Successfully integrating newcomers into native communities has become a key issue for policy makers, as the growing number of migrants has brought cultural diversity, new skills, but also, societal tensions to receiving countries. We develop an agent-based network model to study interacting "hosts" and "guests" and to identify the conditions under which cooperative/integrated or uncooperative/segregated societies arise. Players are assumed to seek socioeconomic prosperity through game theoretic rules that shift network links, and cultural acceptance through opinion dynamics. We find that the main predictor of integration under given initial conditions is the timescale associated with cultural adjustment relative to social link remodeling, for both guests and hosts. Fast cultural adjustment results in cooperation and the establishment of host-guest connections that are sustained over long times. Conversely, fast social link remodeling leads to the irreversible formation of isolated enclaves, as migrants and natives optimize their socioeconomic gains through in-group connections. We discuss how migrant population sizes and increasing socioeconomic rewards for host-guest interactions, through governmental incentives or by admitting migrants with highly desirable skills, may affect the overall immigrant experience.
Citation: Yao-Li Chuang, Tom Chou, Maria R. D'Orsogna. A network model of immigration: Enclave formation vs. cultural integration[J]. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2019, 14(1): 53-77. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2019004
Successfully integrating newcomers into native communities has become a key issue for policy makers, as the growing number of migrants has brought cultural diversity, new skills, but also, societal tensions to receiving countries. We develop an agent-based network model to study interacting "hosts" and "guests" and to identify the conditions under which cooperative/integrated or uncooperative/segregated societies arise. Players are assumed to seek socioeconomic prosperity through game theoretic rules that shift network links, and cultural acceptance through opinion dynamics. We find that the main predictor of integration under given initial conditions is the timescale associated with cultural adjustment relative to social link remodeling, for both guests and hosts. Fast cultural adjustment results in cooperation and the establishment of host-guest connections that are sustained over long times. Conversely, fast social link remodeling leads to the irreversible formation of isolated enclaves, as migrants and natives optimize their socioeconomic gains through in-group connections. We discuss how migrant population sizes and increasing socioeconomic rewards for host-guest interactions, through governmental incentives or by admitting migrants with highly desirable skills, may affect the overall immigrant experience.
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Simulated network dynamics leading to (a) complete segregation, and (b) integration between guest (red) and host (blue) populations. Shading of node colors represents the degree of hostility
Model diagram. Each node
Dynamics of the average utility per node
Dynamics of the integration index
Dynamics of the integration index
Dynamics of the integration index
Integration index at steady state. In panel (a)
Time
Integration index at steady state.