Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments

Zheng Liu; Lingling Lang; Lingling Li; Yuanjun Zhao; Lihua Shi; Zheng Liu; Lingling Lang; Lingling Li; Yuanjun Zhao; Lihua Shi

doi:10.3934/mbe.2021320

Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering

2021, Volume 18, Issue 5: 6434-6451. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2021320

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Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments

1.
School of Management, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai 201620, China
2.
Department of Central Laboratory, Shanghai Children's Hospital, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200062, China
3.
School of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China

Academic Editor:Daniel Rossit

Received: 22 April 2021 Accepted: 21 July 2021 Published: 28 July 2021

Under the background of the aging population and the improvement of people's quality of life, the demand for household medical devices is expanding, which has huge market potential. However, the recycling of waste household medical devices has become a problem that must be faced by the market expansion. In order to reduce the environmental pollution caused by abandoned household medical devices, based on the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy measures adopted by the government, the evolutionary game model between the government and the household medical device enterprises is constructed. The strategic choice of the government and the domestic medical equipment enterprises is studied from the perspective of system dynamics. It is found that when the government adopts static measures, there is no stable equilibrium point in the game between the government and enterprises, while when the government adopts dynamic punishment or subsidies, there is a stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary game. In addition, the government can increase the penalty or reduce the subsidy to promote the probability of household medical device enterprises to choose recycling strategy and reduce environmental pollution.
- household medical devices,
- evolutionary game,
- government supervision,
- dynamic strategy,
- punishment and subsidy measures
Citation: Zheng Liu, Lingling Lang, Lingling Li, Yuanjun Zhao, Lihua Shi. Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2021, 18(5): 6434-6451. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2021320

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Abstract

Under the background of the aging population and the improvement of people's quality of life, the demand for household medical devices is expanding, which has huge market potential. However, the recycling of waste household medical devices has become a problem that must be faced by the market expansion. In order to reduce the environmental pollution caused by abandoned household medical devices, based on the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy measures adopted by the government, the evolutionary game model between the government and the household medical device enterprises is constructed. The strategic choice of the government and the domestic medical equipment enterprises is studied from the perspective of system dynamics. It is found that when the government adopts static measures, there is no stable equilibrium point in the game between the government and enterprises, while when the government adopts dynamic punishment or subsidies, there is a stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary game. In addition, the government can increase the penalty or reduce the subsidy to promote the probability of household medical device enterprises to choose recycling strategy and reduce environmental pollution.

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