

*Research article***Migration as an economic component of the European countries' development****Tetiana But\***

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**Abstract:** Most European countries view migrants as individuals who can increase the country's economic stability in the long run. Our purpose of the article was to determine the impact of Ukrainian migration on the development of the economic component of European countries. We began by analysing migration trends by country, identifying the sharp increase in migrants to Europe and the transport routes for crossing the border, and the European countries' financial challenges due to migrants, which indicated an uneven distribution of migrants in European countries. The methodology of the empirical research was based on theoretical analysis of scientific literature on migration issues; methods: Analysis and synthesis; systemic; comparative; historical; Pareto principle; and expert assessments of numerous statistical reports of international data. The results pointed to the largest migration of the Ukrainian population in history caused by the war in Europe. Various EU support programs for Ukrainian migrants contributed to increasing the labour force, population growth in Europe, and the economic well-being of the European countries' populations. As a result, 2 hypotheses were tested, which revealed: 1H: European countries' economy is developing due to the migration of the Ukrainian population to Europe; 2H: Ukrainian refugees have been integrating successfully since the beginning of the war in Europe. The originality of the study was determined by the development of the Scheme of generalised efficiency of implementation of the directions of the «Programme of simplified legalisation in the EU for Ukrainians», the directions of which will enable the formation of a new economic model of reforms in the European Union, which will create favourable conditions for the legalisation and further integration of Ukrainian migrants in the EU, thereby contributing to the welfare of migrants and the development of European countries.

**Keywords:** migration; Ukrainian refugees; European countries; economic development

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**JEL Codes:** O15.

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## **1. Introduction**

Our purpose of the article is to determine the impact of Ukrainian migration on the development of the economic component of European countries.

The intensification of migration processes is one of the key trends in modern world development. It is caused primarily by the increased unevenness of economic growth in different countries in the context of globalisation, the variety of interethnic, social, and international conflicts, and the peculiarities of demographic processes in Europe. Mass migration has brought about two problems for society: the issue of migrants' integration into a host society and the permissible limits of societal change under the influence of mass foreign cultural immigration. Migration has become one of Europe's most high-profile challenges today. Migrants seeking a better life, needing assistance, and looking for work are drawn to the economies of more developed countries. These migration processes threaten the EU's public policy and can lead to destroying the unity of states and national identity. Such large-scale migration flows necessarily affect the political, economic, and demographic processes in European countries through a sharp increase in the non-indigenous population, a possible increase in riots and strife between migrants and demographic residents, and a decline in the economy of states due to the needs of migrants who are often unemployed and rely only on social benefits from a host country.

As a result of the extensive policy of the European Union, which has just begun to take tough action to regulate migration processes citing the natural human rights of movement and security, the flow of migrants in Europe is continuing. At all times, states have taken measures to regulate migration policy, but in the context of the current migration crisis in European countries, new measures are needed. The ambiguity of the measures taken in relation to migrants and the regulation of migration flows indicate that European countries are not ready to cope with this problem at the moment. In view of the above, the relevance of the research is determined by the importance of assessing and forecasting the impact of large-scale population movements on the political, economic, and social system of the European Union, their effect on the course of modern international relations and the system of ways to overcome the phenomenon of the migration crisis in the EU.

The study is a further in-depth continuation of my previous research. I continue to study the impact of the war in Ukraine on economic processes in Europe in more detail and in depth, as the war in Ukraine affects the economies of countries both in Europe and around the world, as highlighted in a number of his own studies (But et al., 2023), chapter 2 (But, 2024a, 2024b, 2024c). The study of this issue is focused on finding ways to address the problems of the main goal of humanity—reducing poverty on the planet and increasing its well-being, which is caused by various global changes (But, 2024a). Since the migration movement is not only caused by violence, terrorism, hunger, or climate change, but also by military conflicts, I explain the relevance of the chosen topic.

## **2. Literature review**

In studying the theoretical contributions of researchers on the migration of different nationalities in different time periods, I identify the challenges faced by countries and migrants due to mass migration. In particular, it was determined that the main reason for migrating was the danger to life.

Therefore, migration has a historical and economic impact on the economic development of countries in order to find a safe life, enrich well-being, and reduce poverty.

In particular, Vergnano (2024) studied the European countries' dependence on migrant labour during the pandemic. The author examined the forms of resistance caused by migrants during the EU border regime during COVID-19, which were the result of state-imposed restrictions on migration mobility. The author also notes the dependence of the agricultural sector in some EU countries on migrant labour. This approach emphasizes the need for a logistical approach to migration management that will combine the socio-economic rights of migrant workers and employers.

Aldieri et al. (2024) justified that economic development in Europe depends on the share of migrants in the population. The study found that the economic development of countries increases where the share of migrants is higher and their level of education is higher. Therefore, this approach proves the need to improve the education of low-skilled migrants, which will have a positive impact on innovation.

Fiałkowska et al. (2024) studied the history of the development of the Polish Roma migration. This study points to the inequality of citizenship between the Roma and the Polish family groups. This approach indicates the existence of negative attitudes towards this ethnic group and the need to identify the reasons for this. It also shows how this ethnic group among migrants affects the economic development of European countries.

