Research on a collaborative evolution model of multi-airport route network considering subsidy strategies

Wei Wu; Zhiyi Lin; Ming Wei; Wei Wu; Zhiyi Lin; Ming Wei

doi:10.3934/mbe.2023877

Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering

2023, Volume 20, Issue 11: 19808-19838. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2023877

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Research article

Research on a collaborative evolution model of multi-airport route network considering subsidy strategies

1.
Key Laboratory of Internet of Aircraft, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin 300300, China
2.
School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China

Academic Editor: Yang Kuang

Received: 23 August 2023 Revised: 12 October 2023 Accepted: 15 October 2023 Published: 31 October 2023

To efficiently utilize subsidy strategies for optimizing multi-airport route networks and promoting collaborative development among multiple airports, we delve into the tripartite strategic interactions between passengers, airlines and airports. A dual-layer game-theoretic model is constructed to optimize subsidy strategies, facilitating a synergistic alignment between multi-airport positioning and route networks. In the upper-layer game-theoretic model, Fermi rules are employed to analyze the interplay between pricing strategies of distinct airline brands and passenger travel preferences, aiding in determining optimal pricing strategies for airlines. The lower-layer game-theoretic model introduces an asymmetric stochastic best response equilibrium (QRE) model, drawing insights from optimal airline pricing and the impact of airport subsidies on airline route adjustments to formulate effective multi-airport subsidy strategies. The results reveal that: (ⅰ) Airline revenues display varying peaks based on travel distances, with optimal fare discount intervals clustering between 0.6 and 0.9, contingent upon travel distances and passenger rationality; (ⅱ) dynamic monopolistic intervals and inefficient ranges characterize airport subsidy strategies due to diverse competitive strategies employed by rivals; (ⅲ) targeted airport subsidy strategies can enhance inter-airport route coordination in alignment with their functional positioning. This research provides decision-making insights into collaborative airport group development, encompassing airport subsidy strategies and considerations for airline pricing.
- air transportation,
- airport cluster,
- route network,
- subsidy strategy,
- evolutionary game
Citation: Wei Wu, Zhiyi Lin, Ming Wei. Research on a collaborative evolution model of multi-airport route network considering subsidy strategies[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2023, 20(11): 19808-19838. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2023877

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Abstract

To efficiently utilize subsidy strategies for optimizing multi-airport route networks and promoting collaborative development among multiple airports, we delve into the tripartite strategic interactions between passengers, airlines and airports. A dual-layer game-theoretic model is constructed to optimize subsidy strategies, facilitating a synergistic alignment between multi-airport positioning and route networks. In the upper-layer game-theoretic model, Fermi rules are employed to analyze the interplay between pricing strategies of distinct airline brands and passenger travel preferences, aiding in determining optimal pricing strategies for airlines. The lower-layer game-theoretic model introduces an asymmetric stochastic best response equilibrium (QRE) model, drawing insights from optimal airline pricing and the impact of airport subsidies on airline route adjustments to formulate effective multi-airport subsidy strategies. The results reveal that: (ⅰ) Airline revenues display varying peaks based on travel distances, with optimal fare discount intervals clustering between 0.6 and 0.9, contingent upon travel distances and passenger rationality; (ⅱ) dynamic monopolistic intervals and inefficient ranges characterize airport subsidy strategies due to diverse competitive strategies employed by rivals; (ⅲ) targeted airport subsidy strategies can enhance inter-airport route coordination in alignment with their functional positioning. This research provides decision-making insights into collaborative airport group development, encompassing airport subsidy strategies and considerations for airline pricing.

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