond Law Rev 32: 1643-41674.
    [39] HKEX (2018) The green bond trend: Global, Mainland China and Hong Kong. Available from: https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Research-Reports/HKEx-Research-Papers/2018/CCEO_GreenBonds_201812_e.pdf?la=en.
    [40] IFC (2016) Mobilizing Private Climate Finance-Green Bonds and Beyond. Available from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30351/110881-BRI-EMCompass-Note-25-Green-Bonds-FINAL-12-5-PUBLIC.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
    [41] IFC (2018) Creating Green Bond Markets-Insights, Innovations, and Tools from Emerging Markets. Available from: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/55e5e479-b2a8-41a6-9931-93306369b529/SBN+Creating+Green+Bond+Markets+Report+2018.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
    [42] Info Barcelona (2017) First issue of green and social bonds for municipal funding. Available from: https://www.barcelona.cat/infobarcelona/en/first-issue-of-green-and-social-bonds-for-municipal-funding_595425.html.
    [43] Kent A (2014) Implementing the principle of policy integration: institutional interplay and the role of international organizations. Int Environ Agreements 14: 203-224. doi: 10.1007/s10784-013-9224-3
    [44] Keohane RO (1989) "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," In Keohane, R., O. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
    [45] Keohane RO, Victor DG (2010) The Regime Complex for Climate Change. Discussion Paper 2010-33, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, January 2010. Available from: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Keohane_Victor_Final_2.pdf.
    [46] Kollmuss A, Zink H, Polycap C (2008) Making sense of the voluntary carbon market: A comparison of carbon offset standards. Available from: https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-Report-WWF-ComparisonCarbonOffset-08.pdf.
    [47] Mathews JA, Kidney S (2014) Climate bonds: mobilizing private financing for carbon management. Carbon Manage 1: 9-13. doi: 10.4155/cmt.10.15
    [48] Moody's (2019) Corporate issuers drive strong global green bond volume in Q1 2019. Available from: https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/Public-research-resources/Corporate-issuers-drive-strong-global-green-bond-volume-in-Q1-2019-220719.pdf.
    [49] Oberthür S, Gehring T (2006) Institutional interaction in global environmental governance, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    [50] OECD (2015) Green Bonds Mobilising the debt capital markets for a low-carbon transition, Paris: OECD Publishing.
    [51] OECD (2017) Mobilising Bond Markets for a Low-Carbon Transition, Green Finance and Investment, Paris: OECD Publishing.
    [52] O'Neill K (2013) Vertical Linkages and Scale. Int Stud Rev 15: 571-573.
    [53] Orsini A, Morin JF, Young OR (2013) Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance? Global Gov 19: 27-39. doi: 10.1163/19426720-01901003
    [54] Park SK (2018) Investors as regulators: Green bonds and the governance challenges of the sustainable finance evolution. Stanford J Int Law 54: 1-47.
    [55] Paula C, Carola B (2016) Climate Finance after the Paris Agreement: new directions or more of the same? Available from: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-137944.
    [56] PBoC & UNEP (2015) Establishing China's Green Financial System. Available from: https://www.cbd.int/financial/privatesector/china-Green%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf.
    [57] Pham L (2016) Is it risky to go green? A volatility analysis of the green bond market. J Sust Financ Investment 6: 263-291.
    [58] Raustiala K, Victor DG (2004) The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. Int Organ 58: 277-309. doi: 10.1017/S0020818304582036
    [59] Reichelt H, Keenan C (2017) The Green Bond Market: 10 years later and looking ahead. Available from: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/554231525378003380/publicationpensionfundservicegreenbonds201712-rev.pdf.
    [60] Ren S, Li X, Yuan B, et al. (2018) The effects of three types of environmental regulation on eco-efficiency: A cross-region analysis in China. J Clean Prod 173: 245-255. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.113
    [61] Richardson BJ (2009) Climate Finance and Its Governance: Moving to a Low Carbon Economy Through Socially Responsible Financing? Int Comp Law Q 58: 597-626. doi: 10.1017/S0020589309001213