Deneva (2024) investigated the moral economy of welfare through a study of Bulgarian Roma migrants between Bulgaria and the Netherlands. This study indicates that the Roma violate the structural conditions of the modern labour regime and obtain social citizenship through fraud. This approach indicates their negative impact on the socio-economic development of this nationality in Europe and many unresolved migration issues that lead to such consequences through existing nations that live largely on social assistance.

Papadopoulos & Fratsea (2024) investigated the important contribution of migrant labour to the agricultural sector of the Mediterranean economy. The impact of the popularity of the production function of international migration indicates an economic recession and, accordingly, the consequences for the economies of countries through their contributions to the agricultural sector of the economy. This approach characterizes the imbalance between supply and demand due to migration and causes a depressive process in the economic situation of a particular country, characterized by zero GNP growth or its decline.

Scalise (2023), Freeman & Kessler (2008), Pascucci (2022) and Martin et al. (2012) explored migration policy through political economy, the relationship between migrants and politics, and future pathways through welfare theory. The study points to regulating migrant inflows and their impact on labour markets. However, this approach also takes into account challenges and prospects for Europe that appear due to mass migration and the need to integrate into the EU because of the imbalance of the economically active people and the shrinking working age population.

Chung (2016) determined the development of China through the Chinese migration and its investment impact on Europe, which have political and socio-cultural implications.

Yamanlar (2020) examined the growth of migration to Europe after World War II. The growth occurred due to the need for foreign labour, economic crises, and globalization processes. However, this approach points to the European economy's dependence on migrants at the macro level and conflicts in third countries. As we can see, migration movements are only increasing at historical turning points. An example is the Ukrainian migration to Europe, which is the largest migration wave since World War II. Therefore, it is necessary to change immigration policies in European countries.

Begu et al. (2019) highlighted the relationship between corruption and migration from 2008–2016 and proved that the increase in migration is caused by the growth in corruption in the countries from which migrants flee. Therefore, it is possible to assume that a significant share of Ukrainian migrants will remain in Europe due to the high level of corruption in Ukraine, which has been identified by various countries.

Kersan-Skabic & Buric (2022) studied emigration and immigration in Europe and their impact on the economies of the countries in the period between 2006 and 2019. The result confirmed the statistically significant impact of the number of emigrants on incomes in immigration countries, while the number of immigrants showed no significant impact. This explains why migration flows in Europe have increased after the EU enlargement and confirms the importance of migrant inflows for recipient countries in Europe.

Andersson (2016) explored Europe's challenges due to irregular migration using examples from the Spanish African borders. There is a constant "border crisis" because of irregular migration, despite strengthening the efforts by EU member states to strengthen border controls. This approach points to the problems in recipient countries due to illegal migration in Europe, which have political consequences.

Scalettaris et al. (2019) investigated that young migrant, using the example of young Afghans, must constantly prove their success in recipient countries through their behaviour, which is supported by a code of conduct and involves mutual obligations and collective responsibility, as well as social obligations. This approach indicates a constant competition between migrants and the local population, as migrants are motivated to work efficiently for successful integration by meeting all social, political, and moral norms, thereby competing with a certain percentage of the local population, which leads to a negative reaction of the latter to migrants. Such an example confirms the need for young migrants to focus their efforts on education in order to obtain qualifications and, subsequently, decent wages in the recipient country, which will increase their competitiveness at the regional and global levels.

Parello (2019) determined that competitive equilibrium in the countries' economies depends on the percentage level of migration in them, as well as the need to expand access to international financial markets not only for natives but also for migrants with restrictions, which will lead to equilibrium in the countries' economies. This approach determines the need to form a new economic model through labour migration.

Ganoczy (2017) identifies a serious threat to European countries and further EU development due to migration issues. This approach only confirms that Europe is not sufficiently prepared for increased migration and that the EU has to integrate into economic activity in various sectors of the economy.

Antczak (2023) studied the effects of the migration hand in the world. International labour migration proves to lead to exchanging professional experience, the development of innovative technologies, and increased labour productivity. This approach indicates a positive response of migration flows to changes in the global economy and the emergence of better working conditions and wages than in the migrants' countries of origin.

Researchers Kohler et al. (2023) found that international migration improves risk-sharing at the international level. Countries characterized by higher levels of migration are better insured against idiosyncratic consumption shocks.

The role of migration for monetary unions was emphasized in the fundamental work of Mundell (1961) «A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas». The role of international migration in synchronising business cycles in the European Union was studied by Beck (2021). Such benefits associated with international migration contribute to closer synchronization of business cycles. Countries with closely

synchronized business cycles are one of the major conditions for the effective functioning of a monetary union. These approaches confirm the positive impact of migration on the economic development of countries that receive migrants.

Thus, the migration movement definitely affects the development of the economy of European countries (European Commission, 2016; Copyright, 2024; EC, 2020). Despite the significant scientific, theoretical, and practical achievements in this area, there is an urgent need to continue covering problematic issues caused by the constant change in the market environment and trends associated with the largest migration wave of the Ukrainian population to Europe since the Second World War.

### **3. Methodology and data**

The methodological basis of the study was a systematic review of the literature on the fundamental principles of political science analysis of migration issues; analysis and synthesis (when processing statistical data); as well as systematic (when reflecting the phenomenon of migration movement in European countries, global migration processes), comparative analysis (to determine the distribution of refugees by segmentation; determining the level of support of European countries; the contribution of migrants to retail turnover and the impact on fiscal needs), historical (when defining ethnic migration groups for different periods; the number of migrants who arrived in); the Pareto principle (when evaluating the largest share of European countries' assistance to Ukrainian migrants); and expert assessments (when identifying the level of integration of Ukrainian migrants based on reports from their surveys).

