Research article

Private governance schemes for green bond standard: influence on public authorities’ policy making

  • This paper considers the guiding impact of private governance schemes on public authorities' policy-making through a case study on green bond standard. Based on theoretical review of the institutional interplay and private governance scheme, two hypotheses are proposed in this paper: horizontal interplay between transnational private governance schemes can make a particular framework prevalent in given governance area; and prevalent private governance scheme can influence policy making of public authorities through vertical institutional interplay. The argument in this paper supports that internationally-accepted private governance schemes could be in a position to influence policy-making by public authorities. Horizontal interplay in the form of alignment between the Green Bond Principles (GBP) and other private green bond standards reinforces the credibility of the overlapping elements of the private standards. As for vertical level, this paper finds that public authorities at national and regional levels take advantage of the private governance scheme, especially GBP, when developing their own standards and policy frameworks. Private institution's expertise on green bond standards effectively function to help develop coherent green bond standards globally by helping with public authorities' policy development. GBP eventually serves as a model regulation for policy makers as public authorities regard them as market best practice. This further strengthens the credibility of GBP since private governance schemes could attract more users by making it clear that those voluntary private standards are linked with standards and policy frameworks created by public authorities.

    Citation: Toyo Kawabata. Private governance schemes for green bond standard: influence on public authorities’ policy making[J]. Green Finance, 2020, 2(1): 35-54. doi: 10.3934/GF.2020003

    Related Papers:

    [1] Yichao Shao, Hengguo Yu, Chenglei Jin, Jingzhe Fang, Min Zhao . Dynamics analysis of a predator-prey model with Allee effect and harvesting effort. Electronic Research Archive, 2024, 32(10): 5682-5716. doi: 10.3934/era.2024263
    [2] Xiaowen Zhang, Wufei Huang, Jiaxin Ma, Ruizhi Yang . Hopf bifurcation analysis in a delayed diffusive predator-prey system with nonlocal competition and schooling behavior. Electronic Research Archive, 2022, 30(7): 2510-2523. doi: 10.3934/era.2022128
    [3] Fengrong Zhang, Ruining Chen . Spatiotemporal patterns of a delayed diffusive prey-predator model with prey-taxis. Electronic Research Archive, 2024, 32(7): 4723-4740. doi: 10.3934/era.2024215
    [4] Yuan Tian, Yang Liu, Kaibiao Sun . Complex dynamics of a predator-prey fishery model: The impact of the Allee effect and bilateral intervention. Electronic Research Archive, 2024, 32(11): 6379-6404. doi: 10.3934/era.2024297
    [5] Mengting Sui, Yanfei Du . Bifurcations, stability switches and chaos in a diffusive predator-prey model with fear response delay. Electronic Research Archive, 2023, 31(9): 5124-5150. doi: 10.3934/era.2023262
    [6] Ruizhi Yang, Dan Jin . Dynamics in a predator-prey model with memory effect in predator and fear effect in prey. Electronic Research Archive, 2022, 30(4): 1322-1339. doi: 10.3934/era.2022069
    [7] Miao Peng, Rui Lin, Zhengdi Zhang, Lei Huang . The dynamics of a delayed predator-prey model with square root functional response and stage structure. Electronic Research Archive, 2024, 32(5): 3275-3298. doi: 10.3934/era.2024150
    [8] San-Xing Wu, Xin-You Meng . Hopf bifurcation analysis of a multiple delays stage-structure predator-prey model with refuge and cooperation. Electronic Research Archive, 2025, 33(2): 995-1036. doi: 10.3934/era.2025045
    [9] Jiani Jin, Haokun Qi, Bing Liu . Hopf bifurcation induced by fear: A Leslie-Gower reaction-diffusion predator-prey model. Electronic Research Archive, 2024, 32(12): 6503-6534. doi: 10.3934/era.2024304
    [10] Zhuo Ba, Xianyi Li . Period-doubling bifurcation and Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of a discrete predator-prey model with Allee effect and cannibalism. Electronic Research Archive, 2023, 31(3): 1405-1438. doi: 10.3934/era.2023072
  • This paper considers the guiding impact of private governance schemes on public authorities' policy-making through a case study on green bond standard. Based on theoretical review of the institutional interplay and private governance scheme, two hypotheses are proposed in this paper: horizontal interplay between transnational private governance schemes can make a particular framework prevalent in given governance area; and prevalent private governance scheme can influence policy making of public authorities through vertical institutional interplay. The argument in this paper supports that internationally-accepted private governance schemes could be in a position to influence policy-making by public authorities. Horizontal interplay in the form of alignment between the Green Bond Principles (GBP) and other private green bond standards reinforces the credibility of the overlapping elements of the private standards. As for vertical level, this paper finds that public authorities at national and regional levels take advantage of the private governance scheme, especially GBP, when developing their own standards and policy frameworks. Private institution's expertise on green bond standards effectively function to help develop coherent green bond standards globally by helping with public authorities' policy development. GBP eventually serves as a model regulation for policy makers as public authorities regard them as market best practice. This further strengthens the credibility of GBP since private governance schemes could attract more users by making it clear that those voluntary private standards are linked with standards and policy frameworks created by public authorities.


    The predator-prey model has always been an important research content of biomathematics, because a predator-prey relationship is widespread in nature [1,2,3,4]. Among the population growth laws, the Allee effect is an important biological phenomenon. W. Allee proposed the famous Allee effect to describe the phenomenon that low-density populations are prone to extinction [5]. Since then, the predator-prey model with the Allee effect has received extensive attention from scholars. Cooperative hunting is also widespread in nature, such as gray wolves, chimpanzees, banded mongooses, lions, etc. [6,7]. They all hunt collectively.

    In [8], R. Yadav et al. studied a predator-prey model with the Allee effect and hunting cooperation, that is

    {dudt=ru(1uK)(uu0)(λ+av)u2v1+A(λ+av)u2,dvdt=e(λ+av)u2v1+A(λ+av)u2mv. (1.1)

    u(t) and v(t) are densities of prey and predator, respectively. r, K and u0 represent intrinsic growth rate, carrying capacity and Allee effect parameter of prey, respectively. The term (λ+av)u21+A(λ+av)u2 is the functional response function including the hunting cooperation in predator, with capturing rate λ, handling time A and hunting cooperation parameter a. e and m are conversion efficiency and death rate of a predator. Make the changes u=K˜u, v=rλ˜v, t=1rK˜t, α=arλ2, β=N0K, σ=mK2eλ, h=AK2λ, η=Keλr, and drop "~", the model (1.1) is changed into

    {dudt=u(1u)(uβ)(1+αv)u2v1+h(1+αv)u2,dvdt=η((1+αv)u2v1+h(1+αv)u2σv). (1.2)

    The authors mainly studied the Turing pattern of the model (1.2) by applying the amplitude equation through weakly nonlinear analysis [8]. The model (1.2) shows the spiral and target patterns.

