Effective guide for behaviour of farmers in the withdrawal of rural homesteads: An evolutionary game-based study

Jingyu Liu; Weidong Meng; Yuyu Li; Bo Huang; Bixi Zhang; Jingyu Liu; Weidong Meng; Yuyu Li; Bo Huang; Bixi Zhang

doi:10.3934/mbe.2022365

Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering

2022, Volume 19, Issue 8: 7805-7825. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2022365

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Effective guide for behaviour of farmers in the withdrawal of rural homesteads: An evolutionary game-based study

1.
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 401331, China
2.
School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
3.
Sichuan Kangding Airport Group Corporation Ltm, Chengdu 610000, China
Academic editor: Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest

Received: 24 January 2022 Revised: 25 March 2022 Accepted: 11 April 2022 Published: 25 May 2022

In this study, we determined how farmers can be effectively encouraged to withdraw from their idle homesteads, in addition to revitalising the rural construction land stock and realising the market-oriented allocation of land resources. We constructed an evolutionary game model under three scenarios: without penalty mechanism; with a static penalty mechanism; and with a dynamic penalty mechanism. Further, we explicitly describe the strategic behaviours and dynamic evolution processes of local governments and farmers during withdrawal from their rural homesteads. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, under effect of the dynamic penalty mechanism, the strategy systems formed by local governments as well as farmers can gradually converge and stabilise after short-term shocks, compared with that under the no penalty and static penalty mechanisms. Overall, the penalty mechanism mitigates the instability in the game process during participants' incremental changes and strategy choices, while the dynamic mechanism is optimal. Both static and dynamic penalty mechanisms influence the binary equilibrium strategies of local governments as well as farmers, and farmers' strategies evolve towards this state of withdrawal from their homesteads with increasing penalty. When the model is dynamically improved, the probability of farmers' withdrawal of their homesteads increases with increasing penalty. Thus, clearly, the establishment of a penalty mechanism can promote stability of the participants' system; higher penalty implies higher motivation for farmers to withdraw their idle homesteads, enabling revitalisation of the rural stock of construction land and promotion of the optimal allocation of land resource elements.
- evolutionary game,
- construction land,
- penalty mechanism,
- idle homesteads,
- dynamic mechanism,
- allocation of land resource elements
Citation: Jingyu Liu, Weidong Meng, Yuyu Li, Bo Huang, Bixi Zhang. Effective guide for behaviour of farmers in the withdrawal of rural homesteads: An evolutionary game-based study[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2022, 19(8): 7805-7825. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2022365

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Abstract

In this study, we determined how farmers can be effectively encouraged to withdraw from their idle homesteads, in addition to revitalising the rural construction land stock and realising the market-oriented allocation of land resources. We constructed an evolutionary game model under three scenarios: without penalty mechanism; with a static penalty mechanism; and with a dynamic penalty mechanism. Further, we explicitly describe the strategic behaviours and dynamic evolution processes of local governments and farmers during withdrawal from their rural homesteads. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, under effect of the dynamic penalty mechanism, the strategy systems formed by local governments as well as farmers can gradually converge and stabilise after short-term shocks, compared with that under the no penalty and static penalty mechanisms. Overall, the penalty mechanism mitigates the instability in the game process during participants' incremental changes and strategy choices, while the dynamic mechanism is optimal. Both static and dynamic penalty mechanisms influence the binary equilibrium strategies of local governments as well as farmers, and farmers' strategies evolve towards this state of withdrawal from their homesteads with increasing penalty. When the model is dynamically improved, the probability of farmers' withdrawal of their homesteads increases with increasing penalty. Thus, clearly, the establishment of a penalty mechanism can promote stability of the participants' system; higher penalty implies higher motivation for farmers to withdraw their idle homesteads, enabling revitalisation of the rural stock of construction land and promotion of the optimal allocation of land resource elements.

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