The study was supported by the information base of the following government programs and statistical reports: data from the Centre for Economic Strategy in Ukraine, data from the Centre for Migration Studies; Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration - 2024; Eurostat; European Council on Refugees and Eeiles; European Investment Bank; portal Eurofound; European Commission; European Union; International Monetary Fund; Global data institute displacement tracking matrix; International Organisation for Migration IOM; Migration data portal; National Bank of Ukraine; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; Reports Oxford Economics; Portal of Polish Information; Statista; Ukrainian world congress; Ukrinform; United Nations.

The structure of the article is as follows: The study was conducted in several stages; it begins with analysing migration trends by country, identifying the permanent nationalities migrating to Europe and the transport routes they use to cross the border, which indicate an uneven distribution of migrants in European countries by nationality. Below are the data of the largest migration of the Ukrainian population in history caused by the war in Europe. I examine the EU protection and support programs for Ukrainian migrants, which increase the labour force and population in Europe. This contributes to the economic well-being of the European countries. The impact of migrants from Ukraine on the economic development of European countries is analysed. I also test two hypotheses, which reveal the following: The economic growth of European countries due to the migration of the Ukrainian population to Europe, and the successful integration of Ukrainian refugees since the beginning of the war in Europe. Finally, I discuss how migration will be affected by the approved EU migration pact, whose rules of innovation will force an even distribution of migrants across the EU. The final stage is the development of a scenario of expected developments with the support of Ukrainian migrants through the creation of a "Simplified EU Legalization Program for Ukrainians". It is the directions of this program that will create favourable conditions for legalization of Ukrainian migrants in the EU, which will contribute to the well-being of migrants and the development of host countries.

## 4. Results

The migration wave of the Ukrainian population that hit European countries has caused the world to adapt to the circumstances caused by the war in Europe. On 24 February 2022, Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine compelled about 14% of the Ukrainian population, from the largest country in Europe, to migrate to countries around the world, including Europe.

To better understand the impact of Ukrainian refugees on the economic development of European countries, I conduct a study of the migration movement of other nations, substantiate two hypotheses, identify the financial challenges of European countries due to the increase in migrants, the impact of migrants on the economic development of European countries and reveal the goal.

### 4.1. Migration trends in Europe

The term "migration" comes from the Latin *migratio*, meaning 'resettlement'. In essence, it is the movement of a person or groups of people between countries, regions, and cities that takes place consciously and of their own free will, more often with the aim of changing their place of residence.

Accordingly, emigrants are migrants who leave a country for another, and immigrants are migrants who enter a country. When emigrating, a person does not just go abroad for a few months but plans to stay in a new place for a long time, looking for housing and work there. If this person is a specialist in a certain field, his or her departure is often called a "brain drain". Some countries lose scientists, artists, and businessmen this way. It turns out that this phenomenon is unprofitable for the state.

The study of refugee assistance organisations has determined that World War II was one of the largest disasters in human history. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, warfare, and occupation forced 40 to 60 million people, mostly from Eastern and Central Eastern Europe, to flee their homes in the hope of escaping Nazi Germany. One of the consequences of this war was the creation of the United Nations, an institution whose main goal was to prevent similar catastrophes similar disasters in the future to strengthen peace and security around the world. However, the UN could not solve the problem of refugees, so two years after its foundation, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) was established to deal with aspects of forced migration. Less than 10 years later, it was replaced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which operates today and addresses key issues in the field of migrant rights protection and has offices in 135 countries. The agency helps political migrants obtain refugee status in their countries of destination or resettle in third-world safe countries, provides humanitarian assistance, conducts massive information campaigns to raise awareness of the refugee issue, collects donations, and develops a network of Goodwill Ambassadors involving famous sports figures, authors, and musicians. In the 1950s, a separate UN Relief and Works Agency was also set up to help Palestinian refugees.

However, despite the development, the UNHCR leaves many migration issues unresolved due to its own bureaucratic inefficiencies, bureaucracy, and desire to cooperate and maintain good relations with governments even in those states that, at best, are not making progress in building a fair asylum system, and at worst, are inhospitable and dangerous for refugees.

Therefore, at the beginning of the study, we will find out the dynamics of migrant arrivals to European countries from 2015–2022 to determine how migrants have been moving over this period

