To further reform the medical and health care system, regulating multi-level treatment and rationalizing the use of medicine, and securing prescription circulation information, this study explores the evolutionary behavior of three players in terms of information security collaboration under the prescription circulation policy, analyzes the evolutionary paths, and examines the influence of key parameters on evolutionary outcomes by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of hospitals, retail pharmacies, and healthcare service platforms. The study shows the following: (1) When the information security costs of prescription circulation increase, the willingness of hospitals to promote information collaboration weakens, the probability of control and regulation by healthcare platforms will be enhanced, and the incentive for retail pharmacies to undertake prescription circulation increases and then decreases. (2) The increased profitability of prescription drug sales can cause a decrease in the likelihood of both parties working together to promote information security. Increasing the collaborative space between hospitals and retail pharmacies is conducive to improving information security in the circulation of prescriptions. (3) A bi-directional constraint relationship exists between the circulation and control subjects. The shorter the technology spillover time from the healthcare service platform is, the higher the probability that hospitals and retail pharmacies will maintain the security of prescription information. (4) In the early stages of prescription circulation, the external regulatory action of the healthcare service platform is essential to improve the coordination of information security. Finally, combined with the tripartite evolutionary game model and simulation analysis results, it offers countermeasures and suggestions for the government to realize the prescription circulation information security collaboration.
Citation: Xiaochun Chen, Jie Zhao, Yingying Ma, Bo Lv, Xuanjin Du. Tripartite evolutionary game study on coordination information security in prescription circulation[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2023, 20(12): 21120-21146. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2023934
To further reform the medical and health care system, regulating multi-level treatment and rationalizing the use of medicine, and securing prescription circulation information, this study explores the evolutionary behavior of three players in terms of information security collaboration under the prescription circulation policy, analyzes the evolutionary paths, and examines the influence of key parameters on evolutionary outcomes by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of hospitals, retail pharmacies, and healthcare service platforms. The study shows the following: (1) When the information security costs of prescription circulation increase, the willingness of hospitals to promote information collaboration weakens, the probability of control and regulation by healthcare platforms will be enhanced, and the incentive for retail pharmacies to undertake prescription circulation increases and then decreases. (2) The increased profitability of prescription drug sales can cause a decrease in the likelihood of both parties working together to promote information security. Increasing the collaborative space between hospitals and retail pharmacies is conducive to improving information security in the circulation of prescriptions. (3) A bi-directional constraint relationship exists between the circulation and control subjects. The shorter the technology spillover time from the healthcare service platform is, the higher the probability that hospitals and retail pharmacies will maintain the security of prescription information. (4) In the early stages of prescription circulation, the external regulatory action of the healthcare service platform is essential to improve the coordination of information security. Finally, combined with the tripartite evolutionary game model and simulation analysis results, it offers countermeasures and suggestions for the government to realize the prescription circulation information security collaboration.
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Xiaochun Chen, Jie Zhao, Yingying Ma, Bo Lv, Xuanjin Du. Tripartite evolutionary game study on coordination information security in prescription circulation[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2023, 20(12): 21120-21146. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2023934
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