Research on open and shared data from government-enterprise cooperation based on a stochastic differential game

Zifu Fan; Youpeng Tao; Wei Zhang; Kexin Fan; Jiaojiao Cheng; Zifu Fan; Youpeng Tao; Wei Zhang; Kexin Fan; Jiaojiao Cheng

doi:10.3934/math.2023234

AIMS Mathematics

2023, Volume 8, Issue 2: 4726-4752. doi: 10.3934/math.2023234

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Research article

Research on open and shared data from government-enterprise cooperation based on a stochastic differential game

School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China

Received: 10 October 2022 Revised: 16 November 2022 Accepted: 28 November 2022 Published: 07 December 2022
MSC : 91A23, 91A65

Based on the perspective of government and enterprises, we explore the cooperative strategy and cost-sharing problem of cooperative open sharing of data between government and enterprises. In order to accurately analyze the data-opening strategies of government and enterprises, stochastic differential game theory is applied to construct the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg master-slave game and cooperative game models with government and enterprises as game subjects to obtain the optimal open data effort, the optimal trajectory of social data open sharing level and the optimal benefit function of government and enterprises in three scenarios. Combined with numerical simulations to analyze the sensitivity of the relevant parameters affecting the level of social data openness, the results of the study revealed the following: ① When the government's income distribution ratio is greater than 1/3, the benefits of the government and the enterprises under the Stackelberg master-slave game and the effort to open and share data are greater than in the Nash non-cooperative situation; in the case of a cooperative game, the degree of effort and total revenue of both parties reach the Pareto optimal state. ② When the government's income distribution ratio is greater than 1/3, the expectation and variance of the open data and shared stock under the cost-sharing situation and the corresponding limit value are all greater than the value in the Nash non-cooperative situation, and in the cooperative game, the expectation and variance of open data and shared stock and its corresponding limit value are the greatest. ③ The government and enterprises coexist with profit and risk under the influence of random interference factors, and high profit means high risk. This research provides a theoretical basis and practical guidance for promoting the open sharing of government and enterprise data.
- open data sharing,
- open data sharing stock,
- stochastic differential game,
- government-enterprise cooperation,
- benefit distribution
Citation: Zifu Fan, Youpeng Tao, Wei Zhang, Kexin Fan, Jiaojiao Cheng. Research on open and shared data from government-enterprise cooperation based on a stochastic differential game[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2023, 8(2): 4726-4752. doi: 10.3934/math.2023234

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Abstract

Based on the perspective of government and enterprises, we explore the cooperative strategy and cost-sharing problem of cooperative open sharing of data between government and enterprises. In order to accurately analyze the data-opening strategies of government and enterprises, stochastic differential game theory is applied to construct the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg master-slave game and cooperative game models with government and enterprises as game subjects to obtain the optimal open data effort, the optimal trajectory of social data open sharing level and the optimal benefit function of government and enterprises in three scenarios. Combined with numerical simulations to analyze the sensitivity of the relevant parameters affecting the level of social data openness, the results of the study revealed the following: ① When the government's income distribution ratio is greater than 1/3, the benefits of the government and the enterprises under the Stackelberg master-slave game and the effort to open and share data are greater than in the Nash non-cooperative situation; in the case of a cooperative game, the degree of effort and total revenue of both parties reach the Pareto optimal state. ② When the government's income distribution ratio is greater than 1/3, the expectation and variance of the open data and shared stock under the cost-sharing situation and the corresponding limit value are all greater than the value in the Nash non-cooperative situation, and in the cooperative game, the expectation and variance of open data and shared stock and its corresponding limit value are the greatest. ③ The government and enterprises coexist with profit and risk under the influence of random interference factors, and high profit means high risk. This research provides a theoretical basis and practical guidance for promoting the open sharing of government and enterprise data.

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