**Table 1.** Number of arrivals to Europe by country in 2015–2022.

Countries	Years								Deviations 2022/2021	
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Absolute	Relative %
EU 27 countries (from 2020)	4055071	3693495	3751814	3942303	4216138	326876	410338	6977742	2874361	26
Germany	1571047	1029852	917109	893886	886341	728606	874367	2071690	1197323	42
Spain	342114	414746	532132	643684	750480	467918	887960	1258894	370934	12.9
France	364221	377709	369621	387158	385591	293237	336398	431017	94619	3.3
Italy	280078	300823	343440	332324	332778	247526	318366	410985	92619	3.2
Czechia	29602	64083	51847	65910	105888	63095	69360	347429	278069	9.7
Netherlands	166872	189232	189646	194306	215756	182244	214105	326798	112693	3.9
Romania	132795	137455	177435	172578	202422	145519	194642	293024	98382	3.4
Poland	218147	208302	209353	214083	226649	210615	241116	275515	34399	1.2
Belgium	146626	123702	126703	137860	150006	118683	139743	208356	68613	2.4
Austria	166323	129509	111801	105633	109167	103565	118511	201622	83111	2.9
Switzerland	153627	149305	143377	144857	145129	138778	144907	167079	22172	0.8
Ireland	80792	85185	78499	97712	85630	74211	80732	157537	76805	2.7
Croatia	11706	13985	15553	26029	37726	33414	35912	57972	22060	3.3
Malta	16936	17051	21676	26444	28341	13885	18148	34964	16816	4.8
Portugal	29896	29925	36639	43170	72725	67160	50721	117843	67122	2.3
Denmark	78492	74383	68579	64669	61384	57230	63489	121183	57694	2
Lithuania	22130	20162	20368	28914	40067	43096	44858	87367	42509	1.5
Greece	64446	116867	112247	119489	129459	84221	57120	96662	39542	1.4
Norway	60816	61460	53351	47864	48680	36287	53947	90475	36528	1.3
Estonia	15413	14822	17616	17547	18259	16209	19524	49414	29890	1.04
Latvia	9479	8345	9916	10909	11223	8840	12689	38708	26019	0.9
Hungary	58344	53618	68070	82937	88581	75470	80471	94148	13677	0.5
Finland	28746	34905	31797	31106	32758	32898	36364	49998	13634	0.5
Sweden	134240	163005	144489	132602	115805	82518	90631	102436	11805	0.4
Slovenia	15420	16623	18808	28455	31319	36110	23624	35613	11989	0.4
Luxembourg	23803	22888	24379	24644	26668	22490	25335	31433	6098	0.2
Cyprus	15183	179391	21306	23442	26170	25861	24001	31052	7051	0.2
Iceland	5635	8710	12116	11830	9872	8544	8996	14878	5882	0.2
Bulgaria	25223	21241	25597	29559	37929	37364	39461	40619	1158	0.04
Liechtenstein	657	607	645	649	727	713	669	770	101	0.003
Slovakia	6997	7686	7188	7253	7016	6775	5733	5463	−270	−0.01
United Kingdom	631452	588993	644209	603953	680906	0	0	0	0	
Montenegro	4553	4904	6684	8643	10737	6008	0	0	0	


Source: Statistics Explained, (2024).

We are witnessing a sharp increase in migrants, especially in 2022, among European countries. This is due to the war in Ukraine, which has led to the mass migration of the Ukrainian population to European countries, facilitated by numerous support programmes of European countries for Ukrainian migrants.

The results of Table 1 also indicate an increase in migrants in European countries an 8.6% increase in 2022 compared to the previous period. Germany received the largest total number of refugees (2.1 million) in 2022, followed by Spain (1.3 million), France (0.4 million), Italy (0.4 million), and Czechia (0.3 million migrants). The top 10 European countries in terms of the number of refugees accepted are The Netherlands (6th place: 0.33 million people), Romania (7th place: 0.3 million people), Poland (8th place: 0.27 million people), Belgium (9th place: 0.21 million people), Austria (10th place: 0.2 million people). They are followed by Switzerland (0.17 million people) and Ireland (0.16 million people). This increase in 2022 was due to Ukrainian migrants who were forced to migrate due to the war in the country.

In 2022, all 27 EU Member States reported more immigration than emigration, while in 2021, 4 EU Member States (Croatia, Greece, Latvia, and Romania) had more emigrants than immigrants. In addition, compared to 2021, all Member States, except for Slovakia, recorded an increase in the total number of immigrants in 2022: the largest increase in relative terms between 2021 and 2022 was observed in Czechia (401%), Latvia (205%), Estonia (153%), Germany (137%), and Portugal (132%) (ESE, 2024).

It should be noted that different nationalities are among the migrants to Europe OECD (2023). The most common ones in 2024 are shown in Figure 1 (IOM, 2024a). The most influential migration inflow to Europe in 2022–2024 is considered to be the migration of the Ukrainian population, but the impact of this nationality is analysed in the next section. Therefore, the following Figure 1 and Table 2 show the interest of other nationalities in migrating to Europe, as well as which countries have become the most popular for them and the reasons for their migration.



**Figure 1.** Top 10 nationalities that arrived in Europe in 2024, source: IOM, (2024a).

Based on the IOM survey of 1,484 migrants from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo between 1 March and 31 March 2024, the profiles, experiences, needs, routes, and intentions of migrants transiting the Western Balkans were identified (IOM, 2023). Turkey emerged as the main centre from which migrants departed for the Western Balkans. The survey results indicated that 85% left Turkey for economic reasons, 20% due to discrimination, and 15% for family reunification.



The top 10 most popular countries for ethnic nationalities to migrate to include: Germany (47%), Italy (21%), France (9%), Spain (5%), the Netherlands (4%), Belgium (4%), Austria (3%), Portugal (2%), the United Kingdom (2%), and Denmark (1%) (IOM, 2024b).

The results of Table 2 show that migrants wishing to enter Europe in 2024 used different modes of transportation. Furthermore, the largest number of them arrived by sea. According to the United Nations, 63,000 migrants have died or gone missing in the last decade (United Nations, 2024; Ukrinform, 2024). However, according to the IOM, there has been a decrease in the number of migrant deaths and disappearances between 2016 and 2024 (IOM, 2024a).