    In the inter-population interaction, time delay often occurs, such as gestation delay, maturation time, capturing time, and so on. Some scholars have discussed the dynamic properties of predator-prey models with time delay, mainly focusing on Hopf bifurcation [9,10,11]. They obtained that time delay may affect the stability of equilibria, and induce Hopf bifurcation [12,13,14]. In particular, in the reaction-diffusion predator-prey model with time delay, there may be spatially homogeneous and inhomogeneous periodic solutions, but the stable periodic solutions are often spatially homogeneous in the numerical simulation. This is not consistent with the actual situation, because in the real world, the spatial distribution of the population is difficult to reach a completely uniform state, that is, a stable spatial homogeneous periodic solution. This is one of our motivations, that is, will there be stably spatially inhomogeneous periodic solutions for the delayed reaction-diffusion predator-prey model.

    In addition, due to the limited resources and the competition within the population, many scholars have chosen the Logistic growth law to describe the growth law of the prey population. Logistic growth law is mainly applicable to the predator-prey model in the form of an ordinary differential equation, and it is assumed that the spatial distribution of resources is uniform. However, in fact, the spatial distribution of resources is often nonuniform, and the population competition among prey is often spatially nonlocal competition [15,16]. To describe this phenomenon, the authors [17,18] modified the uK as 1KΩG(x,y)u(y,t)dy with some kernel function G(x,y). In [19], D. Geng and H. Wang studied the normal form of double-Hopf bifurcation for a predator-prey model with nonlocal competition with nonlocal effect. In [21], Liu et al. studied a delayed diffusive predator-prey model with group defense effect and nonlocal competition and observed stably spatially inhomogeneous oscillations. In [20] the authors analyzed a diffusive predator-prey model with nonlocal competition from the perspective of bifurcation. In this paper, we want to study what new dynamic phenomena will appear when adding spatial nonlocal competition in the model (1.2), and what impact it will have on the distribution of prey and predator densities. This is another motivation for our work.

    Motivated by above, we studied the following model

    {u(x,t)t=d1Δu+u(1ΩG(x,y)u(y,t)dy)(uβ)(1+αv)u2v1+h(1+αv)u2,v(x,t)t=d2Δv+η((1+αv(tτ))u2(tτ)v(tτ)1+h(1+αv(tτ))u2(tτ)σv),xΩ,t>0u(x,t)ˉν=v(x,t)ˉν=0,xΩ,t>0u(x,θ)=u0(x,θ)0,v(x,θ)=v0(x,θ)0,xˉΩ,θ[τ,0]. (1.3)

    where d1 and d2 are diffusive coefficients. τ is the gestation delay in predator. ΩG(x,y)u(y,t)dy represents the nonlocal competition effect. The kernel function is

    G(x,y)=1|Ω|=1lπ,x,yΩ,

    which is widely used [20,21]. This is based on the assumption that the competition strength among prey individuals in the habitat is the same. The region Ω=(0,lπ) with l>0 just for the convenience of calculation.

    The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, the stability and existence of Hopf bifurcation for the models with and without nonlocal competition are studied. In Section 3, the parameters that determine the properties of Hopf bifurcation are given. In Section 4, some numerical simulations are shown. In Section 5, a short conclusion is given.

    The authors obtain that the system (1.3) has at least one coexisting equilibrium (u,v) when β2β2h+1<σ<1h+1 and β<1 in [8], where u is the root of the following equation falling in the interval (β,1),

    u2(α(1u)u(uβ)σ+1)σ1hσ=0,

    and v=u(1u)(uβ)σ. In the following, we just denote the coexisting equilibrium as (u,v).

    Linearize system (1.3) at E(u,v)

    ut(u(x,t)u(x,t))=D(Δu(t)Δv(t))+L1(u(x,t)v(x,t))+L2(u(x,tτ)v(x,tτ))+L3(ˆu(x,t)ˆv(x,t)), (2.1)

    where

    D=(d100d2),L1=(a1a20ησ),L2=(00b1b2),L3=(ˆa000),
    a1=u(v(αv+1)(hu2(αv+1)1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)2+1u),a2=u2(h(αuv+u)2+2αv+1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)2<0,b1=2ηuv(αv+1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)2>0,b2=ηu2(h(αuv+u)2+2αv+1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)2>0,ˆa=u(uβ)<0, (2.2)

    and ˆu=1lπlπ0u(y,t)dy. The characteristic equations are

    λ2+Enλ+Mn+(Gnb2λ)eλτ=0,nN0, (2.3)

    where

    E0=ησ(ˆa+a1),M0=ησ(ˆa+a1),G0=b2(ˆa+a1)a2b1,En=+(d1+d2)n2l2+ησa1,Mn=d1d2n4l4+(d1ησa1d2)n2l2a1ησ,Gn=b2d1n2l2+a1b2a2b1,nN. (2.4)

    N and N0 represent the positive integer set and the non-negative integer set.

    When τ=0, the characteristic equations are as follow

    λ2+(Enb2)λ+Mn+Gn=0,nN0. (2.5)

    Make the following hypothesis

    (H1)Enb2>0,Mn+Gn>0,fornN0.

    Under the hypothesis (H1), E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable when τ=0.

    Next, we will discuss the case of τ>0.

    Lemma 2.1. Assume (H1) holds, the following results hold.

    Equation (2.3) has a pair of purely imaginary roots ±iω+n at τj,+n for jN0 and nW1.

    Equation (2.3) has two pairs of purely imaginary roots ±iω±n at τj,±n for jN0 and nW2.

    Equation (2.3) has no purely imaginary root for nW3.

    Where ±iω±n, τj,±n, W1, W2 and W3 are defined in (2.8) and (2.9).

    Proof. Let iω (ω>0) be a solution of Eq (2.3), then

    ω2+iωEn+Mn+(Gnb2iω)(cosωτisinωτ)=0.

