Effects of co-infection on vaccination behavior and disease propagation

Kelu Li; Junyuan Yang; Xuezhi Li; Kelu Li; Junyuan Yang; Xuezhi Li

doi:10.3934/mbe.2022468

Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering

2022, Volume 19, Issue 10: 10022-10036. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2022468

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Effects of co-infection on vaccination behavior and disease propagation

Kelu Li ¹,
Junyuan Yang ^{2,3
,
,},
Xuezhi Li ^{1,4
,
,}

1.
School of Mathematics and Information Science, Henan Normal University, Xinxiang 453007, China
2.
Complex Systems Research Center, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China
3.
Shanxi Key Laboratory of Mathematical Techniques and Big Data Analysis on Disease Control and Prevention, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China
4.
School of Statistics and Mathematics, Henan Finance University, Zhengzhou 450046, China

Academic Editor: Sanling Yuan

Received: 15 May 2022 Revised: 28 June 2022 Accepted: 04 July 2022 Published: 14 July 2022

Coinfection is the process of an infection of a single host with two or more pathogen variants or with two or more distinct pathogen species, which often threatens public health and the stability of economies. In this paper, we propose a novel two-strain epidemic model characterizing the co-evolution of coinfection and voluntary vaccination strategies. In the framework of evolutionary vaccination, we design two game rules, the individual-based risk assessment (IB-RA) updated rule, and the strategy-based risk assessment (SB-RA) updated rule, to update the vaccination policy. Through detailed numerical analysis, we find that increasing the vaccine effectiveness and decreasing the transmission rate effectively suppress the disease prevalence, and moreover, the outcome of the SB-RA updated rule is more encouraging than those results of the IB-RA rule for curbing the disease transmission. Coinfection complicates the effects of the transmission rate of each strain on the final epidemic sizes.
- evolutionary game theory,
- co-infection,
- imperfect vaccination
Citation: Kelu Li, Junyuan Yang, Xuezhi Li. Effects of co-infection on vaccination behavior and disease propagation[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2022, 19(10): 10022-10036. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2022468

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Abstract

Coinfection is the process of an infection of a single host with two or more pathogen variants or with two or more distinct pathogen species, which often threatens public health and the stability of economies. In this paper, we propose a novel two-strain epidemic model characterizing the co-evolution of coinfection and voluntary vaccination strategies. In the framework of evolutionary vaccination, we design two game rules, the individual-based risk assessment (IB-RA) updated rule, and the strategy-based risk assessment (SB-RA) updated rule, to update the vaccination policy. Through detailed numerical analysis, we find that increasing the vaccine effectiveness and decreasing the transmission rate effectively suppress the disease prevalence, and moreover, the outcome of the SB-RA updated rule is more encouraging than those results of the IB-RA rule for curbing the disease transmission. Coinfection complicates the effects of the transmission rate of each strain on the final epidemic sizes.

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