**Table 2.** Migration flows to Europe in 2024, people.

Dead and missing migrants to Europe	Arrival by land transport	Arrival by sea	Total arrivals
916	1998	50055	52053

Source: IOM, (2024a).

It should be noted that the hostilities and war crimes in Syria, which have been repeatedly documented by international organizations, as well as the tragic deaths of thousands of migrants at sea while trying to reach Europe, show that the threats were quite real.

It is essential to note that in addition to legal migration, there is an illegal one (crossing the border in violation of the established rules without the necessary documents), which is highly widespread. The criminalization of migration turns refugees into criminals. Recently, many countries have tightened border control, erected barrier walls and fences, destroyed refugee camps, and deployed army units; however, these methods have not yielded strikingly positive results.


Lacking access to transportation routes, refugees resort to the services of carriers and pay the last of their money, and when they do not have enough to pay for the transportation for the whole family, they send part of the family, including children, without receiving any guarantees and risking their lives on the way. For example, in 2020, Spain officially accepted almost 80% of refugees from South Sudan and Morocco who sought asylum. Furthermore, the state fiercely opposes refugees entering the country illegally, even if this leads to increasing mortality when these people try to reach the territory of the European Union.

Therefore, we determine that migrants from Africa, Asia, and Arab countries are interested in moving to European countries when fleeing from danger, while there is an uneven distribution of migrants across European countries, which causes certain economic problems for some countries (United Nations, 2024).

#### *4.2. Ukrainian migration to European countries*

In 2022 alone, migration to the EU countries increased by 8.5% (ODP, 2024). The overwhelming majority of migrants were Ukrainian refugees, whose migration was caused by Russia's aggressive full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022.

More than 5.5 million refugees from Ukraine applied for asylum, temporary protection, or similar national protection programs in Europe in 2022–2024 (Figure 2) (MDP, 2024).



**Figure 2.** The total number of refugees from Ukraine to the EU countries in the period from 24.02.2022–15.02.2024. Source: MDP, (2024).

As of April 18, 2024, the UNHCR has registered 5,930,386 refugees from Ukraine across Europe (CReAM, 2024). This amounts to about 14% of Ukraine's population (according to Eurostat estimates for 2021). The overwhelming majority of refugees are women (the largest share is women aged 35–49 –13%) and children. Only 5,605,398 refugees have registered for temporary protection in Europe (CReAM, 2024). The peak of the exodus occurred between March 1 and March 15, 2022, with about 40% of Ukrainians leaving the country in November 2022 (EC Data Browser, 2024). The first hopes that the fighting would end quickly were dashed; Russian troops continued to advance in all directions, sparing no Ukrainians who might be caught in the line of fire. Another 12.8% of respondents left in the second half of March, and 9.6% left in April. In the following months, fewer and fewer people travelled abroad. Experts recognized that the most significant period in terms of vulnerability was at least two weeks since February 2022 (IOM, 2023a).

Figure 3 shows the distribution of Ukrainian refugees by age segmentation in 2022. The analysis shows that 17.3% of families consisting of a husband and wife went abroad, 13.3% went alone; 59.3% went with minor children.


As we can see, the majority of Ukrainian migrants are women and their children. Almost a quarter of the total population (23%) left Zaporizhzhia region for other countries, followed by Kyiv (19%) and Kyiv region (19%), Dnipropetrovsk (18%), Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions (16% each).

This is due to the proximity to the occupied territories and the increased level of insecurity in these regions of the country.


Figure 4 shows the number of Ukrainians who arrived in Europe by country as of 2024.

As of 2024, the 80/20 Pareto distribution of Ukrainian migrants across European countries shows that 20% of the efforts to support the Ukrainian population are mainly directed towards Germany (30% of Ukrainian migrants) and Poland (22% of Ukrainian migrants) (Economic Truth, 2024). These countries account for 80% of all EU programs supporting Ukrainian migrants, with the remaining countries providing 20% of support efforts.

Among the countries outside Europe, the largest countries in terms of the number of Ukrainian refugees accepted since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine are the United States (280,000 people), the United Kingdom (253,200 people), and Canada (210,200 people) (Economic Truth, 2024).



**Figure 3.** Share of main population groups by segmentation who received temporary protection in the EU 2022–2023 (%). Source: Eurofound (2024b). Notes: EU total excluding Ireland and Hungary; Data by age group are not available; France: data for minors generally not included. Germany: Data are not available from March 2022 to July 2022. Percentages do not odd up to 100% due to rounding.




**Figure 4.** The number of refugees from Ukraine registered in February 2022 as of March 2024, divided by individual countries. Source: Statista (2024).

In the European Union, the Temporary Protection Directive was enacted to ease the significant influx of refugees from Ukraine. Despite the large number of new registrations for temporary

protection in 27 EU countries, especially in Poland (1.6 million), Germany (1.1 million), and Czechia (590,000), in the first half of 2022, the number of new registrations has slowed down since the third quarter of 2022 (ESE, 2024; OECD, 2023; IOM, 2024c).