    Obviously. cosωτ=ω2(b2En+Gn)MnGnG2n+b22ω2, sinωτ=ω(EnGn+Mnb2b2ω2)G2n+b22ω2. It leads to

    ω4+ω2(E2n2Mnb22)+M2nG2n=0. (2.6)

    Let z=ω2, then (2.6) becomes

    z2+z(E2n2Mnb22)+M2nG2n=0, (2.7)

    and the roots of (2.7) are z±=12[Hn±H2n4JnKn], where Hn=E2n2Mnb22, Jn=Mn+Gn, and Kn=MnGn. If (H1) holds, Jn>0(nN0). By direct calculation, we have

    H0=(ˆa+a1)2+η2σ2b22,Hk=(a1d1k2l2)2+(d2k2l2+ησ)2b22,forkNK0=a2b1(ˆa+a1)(b2+ησ),Kk=d1d2k4l4+[d1(b2+ησ)a1d2]k2l2+a2b1a1b2+ησ,forkN.

    Define

    S1={n|Kn<0,nN0},S2={n|Kn>0,Hn<0,H2n4JnKn>0,nN0},S3={n|Kn>0,H2n4JnKn<0,nN0}, (2.8)

    and

    ω±n=z±n,τj,±n={1ω±narccos(V(n,±)cos)+2jπ,V(n,±)sin0,1ω±n[2πarccos(V(n,±)cos)]+2jπ,V(n,±)sin<0.V(n,±)cos=(ω±n)2(b2En+Gn)MnGnG2n+b22(ω±n)2,V(n,±)sin=ω±n(EnGn+Mnb2b2(ω±n)2)G2n+b22(ω±n)2. (2.9)

    It is easy to verify the conclusion in the Lemma 2.1.

    Next, we verify the transversal condition for the existence of Hopf bifurcation.

    Lemma 2.2. Assume (H1) holds. Then Re(dλdτ)|τ=τj,+n>0, Re(dλdτ)|τ=τj,n<0 for nS1S2 and jN0.

    Proof. By (2.3), we have

    (dλdτ)1=2λ+Enb2eλτ(Gnb2λ)λeλττλ.

    Then

    [Re(dλdτ)1]τ=τj,±n=Re[2λ+Enb2eλτ(Gnb2λ)λeλττλ]τ=τj,±n=[1G2n+b22ω2(2ω2+E2n2Mnb22)]τ=τj,±n=±[1G2n+b22ω2(E2n2Mnb22)24(M2nG2n)]τ=τj,±n.

    Therefore, Re(dλdτ)|τ=τj,+n>0, Re(dλdτ)|τ=τj,n<0.

    Denote τ=min{τ0n|nS1S2}. We have the following theorem.

    Theorem 2.1. For system (1.3), assume (H1) holds.

    E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable for τ>0 when S1S2=.

    E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable for τ[0,τ) when S1S2.

    E(u,v) is unstable for τ(τ,τ+ε) for some ε>0 when S1S2.

    Hopf bifurcation occurs at (u,v) when τ=τj,+n (τ=τj,n), jN0, nS1S2. In addition, the spatially homogeneous (inhomogeneous) periodic solutions occur when τ=τj,±0 (τ=τj,±n, n>0).

    The model (1.3) without nonlocal competition is as follow

    {u(x,t)t=d1Δu+u(1u)(uβ)(1+αv)u2v1+h(1+αv)u2,v(x,t)t=d2Δv+η((1+αv(tτ))u2(tτ)v(tτ)1+h(1+αv(tτ))u2(tτ)σv). (2.10)

    Linearize system (2.10) at E(u,v)

    ut(u(x,t)u(x,t))=D(Δu(t)Δv(t))+(L1+L3)(u(x,t)v(x,t))+L2(u(x,tτ)v(x,tτ)). (2.11)

    The characteristic equations are

    λ2+˜Anλ+˜Mn+(˜Gnb2λ)eλτ=0,nN0, (2.12)

    where

    ˜En=+(d1+d2)n2l2+ησ(a1+ˆa),˜Mn=d1d2n4l4+(d1ησ(a1+ˆa)d2)n2l2(a1+ˆa)ησ,˜Gn=b2d1n2l2+(a1+ˆa)b2a2b1,nN0. (2.13)

    When τ=0, the characteristic equations are as follow

    λ2+(˜Enb2)λ+˜Mn+˜Gn=0,nN0. (2.14)

    Make the following hypothesis

    (H2)˜Enb2>0,˜Mn+˜Gn>0,fornN0.

    Under the hypothesis (H2), E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable when τ=0.

    Remark 2.1. It is easy to obtain that ˜A0b2=E0b2, ˜B0+˜C0=M0+G0, ˜Enb2(Enb2)=ˆa>0 and ˜Mn+˜Gn(Mn+Gn)=ˆa(d2n2l2+ησb2) for nN. Hence, under condition d2l2+ησb20, hypothesis (H1) can deduce (H2).

    Through a similar process, we have the following results. Define

    ˜Hk=(a1+ˆad1k2l2)2+(d2k2l2+ησ)2b22,˜Jk=d1d2k4l4+[d1(b2ησ)+(a1+ˆa)d2]k2l2a2b1+(ˆa+a1)(b2ησ),˜Kk=d1d2k4l4+[d1(b2+ησ)(a1+ˆa)d2]k2l2+a2b1(ˆa+a1)(b2+ησ),forkN0. (2.15)
    ˜S1={n|˜Kn<0,nN0},˜S2={n|˜Kn>0,˜Hn<0,˜H2n4˜Jn˜Kn>0,nN0},˜S3={n|˜Kn>0,˜H2n4˜Jn˜Kn<0,nN0}, (2.16)
    ω±n=12[˜Hn±˜H2n4˜Jn˜Kn],τj,±n={1ω±narccos(V(n,±)cos)+2jπ,V(n,±)sin0,1ω±n[2πarccos(V(n,±)cos)]+2jπ,V(n,±)sin<0.V(n,±)cos=(ω±n)2(b2˜En+˜Gn)˜Mn˜Gn˜G2n+b22(ω±n)2,V(n,±)sin=ω±n(˜En˜Gn+˜Mnb2b2(ω±n)2)˜G2n+b22(ω±n)2. (2.17)

    Corollary 2.1. Assume (H2) holds, the following results hold.

    Equation (2.12) has a pair of purely imaginary roots ±iω+n at τj,+n for jN0 and nS1.

    Equation (2.12) has two pairs of purely imaginary roots ±iω±n at τj,±n for jN0 and nS2.

    Equation (2.12) has no purely imaginary root for nS3.

    The transversal condition is also valid.

    Corollary 2.2. Assume (H2) holds. Then Re(dλdτ)|τ=τj,+n>0, Re(dλdτ)|τ=τj,n<0 for n˜S1˜S2 and jN0.

