Authority decentralization and air pollution reduction: Evidence from China

Rui Huang; Hao Xiao; Guoqin Pan; Rui Huang; Hao Xiao; Guoqin Pan

doi:10.3934/mbe.2022661

Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering

2022, Volume 19, Issue 12: 14212-14231. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2022661

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Research article Special Issues

Authority decentralization and air pollution reduction: Evidence from China

1.
School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha 410006, China
2.
School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China

Received: 21 September 2022 Revised: 27 October 2022 Accepted: 10 November 2022 Published: 23 November 2022

Whether authority decentralization can strengthen the effort of local governments to reduce environmental pollution is theoretically and practically important. Based on a reform of delegating power of organizing marathon games from central to local governments in China, this paper finds that air quality during the days of marathon games improves significantly after decentralization. Such results pass a series of robustness checks. Moreover, we find that the improvement of air quality during marathon games after authority decentralization have close relationship with official promotion incentives, local political cycles and the career concerns of prefectural secretaries and mayors.
- authority decentralization,
- air pollution,
- marathon games,
- career concerns,
- China
Citation: Rui Huang, Hao Xiao, Guoqin Pan. Authority decentralization and air pollution reduction: Evidence from China[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2022, 19(12): 14212-14231. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2022661

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Abstract

Whether authority decentralization can strengthen the effort of local governments to reduce environmental pollution is theoretically and practically important. Based on a reform of delegating power of organizing marathon games from central to local governments in China, this paper finds that air quality during the days of marathon games improves significantly after decentralization. Such results pass a series of robustness checks. Moreover, we find that the improvement of air quality during marathon games after authority decentralization have close relationship with official promotion incentives, local political cycles and the career concerns of prefectural secretaries and mayors.

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