Fortunately for Ukrainian refugees, they have not experienced the same treatment as other nationalities when migrating to Europe (European Commission, 2022a; EC, 2024a). European countries have taken prompt political measures to respond to the ongoing war in Ukraine, and most of them have agreed to accept Ukrainian war refugees under various immigration schemes and conditions (IOM, 2024c). However, the results indicate that in 2023 these countries were no longer as active in accepting Ukrainian migrants as in 2022 (Figure 5).

Despite the fact that the major EU countries that accepted refugees from Ukraine were Germany, Poland, and Czechia, many countries gradually reduced some of the costs for refugees and made conditions more stringent than at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.



**Figure 5.** Decisions on temporary protection in the EU, quarterly data 2022–2023. Source: MDP (2024).

The study by the Migration data portal completed in December 2023 showed that almost 4.5 million people had returned to Ukraine (MDP, 2024). This statistic includes people who returned after a minimum period abroad of two weeks since February 2022 but not to their places of usual residence in the country (IOM, 2023).

In general, 70% of Ukrainian refugees are satisfied with their current residence in the country of their present stay. The highest percentage among European countries was recorded in Germany (74%), Czechia (73%) and France (71%) (CES, 2024a).

Declining migration rates, favourable government policies, cultural and linguistic similarities (in Germany, Czechia and Poland), a tight labour market and high wage growth all increase the chances

that a significant part of refugees will stay in European countries. This suggests that this part of the migrants will stay in the European countries for various reasons, and they need certainty and stability (CES, 2024a; CES, 2024b).

### *4.3. Financial challenges of European countries due to migrants*

The migration crisis is having a negative impact on all European countries, but there is one area that, according to experts, can benefit from the influx of refugees and economic migrants: the economy.

Many experts believe that the current situation with migrants is a manifestation of the end of European civilization. For others, the current situation with migrants has become a manifestation of the ineffectiveness of European institutions and organisational structures created to regulate migration flows, a symbol of the failure of the “managed migration” policy.

The colonial past of many European states has created and continues to reproduce many crises and inequalities, which in turn force people from African and Middle Eastern countries to flee to Europe. Political refugees are more likely to come due to military conflicts than climate change and hunger, although all these things are very closely related. Violence and terrorism are also among the reasons for migrants from some of the countries shown in Figure 6.

It should be noted that there have been cases where the Roma refugees have been denied assistance due to a lack of resources or places to stay, while ethnic Ukrainian refugees have received this assistance. This proves hidden racism, which can sometimes be openly articulated. Such refugees are also called economic migrants.

Another tool to combat «economic migrants» is the narrative of the hierarchy of suffering, meaning that only those who are in truly extreme conditions, such as in a war zone, preferably active, with a bomb falling somewhere nearby and evidence of it.

Besides, despite the additional financial challenges of European countries due to the volume of social payments of support programmes, there has been a positive impact on the countries’ budgets and economic growth. An example of this result is the taxes paid by Ukrainian migrants in Poland and Czechia. According to the Centre for Migration Research, Ukrainians employed in Poland and Czechia paid more taxes than the financial costs of their assistance, although the data does not include education and healthcare costs (in 2022) (Tucha et al., 2022).

However, there has been an increase in unemployment in Germany due to the inclusion of migrants in the statistics since June 2022, but there are no signs of changes in the labour market (Tucha et al., 2022). Germany is one of the most popular countries that advocates an active policy of migrant integration of all nations. Germany protects refugees and calls for combating such causes around the world. This low level of migrant employment has several reasons.

The results of the Ukrainian refugees’ survey showed that Germany provides more efforts (28.6%) than all other countries to teach German and provide social assistance, compared to 1.6% in Czechia, 0.6% in Poland, and 0% in Italy (CES, 2024).

It is worth noting that Germany was expecting workers to take over service jobs and those requiring physical strength. To accelerate the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the labour market, the federal Job-Turbo program was created in 2023, according to which the time interval between migrants’ interviews with employment specialists should not exceed six weeks. Migrants were not required to have a vocational education, and companies gave refugees more chances to get a job, even with imperfect language skills, which should be improved on the spot.


However, the state program did not work. According to a German employment agency, more than 1% of Ukrainian women found jobs in 2023. This was less than in 2022 (2%). Experts attribute this to the fact that first of all, large cities' residents left Ukraine for Europe to wait until the fighting ended, as well as there are those who wanted to improve their own standard of living in Europe.

Another reason for the high unemployment in Germany is that half of Ukrainian refugees have higher education and apply for skilled jobs of a superior level than those offered by the country. This trend is also observed in other European countries, where Ukrainian refugees are forced to work in lower-level positions than their professional designation.

Thus, starting in the 2024–2025 school year, schools in Hesse (Germany) are planning to start teaching Ukrainian as a second foreign language. This is the first federal state in Germany to take such a step. The project will involve the first schools in the country with many Ukrainian students and young people without Ukrainian roots. Thus, Hesse will improve educational opportunities for young people from Ukraine and offer Ukrainian teachers new prospects, as there are about 20,000 students from Ukraine studying in Hesse. In addition, there are more than 300 Ukrainian teachers working in Hessian schools.

It should also be noted that in 2024, Germany significantly accelerated the granting of refugee status, especially for professionals who are qualified and can find a job. In this case, refugees receive a work visa and promising rules for reunifying foreign professionals with their families.