    Denote ˜τ=min{τ0n|n˜S1˜S2}. We have the following theorem.

    Corollary 2.3. For the model (2.10), assume (H2) holds.

    E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable for τ>0 when ˜S1˜S2=.

    E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable for τ[0,˜τ) when ˜S1˜S2.

    E(u,v) is unstable for τ(˜τ,˜τ+ε) for some ε>0 when ˜S1˜S2.

    Hopf bifurcation occurs at (u,v) when τ=τj,+n (τ=τj,n), jN0, n˜S1˜S2. In addition, the spatially homogeneous (inhomogeneous) periodic solutions occur when τ=τj,±0 (τ=τj,±n, n>0).

    By the work [22,23], we study the property of Hopf bifurcation. For fixed jN0 and nS1S2, we denote ˜τ=τj,±n. Let ˉu(x,t)=u(x,τt)u and ˉv(x,t)=v(x,τt)v. Drop the bar, (1.3) can be written as

    {ut=τ[d1Δu+(u+u)(11lπlπ0(u(y,t)+u)dy)(u+uβ)(1+α(v+v))(u+u)2(v+v)1+h(1+α(v+v))(u+u)2],vt=τ[d2Δvη((1+α(v(t1)+v))(u(t1)+u)2v(tτ)1+h(1+α(v(t1)+v))(u(t1)+u)2σv)]. (3.1)

    We rewrite system (3.1) as following system

    {ut=τ[d1Δu+a1u+a2vˆaˆu+α1u2(2uβ)uˆu+α2uv+α3v2+α4u3+α5u2v+α6uv2+α7v3]+h.o.t.,vt=τ[d2Δvησv+b1u(t1)+b2v(t1)+β1u2(t1)+β2u(t1)v(t1)+β3u2(t1)+β4u3(t1)+β5u2(t1)v(t1)]+β6u(t1)v2(t1)+β7v3(t1)]+h.o.t., (3.2)

    where α1=2v(αv+1)(3hu2(αv+1)1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)32u+2, α2=2(u3(αhv+h)+2αuv+u)(hu2(αv+1)+1)3, α3=2u2(α+αhu2)(hu2(αv+1)+1)3, α4=24huv(αv+1)2(hu2(αv+1)1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)4, α5=6u4(αhv+h)2+4hu2(5α2v2+6αv+1)4αv2(hu2(αv+1)+1)4, α6=4αu(h2u4(αv+1)+2αhu2v1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)4, α7=6α2hu4(hu2+1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)4, β1=2ηv(αv+1)(3hu2(αv+1)1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)3, β2=2η(u3(αhv+h)+2αuv+u)(hu2(αv+1)+1)3;β3=2αηu2(hu2+1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)3, β4=24ηhuv(αv+1)2(hu2(αv+1)1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)4, β5=2η(3u4(αhv+h)2+2hu2(5α2v2+6αv+1)2αv1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)4, β6=4αηu(h2u4(αv+1)+2αhu2v1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)4, β7=6α2ηhu4(hu2+1)(hu2(αv+1)+1)4.

    Define the real-valued Sobolev space X:={(u,v)T:u,vH2(0,lπ),(ux,vx)|x=0,lπ=0}, the complexification of X is XC:=XiX={x1+ix2|x1,x2X}. The inner product <˜u,˜v>:=lπ0¯u1v1dx+lπ0¯u2v2dx is for ˜u=(u1,u2)T, ˜v=(v1,v2)T, ˜u,˜vXC. The phase space C:=C([1,0],X) is with the sup norm, then we can write ϕtC, ϕt(θ)=ϕ(t+θ) or 1θ0. Denote β(1)n(x)=(γn(x),0)T, β(2)n(x)=(0,γn(x))T, and βn={β(1)n(x),β(2)n(x)}, where {β(i)n(x)} is an orthonormal basis of X. We define the subspace of C as Bn:=span{<ϕ(),β(j)n>β(j)n|ϕC,j=1,2}, nN0. There exists a 2×2 matrix function ηn(σ,˜τ) 1σ0, such that ˜τDn2l2ϕ(0)+˜τL(ϕ)=01dηn(σ,τ)ϕ(σ) for ϕC. The bilinear form on C×C is defined by

    (ψ,ϕ)=ψ(0)ϕ(0)01σξ=0ψ(ξσ)dηn(σ,˜τ)ϕ(ξ)dξ, (3.3)

    for ϕC, ψC. Define τ=˜τ+μ, then the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at (0,0) when μ=0, with a pair of purely imaginary roots ±iωn0. Let A denote the infinitesimal generators of semigroup, and A be the formal adjoint of A under the bilinear form (3.3). Define the following function

    δ(n0)={1n0=0,0n0N. (3.4)

    Choose ηn0(0,˜τ)=˜τ[(n20/l2)D+L1+L3δ(nn0)], ηn0(1,˜τ)=˜τL2, ηn0(σ,˜τ)=0 for 1<σ<0. Let p(θ)=p(0)eiωn0˜τθ(θ[1,0]), q(ϑ)=q(0)eiωn0˜τϑ(ϑ[0,1]) be the eigenfunctions of A(˜τ) and A corresponds to iωn0˜τ respectively. We can choose p(0)=(1,p1)T, q(0)=M(1,q2), where p1=1a2(iωn0+d1n20/l2a1ˆaδ(n0)), q2=eiτωn0b1(ˆaδ(n0)a1+d1n2l2+iωn0), and M=(1+p1q2+˜τq2(b1+b2p1)eiωn0˜τ)1. Then (3.1) can be rewritten in an abstract form

    dU(t)dt=(˜τ+μ)DΔU(t)+(˜τ+μ)[L1(Ut)+L2U(t1)+L3ˆU(t)]+F(Ut,ˆUt,μ), (3.5)

    where

    F(ϕ,μ)=(˜τ+μ)(α1ϕ1(0)2(2uβ)ϕ1(0)ˆϕ1(0)+α2ϕ1(0)ϕ2(0)+α3ϕ2(0)2+α4ϕ31(0)+α5ϕ21(0)ϕ2(0)+α6ϕ1(0)ϕ22(0)+α7ϕ32(0)β1ϕ21(1)+β2ϕ1(1)ϕ2(1)+β3ϕ22(1)+β4ϕ31(1)+β4ϕ21(1)ϕ2(1)+β6ϕ1(1)ϕ22(1)+β7ϕ32(1)) (3.6)

    respectively, for ϕ=(ϕ1,ϕ2)TC and ˆϕ1=1lπlπ0ϕdx. Then the space C can be decomposed as C=PQ, where P={zpγn0(x)+ˉzˉpγn0(x)|zC}, Q={ϕC|(qγn0(x),ϕ)=0and(ˉqγn0(x),ϕ)=0}. Then, system (3.6) can be rewritten as Ut=z(t)p()γn0(x)+ˉz(t)ˉp()γn0(x)+ω(t,) and ^Ut=1lπlπ0Utdx, where

    z(t)=(qγn0(x),Ut),ω(t,θ)=Ut(θ)2Re{z(t)p(θ)γn0(x)}. (3.7)

    then, we have ˙z(t)=iω)n0˜τz(t)+ˉq(0)<F(0,Ut),βn0>. There exists a center manifold C0 and ω can be written as follow near (0,0).