    [62] Richardson BJ (2010) Reforming Climate Finance Through Investment Codes of Conduct. Wisconsin Int Law J 27: 483-515.
    [63] Richardson BJ (2017) Divesting from Climate Change: The Road to Influence. Law Policy 39: 325-348. doi: 10.1111/lapo.12081
    [64] Rose P (2018) Certifying the "Climate" in Climate Bonds. Legal Studies Working Paper Series No. 458. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3243867.
    [65] S&P (2018) Frequently Asked Questions: Green Evaluations And Transaction Alignment With The Green Bond Principles 2018. Available from: https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/4756601/Green+Evaluations+And+Transaction+Alignment+With+The+Green+Bond+Principles+2018%2C+July+24+2018.pdf/8295714b-4eab-4c35-86e4-835ccf738902.
    [66] SEBI (2016) Disclosure Requirements for Issuance and Listing Green Bonds. Available from: https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/meetingfiles/1453349548574-a.pdf.
    [67] Shishlov I, Nicol M, Cochran I (2018) Environmental integrity of green bonds: stakes, status and next steps. Available from: https://www.i4ce.org/download/environmental-integrity-of-green-bonds/.
    [68] Stokke OS (2001) The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work. Available from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/100208/01-14-oss.pdf.
    [69] Strange S (1996) The Retreat of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    [70] SynTao Green Finance (2019) Top Ten Responsible Investment Trends in China in 2019. Available from: http://www.syntaogf.com/Menu_Page_EN.asp?ID=21&Page_ID=292.
    [71] Thistlethwaite T (2014) Private governance and sustainable finance. J Sustainable Financ Investment 4: 61-75. doi: 10.1080/20430795.2014.887348
    [72] UNEP (2019) Sustainable Finance Progress Report. Available from: http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Sustainable_Finance_Progress_Report_2018.pdf
    [73] Vatn A, Vedeld P (2012) Fit, interplay, and scale: a diagnosis. Ecology and Society 17:12. Available from: http:// dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05022-170412. doi: 10.5751/ES-05022-170412
    [74] Wang Y, Zang R (2017) China's green bond market. International Capital Market Features, 44: 16-17.
    [75] Weiss EB (1993) International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order. Georgetown Law J 675: 675-710.
    [76] Whiley A (2018) Chinese regulators introduce supervisory scheme for green bond verifiers - Further step in building market frameworks. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/2018/01/chinese-regulators-introduce-supervisoryscheme-green-bond-verifiers-further-step-building.
    [77] World Bank (2015) Innovative Finance for Development Solutions. Available from: http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/IF-for-Development-Solutions.pdf.
    [78] Young OR (1996) Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives. Global Gov 2: 1-24. doi: 10.1163/19426720-002-01-90000002
    [79] Young OR (1999) Governance in World Affairs, Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.
    [80] Young OR (2002) The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    [81] Young OR, King LA, Schroeder H (2008) Institutions and environmental change: principal findings, applications, and research frontiers, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    [82] Zelli F (2011) Regime Conflicts and Their Management in Global Environmental Governance, Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change, Cambridge MA:MIT Press. 197-226.
    [83] Zelli F, Moller I, van Asselt H (2017) Institutional complexity and private authority in global climate governance: the case of climate engineering, REDD+ and short-lived climate pollutants. Environ Politics 26: 669-693. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1319020
  • This article has been cited by:

    1. Madiha Salhi, Ridha Abdeljabar, Khaled Kharrati, Improvement of Tozeur’s fired bricks properties: an experimental approach, 2024, 2365-6433, 10.1007/s41207-024-00701-1
  • Reader Comments
  • © 2020 the Author(s), licensee AIMS Press. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0)
通讯作者: 陈斌, bchen63@163.com
  • 1. 

    沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院 沈阳 110142

  1. 本站搜索
  2. 百度学术搜索
  3. 万方数据库搜索
  4. CNKI搜索

Metrics

Article views(4758) PDF downloads(576) Cited by(16)

Other Articles By Authors

/

DownLoad:  Full-Size Img  PowerPoint
Return
Return

Catalog