It is worth noting that the share of Ukrainians with higher education is higher among refugees than among the population of Ukraine as a whole, so the departure of refugees contributed to the brain drain from Ukraine. Since refugees with higher education are less likely to return to Ukraine than other refugee groups, they are interested in obtaining education and language training in the host country, and this brain drain may turn from a temporary to a permanent phenomenon (CES, 2024a). As we can see, Germany is interested in providing assistance with language learning in order to keep qualified professionals with families to enhance its economic and demographic development. The above summarization of the results made it possible to identify endogenous and exogenous factors influencing the problems of migrants in recipient countries in Figure 6.



**Figure 6.** Factors influencing the problems of migrant. Source: Developed by the author.

It should be added that among the above-mentioned challenges, the key one is the process of integration into the host country's society, which arises due to socially vulnerable reasons (a woman with children may face difficulties in enrolling children in the kindergarten and finding time to learn the language). Another reason is the language barrier. This is due to the fact that not all European countries provide the opportunity to study the language of their country for free up to a certain language or professional level or provide the opportunity to study with an imperfect system of getting language material (for example, Ukrainian migrants learning Polish from a teacher who only speaks Polish, not Ukrainian). As we can see, not all countries provide free interpreters for migrants in cities where social and health services are provided.

Table 3 shows the results of a survey of Ukrainian migrants who indicated the level of assistance in some European countries in various areas. We believe that one of the most important areas of assistance is housing support.

**Table 3.** Level of assistance to Ukrainian migrants in some countries in 2022.

Type of assistance	Germany, %	Poland, %	Czechia, %	France, %	Italy, %	Others, %
Language courses	67.2	12.4	21.2	36.6	34.9	35.9
Social benefits	71.8	30.4	28.9	48.8	51.5	39.5
Provision of housing	76.3	13.7	15.4	56.1	34.9	37.8
Education (for children)	34.6	14.9	13.5	29.3	34.5	17.7
Education (for adults)	14.1	2.5	3.9	9.8	15.1	15.0
Humanitarian aid	29.4	9.9	9.6	46.3	30.1	26.2
Psychological support	9.6	5.6	3.9	12.2	10.6	9.0
Medical assistance	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.9
Assistance in the form of childcare	6.8	0.6	0.0	4.9	0.5	4.0
Other	1.1	0.6	1.9	0.0	1.5	1.0

Source: CES (2024a), CES (2024b).

Consequently, the living conditions of Ukrainians in different EU countries vary significantly. Germany is the country where Ukrainians receive the best social benefits and housing. However, assistance to refugees from Poland and Czechia has decreased or does not exist any longer. On the other hand, restrictions to housing and public services, as well as social benefits, may limit the scale of migration (CES, 2024a; CES, 2024b). This confirms the rapid integration of Ukrainians who intend to stay in European countries and are, therefore, forced to go to work instead of learning the language.

Despite the overall decrease in support received, the level of assistance to refugees remains significant: approximately 71% of refugees receive assistance of some kind. In November 2022, this figure was 92.5% (CES, 2024a). European countries continue to support Ukrainian refugees, but financial challenges have forced countries to reconsider the level of assistance to Ukrainians in order to ensure their rapid integration and balance the economy in the EU.

#### 4.4. *The impact of migrants from Ukraine on the economic development of European countries*

The Oxford Economics study provides more conservative estimates of the economic activity of migrants from Ukraine (Oxford Economics, 2024). Here are the results of the study of some countries. Thus, if 650,000 Ukrainian migrants stay in Poland, the labour force will grow by an additional

210,000 (1.2%) by 2030, and the potential GDP will increase by 1.2% compared to the baseline forecast of Oxford Economics (Tucha et al., 2022). Instead, the inflow of 1 million migrants will increase the labour force by 370 thousand (2.1%) and potential GDP by 2.0% by 2030. In the long run, by 2050, the positive impact will go up: potential GDP will exceed the baseline forecast by 1.7% in the first scenario (+650 thousand migrants) and by as much as 2.9% in the second (+1 million migrants). According to the Deloitte report, the integration of Ukrainian IDPs in Poland could lead to additional GDP growth of 0.2–3.5% annually in the first five years, depending on the quality of the country's integration policy, with the favourable factors being increased labour market flexibility and resolving problems with the housing market. Kancs and Lecca (2018) estimate that the inflow of about 2.3 million migrants to the EU in the first three years (followed by a significant decline in the number of new migrants) contributed to an increase in GDP from 0.2% in the first year to 1.3% by 2040, assuming full integration. Moreover, the long-term (over nine years) financial benefits of migrant adaptation (social benefits, language, and vocational training) outweighed the short-term costs of such programs.

Despite the positive effects of the migrants' presence, there are challenges associated with them. For example, the costs of Ukrainian migrants were an additional factor in the high inflation rate in the EU, which, amid a significant increase in energy prices in 2022, reached record levels in a decade, in particular in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Hungary—over 20% YoY, in Czechia and Poland—about 18% YoY, and in the Eurozone—up to almost 10% YoY (IMF, 2024).

As migration has reached record levels worldwide, economists are deciding which industries are becoming too dependent on foreign labour. It is worth noting that due to the prolonged war scenario in Ukraine, Ukrainian migrants who have already settled down in Europe are more likely to stay in their host countries. This will have a positive impact on population growth in Europe, which is experiencing an aging population problem, as well as on the growth of the economic well-being of the EU population as a whole.