    ω(t,θ)=ω(z(t),ˉz(t),θ)=ω20(θ)z22+ω11(θ)zˉz+ω02(θ)ˉz22+. (3.8)

    Restrict the system to the center manifold is ˙z(t)=iωn0˜τz(t)+g(z,ˉz). Denote g(z,ˉz)=g20z22+g11zˉz+g02ˉz22+g21z2ˉz2+. By direct computation, we have

    g20=2˜τM(ς1+q2ς2)I3,g11=˜τM(ϱ1+q2ϱ2)I3,g02=ˉg20,
    g21=2˜τM[(κ11+q2κ21)I2+(κ12+q2κ22)I4],

    where I2=lπ0γ2n0(x)dx, I3=lπ0γ3n0(x)dx, I4=lπ0γ4n0(x)dx, ς1=(α1+ξ(α2+α3ξ))+δn0(β2u), ς2=e2iτωn(β1+ξ(β2+β3ξ)), ϱ1=14((2α1+α2(¯ξ+ξ)+2α3¯ξξ)+2δn0(β2u)), ϱ2=14(2β1+β2(¯ξ+ξ)+2β3¯ξξ), κ11=2W(1)11(0)(2α1+α2ξ+βδn0+β2(δn0+1)u)+W(1)20(0)(2α1+α2¯ξ+βδn0+β2(δn0+1)u)+2W(2)11(0)(α2+2α3ξ)+W(2)20(0)(α2+2α3¯ξ), κ12=12(3α4+α5(¯ξ+2ξ)+ξ(2α6¯ξ+α6ξ+3α7¯ξξ)), κ21=2W(1)11(1)(2β1+β2ξ)eiτωn+2W(2)11(1)(β2+2β3ξ)eiτωn+W(1)20(1)(2β1+β2¯ξ)eiτωn+W(2)20(1)(β2+2β3¯ξ)eiτωn, κ22=12eiτωn(3β4+β5(¯ξ+2ξ)+ξ(2β6¯ξ+β6ξ+3β7¯ξξ)).

    Now, we compute W20(θ) and W11(θ) for θ[1,0] to give g21. By (3.7), we have

    ˙ω=˙Ut˙zpγn0(x)˙ˉzˉpγn0(x)=Aω+H(z,ˉz,θ), (3.9)

    where

    H(z,¯z,θ)=H20(θ)z22+H11(θ)z¯z+H02(θ)¯z22+. (3.10)

    Compare the coeffcients of (3.8) with (3.9), we have

    (A2iωn0˜τI)ω20=H20(θ),Aω11(θ)=H11(θ). (3.11)

    Then, we have

    ω20(θ)=g20iωn0˜τp(0)eiωn0˜τθˉg023iωn0˜τˉp(0)eiωn0˜τθ+E1e2iωn0˜τθ,ω11(θ)=g11iωn0˜τp(0)eiωn0˜τθˉg11iωn0˜τˉp(0)eiωn0˜τθ+E2, (3.12)

    where E1=n=0E(n)1, E2=n=0E(n)2,

    E(n)1=(2iωn0˜τI01e2iωn0˜τθdηn0(θ,ˉτ))1<˜F20,βn>,E(n)2=(01dηn0(θ,ˉτ))1<˜F11,βn>,nN0,
    <˜F20,βn>={1lπˆF20,n00,n=0,12lπˆF20,n00,n=2n0,1lπˆF20,n0=0,n=0,0,other,<˜F11,βn>={1lπˆF11,n00,n=0,12lπˆF11,n00,n=2n0,1lπˆF11,n0=0,n=0,0,other,

    and ˆF20=2(ς1,ς2)T, ˆF11=2(ϱ1,ϱ2)T.

    Thus, we can obtain

    c1(0)=i2ωn˜τ(g20g112|g11|2|g02|23)+12g21,μ2=Re(c1(0))Re(λ(˜τ)),T2=1ωn0˜τ[Im(c1(0))+μ2Im(λ(τjn))],β2=2Re(c1(0)). (3.13)

    By the work [22], we can obtain the following theorem.

    Theorem 3.1. For any critical value τjn (nS,jN0), we have the following results.

    When μ2>0 (resp. <0), the Hopf bifurcation is forward (resp. backward).

    When β2<0 (resp. >0), the bifurcating periodic solutions on the center manifold are orbitally asymptotically stable (resp. unstable).

    When T2>0 (resp. T2<0), the period increases (resp. decreases).

    To analyze the effect of the Allee effect, hunting cooperation, nonlocal competition and time delay on the model (1.3), we carry out numerical simulations in this section which is done with Matlab. The numerical simulation of the systems is implemented by finite-difference methods. In the later numerical simulation, we select the initial value as (u0(x)=u+0.001cosx,v0(x)=v0.001cosx.), and have similar conclusions when we randomly select other initial values in the convergence domain. Fix the following parameters.

    h=0.5,σ=0.3,η=0.2,d1=0.1,d2=0.1,l=1.

    The bifurcation diagrams of models (1.3) and (2.10) are given in Figures 1 and 2. It can be seen that the coexistence equilibrium will change from stable to unstable with the appearance of periodic solutions. In the model (1.3), the inhomogeneous Hopf bifurcation curve τ0,+1 exists, which implies that the stably spatially inhomogeneous periodic solutions may exist. But in the model (2.10), only the homogeneous Hopf bifurcation curve τ0,+0 exists, which implies that only the spatially homogeneous periodic solutions may exist. This implies that the model (1.3) with nonlocal competition is more realistic than the model (2.10), since the existence of periodic solutions in the model (1.3) is spatially inhomogeneous. Because the prey and predator will continue to spread in space and move from the place with high survival pressure to the place with low survival pressure, thus forming a non-uniform periodic oscillation. Therefore, we should consider the nonlocal competition within the population when establishing the delayed reaction-diffusion predator-prey model. We can obtain that increasing the Allee effect parameter β and hunting cooperation parameter α is not conducive to the stability of coexistence equilibrium points.

    Figure 1.  Bifurcation diagram for α and τ with β=0.1. (a): Model (1.3). (b): Model (2.10).
    Figure 2.  Bifurcation diagram for β and τ with α=1. (a): Model (1.3). (b): Model (2.10).

    If we choose β=0.1 and α=1, then (u,v)=(0.5125,0.3436) is the unique coexisting equilibrium and the hypothesis (H1) holds. By direct computation, we have τ=τ013.4439<τ007.0688. By Theorem 2.1, we know that E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable when τ[0,τ) (Figure 3). It can be seen that the coexisting equilibrium (u,v) is stable for models (1.3) and (2.10). For model (1.3), the Hopf bifurcation occurs when τ=τ. By Theorem 2.3, we have

    μ2637.4179>0,β29.1705<0,T24.0035<0.
    Figure 3.  The numerical simulations for the models (1.3) (a–b) and (2.10) (c–d) with α=1 and τ=3. The coexistence equilibrium E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable.

    Hence, the stably spatially inhomogeneous bifurcating periodic solutions exist for τ>τ (Figure 4). This means that increasing the time delay τ can affect the stability of the coexisting equilibrium (u,v). In addition, the coexisting equilibrium (u,v) changes from stable to unstable and the stably spatially inhomogeneous bifurcating periodic solutions appear for the model (1.3). But with the same parameters, the coexisting equilibrium (u,v) is still stable for the model (2.10). Comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5, we can see that the nonlocal competition in prey can affect the dynamic properties of the predator-prey model and induce new dynamic phenomena (stably spatially inhomogeneous bifurcating periodic solutions).

    Figure 4.  The numerical simulations for the model (1.3) with α=1 and τ=5. Prey: (a), (c), (e). Predator: (b), (d), (f). The coexistence equilibrium E(u,v) is unstable and there exists a stably spatially inhomogeneous bifurcating periodic solution with mode-1.
    Figure 5.  The numerical simulations for the model (2.10) with α=1 and τ=5. Prey: (a), (c). Predator: (b), (d). The coexistence equilibrium E(u,v) is locally asymptotically stable.

    Continue to increase the time delay τ until it is larger than the critical value τ0,+0, we can observe stable periodic solutions for both models (1.3) and (2.10). However, the stably spatially inhomogeneous bifurcating periodic solutions appear in model (1.3), and stably spatially homogeneous bifurcating periodic solutions appear in model (2.10). This also shows that nonlocal competition can affect the dynamic properties of the predator-prey model.

    In this paper, considering the self-diffusion of prey and predator, nonlocal competition in prey, and gestation delay in predators, we propose a delayed diffusive predator-prey model with the Allee effect and nonlocal competition in prey and hunting cooperation in predators. We study the local stability of coexisting equilibrium and existence of Hopf bifurcation by analyzing the distribution of eigenvalues. We also study the property of Hopf bifurcation: bifurcation direction, stability of the periodic solution, period of the periodic solution by center manifold theorem and normal form method.

    Figure 6.  The numerical simulations for the model (1.3) with α=1 and τ=8. Prey: (a), (c), (e). Predator: (b), (d), (f). The coexistence equilibrium E(u,v) is unstable and there exists a stably spatially inhomogeneous bifurcating periodic solution with mode-1.
    Figure 7.  The numerical simulations for the model (2.10) with α=1 and τ=8. The coexistence equilibrium E(u,v) is unstable and there exists a stably spatially homogeneous bifurcating periodic solution.

    Our analysis results are verified by numerical simulation, and the influence of the Allee effect, hunting cooperation, nonlocal competition and time delay on the model is analyzed. By numerical simulation, we obtain that increasing the Allee effect parameter β and hunting cooperation parameter α will affect the stability of the coexistence equilibrium point, and there will be periodic solutions. The time delay can also affect the stability of coexisting equilibrium. When the time delay is less than the critical value, the coexistence equilibrium point is stable, and the densities of prey and predator will tend to the coexistence equilibrium. However, when the time delay is larger than the critical value, the coexistence equilibrium is unstable and the stable periodic solution appears. At this time, the density of prey and predator will produce periodic oscillation. The nonlocal competition in prey can affect the dynamic properties of the predator-prey model and induce new dynamic phenomena (stably spatially inhomogeneous bifurcating periodic solutions). Sometimes, the stability interval of a predator-prey model with nonlocal competition is smaller than that of a predator-prey model without nonlocal competition. This is also the reason why the predator-prey model with the nonlocal competition will have stably spatial inhomogeneous periodic solutions.

    The main findings show that the Allee effect parameter β, hunting cooperation parameter α, and time delay τ can significantly affect the stability of the coexistence equilibrium point, and can be used control the development of the population.

    This research is supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No.2572022DJ05), Postdoctoral program of Heilongjiang Province (No.LBHQ21060) and College Students Innovations Special Project funded by Northeast Forestry University. Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

    The authors declare there is no conflicts of interest.



    [1] Abbott KW (2012) The transnational regime complex for climate change. Environ Planning C Gov Policy 30: 571-590. doi: 10.1068/c11127
    [2] ACMF (2017) ASEAN Green Bond Standards. Available from: http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/upload/GREENBONDACMF.pdf.
    [3] Andrade J, Puppim de Oliveira JA (2015) The Role of the Private Sector in Global Climate and Energy Governance. J Bus Ethics 130: 375-387. doi: 10.1007/s10551-014-2235-3
    [4] Andonova LB, Betsill MM, Bulkeley H (2009) Transnational Climate Governance. Global Environ Politics 9: 52-73. doi: 10.1162/glep.2009.9.2.52
    [5] Ayling J, Gunningham N (2017) Non-state Governance and Climate Policy: The Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement. Climate Policy 17: 131-149. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2015.1094729
    [6] Bachelet JM, Becchetti L, Stefano M (2019) The Green Bonds Premium Puzzle: The Role of Issuer Characteristics and Third-Party Verification. Sustainability 11: 1-22. doi: 10.3390/su11041098
    [7] Bernstein S, Cashore B (2007) Can non-state global governance be legitimate? An analytical framework. Regul Gov 1: 347-371. doi: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00021.x
    [8] Biermann F (2007) 'Earth system governance' as a crosscutting theme of global change research. Global Environ Change 17: 326-337. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.11.010
    [9] Biermann F, Pattberg P (2008) Global Environmental Governance: Taking Stock, Moving Forward. Annu Rev Env Resour 33: 277-294. doi: 10.1146/annurev.environ.33.050707.085733
    [10] Biermann F, Pattberg P, van Asselt H, et al. (2009) The fragmentation of global governance architectures: a framework for analysis. Global Environ Politics 9: 14-40. doi: 10.1162/glep.2009.9.4.14
    [11] Bulkeley H (2005) Reconfiguring environmental governance: towards a politics of scales and networks. Political Geogr 24: 875-902. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.07.002
    [12] Büthe T (2010a) Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review. Bus Politics 12: 1-38.
    [13] Cashore B (2002) Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority. Governance 15: 508-529. doi: 10.1111/1468-0491.00199
    [14] CBI (2018a) Green Bonds Policy: Highlights from 2017. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/reports/cbi-policyroundup_2017_final_3.pdf.
    [15] CBI (2018b) ASEAN Green Finance State of the Market. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/resources/reports/asean-green-finance-state-market-2018.
    [16] CBI & CCDC (2018) China Green Bond Market 2017. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/China_Annual_Report_2017_English.pdf.
    [17] CBI (2019) Climate Bonds Taxonomy. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/CBI_Taxonomy_Tables-Oct19_Final.pdf.
    [18] CBI & CCDC (2019) China Green Bond Market 2018. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/resources/reports/china-green-bond-market-2018.
    [19] CBI & IISD (2015) Growing a green bonds market in China: Key recommendations for policymakers in the context of China's changing financial landscape. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/Growing%20a%20green%20bonds%20market%20in%20China.pdf.
    [20] Chan S, van Asselt H, Hale T, et al. (2015) Reinvigorating international climate policy: a comprehensive framework for effective nonstate action. Global Policy 6: 466-473. doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12294
    [21] Chen CJ, Srinidhi B, Su X (2014) Effect of auditing: Evidence from variability of stock returns and trading volume. China J Accounting Res 7: 223-245. doi: 10.1016/j.cjar.2014.11.002
    [22] CICERO (2016) Framework for CICERO's 'Second Opinions' on green bond investments. Available from: https://cicero.oslo.no/en/posts/single/CICERO-second-opinions.
    [23] Cutler CA, Haufler V, Porter T (1999) Private Authority and International Affairs, Albany: SUNY Press.
    [24] Cutler CA (2009) Private international regimes and interfirm cooperation. The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23-40.
    [25] Dai W, Kidney S (2016) Climate Bonds Initiative International Institute for Sustainable Development. Aavailable from: https://www.climatebonds.net/resources/Roadmap-for-China/April/2016/Paper1.
    [26] Dingwerth K (2008) Private transnational governance and the developing world: A comparative perspective. Int Stud Q 52: 607-634. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00517.x
    [27] EC (2018) Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097&from=EN.
    [28] EC (2019a) Report of the Technical Expert Group (TEG) subgroup on Green Bond Standard Proposal for an EU Green Bond Standard: Interim Report. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190306-sustainable-finance-teg-interim-report-green-bond-standard_en_0.pdf.
    [29] EC (2019b) Report on EU Green Bond Standard. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190618-sustainable-finance-teg-report-green-bond-standard_en.pdf.
    [30] Flammer C (2018) Corporate Green Bonds. Available from: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3125518.
    [31] Gehring T, Oberthür S (2011) Institutional Interaction: Ten Years of Scholarly Development. Managing Institutional Complexity, Cambridge: MIT Press, 25-58.
    [32] GFS (2015) Preparation Instructions on Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue. Available from: https://www.bourse.lu/documents/brochure-GB_endorsed_project_catalogue_2015.pdf.
    [33] Green JF (2014) Rethinking private authority: agents and entrepreneurs in global environmental governance, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    [34] Green JF, Auld G (2017) Unbundling the regime complex: the effects of private authority. Transnational Environ Law 6: 1-28. doi: 10.1017/S2047102517000012
    [35] Ehlers T, Packer F (2017) Green Bond Finance and Certification. BIS Quarterly Review September 2017. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3042378.
    [36] Hall RB, Biersteker TJ (2002) The emergence of private authority in the international system. The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-22. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491238. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511491238.002
    [37] Hickmann T (2017) The Reconfiguration of Authority in Global Climate Governance. Int Stud Rev 19: 430-451. doi: 10.1093/isr/vix037
    [38] Hicks BL (1999) Treaty Congestion in International Environmental Law: The Need for Greater International Coordination. Unive Richmond Law Rev 32: 1643-41674.
    [39] HKEX (2018) The green bond trend: Global, Mainland China and Hong Kong. Available from: https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Research-Reports/HKEx-Research-Papers/2018/CCEO_GreenBonds_201812_e.pdf?la=en.
    [40] IFC (2016) Mobilizing Private Climate Finance-Green Bonds and Beyond. Available from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30351/110881-BRI-EMCompass-Note-25-Green-Bonds-FINAL-12-5-PUBLIC.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
    [41] IFC (2018) Creating Green Bond Markets-Insights, Innovations, and Tools from Emerging Markets. Available from: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/55e5e479-b2a8-41a6-9931-93306369b529/SBN+Creating+Green+Bond+Markets+Report+2018.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
    [42] Info Barcelona (2017) First issue of green and social bonds for municipal funding. Available from: https://www.barcelona.cat/infobarcelona/en/first-issue-of-green-and-social-bonds-for-municipal-funding_595425.html.
    [43] Kent A (2014) Implementing the principle of policy integration: institutional interplay and the role of international organizations. Int Environ Agreements 14: 203-224. doi: 10.1007/s10784-013-9224-3
    [44] Keohane RO (1989) "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," In Keohane, R., O. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
    [45] Keohane RO, Victor DG (2010) The Regime Complex for Climate Change. Discussion Paper 2010-33, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, January 2010. Available from: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Keohane_Victor_Final_2.pdf.
    [46] Kollmuss A, Zink H, Polycap C (2008) Making sense of the voluntary carbon market: A comparison of carbon offset standards. Available from: https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-Report-WWF-ComparisonCarbonOffset-08.pdf.
    [47] Mathews JA, Kidney S (2014) Climate bonds: mobilizing private financing for carbon management. Carbon Manage 1: 9-13. doi: 10.4155/cmt.10.15
    [48] Moody's (2019) Corporate issuers drive strong global green bond volume in Q1 2019. Available from: https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/Public-research-resources/Corporate-issuers-drive-strong-global-green-bond-volume-in-Q1-2019-220719.pdf.
    [49] Oberthür S, Gehring T (2006) Institutional interaction in global environmental governance, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    [50] OECD (2015) Green Bonds Mobilising the debt capital markets for a low-carbon transition, Paris: OECD Publishing.
    [51] OECD (2017) Mobilising Bond Markets for a Low-Carbon Transition, Green Finance and Investment, Paris: OECD Publishing.
    [52] O'Neill K (2013) Vertical Linkages and Scale. Int Stud Rev 15: 571-573.
    [53] Orsini A, Morin JF, Young OR (2013) Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance? Global Gov 19: 27-39. doi: 10.1163/19426720-01901003
    [54] Park SK (2018) Investors as regulators: Green bonds and the governance challenges of the sustainable finance evolution. Stanford J Int Law 54: 1-47.
    [55] Paula C, Carola B (2016) Climate Finance after the Paris Agreement: new directions or more of the same? Available from: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-137944.
    [56] PBoC & UNEP (2015) Establishing China's Green Financial System. Available from: https://www.cbd.int/financial/privatesector/china-Green%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf.
    [57] Pham L (2016) Is it risky to go green? A volatility analysis of the green bond market. J Sust Financ Investment 6: 263-291.
    [58] Raustiala K, Victor DG (2004) The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. Int Organ 58: 277-309. doi: 10.1017/S0020818304582036
    [59] Reichelt H, Keenan C (2017) The Green Bond Market: 10 years later and looking ahead. Available from: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/554231525378003380/publicationpensionfundservicegreenbonds201712-rev.pdf.
    [60] Ren S, Li X, Yuan B, et al. (2018) The effects of three types of environmental regulation on eco-efficiency: A cross-region analysis in China. J Clean Prod 173: 245-255. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.113
    [61] Richardson BJ (2009) Climate Finance and Its Governance: Moving to a Low Carbon Economy Through Socially Responsible Financing? Int Comp Law Q 58: 597-626. doi: 10.1017/S0020589309001213
    [62] Richardson BJ (2010) Reforming Climate Finance Through Investment Codes of Conduct. Wisconsin Int Law J 27: 483-515.
    [63] Richardson BJ (2017) Divesting from Climate Change: The Road to Influence. Law Policy 39: 325-348. doi: 10.1111/lapo.12081
    [64] Rose P (2018) Certifying the "Climate" in Climate Bonds. Legal Studies Working Paper Series No. 458. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3243867.
    [65] S&P (2018) Frequently Asked Questions: Green Evaluations And Transaction Alignment With The Green Bond Principles 2018. Available from: https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/4756601/Green+Evaluations+And+Transaction+Alignment+With+The+Green+Bond+Principles+2018%2C+July+24+2018.pdf/8295714b-4eab-4c35-86e4-835ccf738902.
    [66] SEBI (2016) Disclosure Requirements for Issuance and Listing Green Bonds. Available from: https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/meetingfiles/1453349548574-a.pdf.
    [67] Shishlov I, Nicol M, Cochran I (2018) Environmental integrity of green bonds: stakes, status and next steps. Available from: https://www.i4ce.org/download/environmental-integrity-of-green-bonds/.
    [68] Stokke OS (2001) The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work. Available from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/100208/01-14-oss.pdf.
    [69] Strange S (1996) The Retreat of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    [70] SynTao Green Finance (2019) Top Ten Responsible Investment Trends in China in 2019. Available from: http://www.syntaogf.com/Menu_Page_EN.asp?ID=21&Page_ID=292.
    [71] Thistlethwaite T (2014) Private governance and sustainable finance. J Sustainable Financ Investment 4: 61-75. doi: 10.1080/20430795.2014.887348
    [72] UNEP (2019) Sustainable Finance Progress Report. Available from: http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Sustainable_Finance_Progress_Report_2018.pdf
    [73] Vatn A, Vedeld P (2012) Fit, interplay, and scale: a diagnosis. Ecology and Society 17:12. Available from: http:// dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05022-170412. doi: 10.5751/ES-05022-170412
    [74] Wang Y, Zang R (2017) China's green bond market. International Capital Market Features, 44: 16-17.
    [75] Weiss EB (1993) International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order. Georgetown Law J 675: 675-710.
    [76] Whiley A (2018) Chinese regulators introduce supervisory scheme for green bond verifiers - Further step in building market frameworks. Available from: https://www.climatebonds.net/2018/01/chinese-regulators-introduce-supervisoryscheme-green-bond-verifiers-further-step-building.
    [77] World Bank (2015) Innovative Finance for Development Solutions. Available from: http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/IF-for-Development-Solutions.pdf.
    [78] Young OR (1996) Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives. Global Gov 2: 1-24. doi: 10.1163/19426720-002-01-90000002
    [79] Young OR (1999) Governance in World Affairs, Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.
    [80] Young OR (2002) The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    [81] Young OR, King LA, Schroeder H (2008) Institutions and environmental change: principal findings, applications, and research frontiers, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    [82] Zelli F (2011) Regime Conflicts and Their Management in Global Environmental Governance, Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change, Cambridge MA:MIT Press. 197-226.
    [83] Zelli F, Moller I, van Asselt H (2017) Institutional complexity and private authority in global climate governance: the case of climate engineering, REDD+ and short-lived climate pollutants. Environ Politics 26: 669-693. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1319020
  • This article has been cited by:

    1. Miao Peng, Rui Lin, Zhengdi Zhang, Lei Huang, The dynamics of a delayed predator-prey model with square root functional response and stage structure, 2024, 32, 2688-1594, 3275, 10.3934/era.2024150
    2. Xin Du, Quansheng Liu, Yuanhong Bi, Bifurcation analysis of a two–dimensional p53 gene regulatory network without and with time delay, 2023, 32, 2688-1594, 293, 10.3934/era.2024014
    3. L. R. Ibrahim, D. K. Bahlool, Exploring the Role of Hunting Cooperation, and Fear in a Prey-Predator Model with Two Age Stages, 2024, 18, 1823-8343, 727, 10.47836/mjms.18.4.03
  • Reader Comments
  • © 2020 the Author(s), licensee AIMS Press. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0)
通讯作者: 陈斌, bchen63@163.com
  • 1. 

    沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院 沈阳 110142

  1. 本站搜索
  2. 百度学术搜索
  3. 万方数据库搜索
  4. CNKI搜索

Metrics

Article views(4737) PDF downloads(576) Cited by(16)

Other Articles By Authors

/

DownLoad:  Full-Size Img  PowerPoint
Return
Return

Catalog