Ukraine's geographical and cultural proximity to Europe, the presence of a diaspora, and temporary protection status contribute to increased labour force participation of forced migrants. Family reunification and childcare will be key to assessing the impact on labour supply.

Using OECD estimates of the contribution of Ukrainian migrants to the labour force in European countries and considerations of Strzelecki et al. (2022) of their impact on GDP growth in Poland, we make assumptions about the impact of Ukrainian migrants on the economies of other countries by extrapolating these effects with taking into account the number of migrants. As a result, the additional contribution to the annual GDP growth rates of Czechia, Poland, and Estonia will be about 1.2 percentage points per year, while the contribution of migrants to the GDP of Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Romania will be almost 0.8 percentage points. Such estimates, however, may be somewhat overstated because unlike economic migration in 2013–2018, migration in 2022 is forced and has a different demographic structure, so the level of integration may be lower.

Based on the results of the UN survey and the IMF study, the contribution of Ukrainian migrants to the output of goods and services in Estonia, Poland, and Czechia was estimated. It is determined that in 2026 their contribution will be 2.2–2.3% higher than in the scenario without migration and 0.5–0.65% higher in Germany (IMF, 2024).

The estimates are based on the UN survey data on the share of women with children in the total number of IDPs at 87%, the share of migrants aged 18–59, the average number of children per woman in Ukraine (1.2), and the assumption that 70% of migrants of working age will be employed throughout the period (Figure 7).





**Figure 7.** Retail turnover dynamics, 12.2016=100, seasonally adjusted data. Source: IMF (2024).

The data for 2024 shows in which countries the contribution of Ukrainians is the largest. Poland and Germany became the leaders among countries in terms of the number of non-cash payments (28% and 10% of the total) (Visit Ukraine, 2024).

As for the Czech Republic, which hosts about 400,000 refugees from Ukraine, almost 90% of able-bodied Ukrainian refugees are already employed, and in the first quarter of 2024, budget revenues from them exceeded expenditures by almost two times. Tax revenues and other contributions of Ukrainian refugees to the Czech budget were almost twice as high as their expenditures. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, in the first half of 2024, revenues amounted to 11.7 billion CZK (about 465 million euros) (Visit Ukraine, 2024). The Czech authorities believe that refugees from Ukraine have long contributed much more to their budget than they spend on their assistance.

In the first quarter of 2024, expenditures on refugees amounted to CZK 3.8 billion, and income amounted to CZK 5.8 billion. In the second quarter of 2024, expenditures decreased to CZK 3.5 billion, and revenues increased to CZK 5.9 billion. Thus, in six months, Ukrainian refugees brought the Czech state budget of 4.4 billion CZK (approximately 175 million euros) (Visit Ukraine, 2024).

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the additional contribution of Ukrainian refugees to the annual GDP growth of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Estonia is 1.2% per year, and to the GDP of Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Romania is almost 0.8%. Even in the UK, it hovers around 0.2%. These are billions of euros a year (Visit Ukraine, 2024).

Thus, by paying taxes, Ukrainians have become part of the European labor force and are already supporting the economies of the countries where they live. This only confirms that Ukrainian migration is a benefit, not a burden, for these countries.

In addition, the presence of Ukrainian migrants also affected the real estate markets of their host countries. Although only a quarter of them could rent a house on their own, the rental price has increased significantly in many cities.

The economic development of European countries is manifested through public consumption: Spending on education, healthcare, housing, and communal infrastructure. Furthermore, this will

increase challenges for the public finances of European countries. The biggest burden will be on Ukraine's neighbours and the Baltic states. However, the net fiscal effect for Europe, in the long run, will be positive, as Ukrainians actively integrate into the European labour market.

Bird and Amaglobeli (2022) estimate the short-term fiscal impact of migrants from Ukraine on EU economies at around €30–37 billion, or 0.19–0.23% of EU GDP. In their calculations, the researchers used assumptions about the number of internally displaced persons at 4.1–5.0 million and the average cost per person at €1,577 (OECD 2017 data, adjusted for inflation).

Another opinion of the researchers determined that it is impossible to estimate the financial costs of accommodating Ukrainian refugees in the EU. Only 2/3 of Ukrainians need financial support, the average cost of which is 15 thousand euros per year and is calculated for an average of 9 months. Therefore, total expenditures range from 26.4 billion to 73.3 billion euros per year. Furthermore, as mentioned, the greatest burden will be on Ukraine's neighbours and the Baltic states. According to the European Investment Bank, Latvia could spend more than 9% of its GDP on migrant adaptation, Estonia—more than 7% of its GDP, and Hungary, Poland, and Czechia—from 4% to 6% of its GDP (EIB, 2022). Instead, let us note that this estimate depends on the number of migrants and the costs per person (EC, 2024).

However, the short-term fiscal impact may be lower, depending on the help of private individuals and volunteers, and the rapid integration of Ukrainians into the labour market. However, its growth will be influenced by the costs of education, health care, and adaptation, as the share of children ranges from 28% to 44% in different countries.

In response to the increased fiscal needs, the European Council in April 2022 redistributed financial funds to help countries hosting Ukrainians. The European Commission has allocated €3.5 billion to aid the EU member states, with the largest amounts going to Poland (€562 million), Italy (€452 million), and Romania (€450 million).

According to IMF estimates, the net fiscal effect for Europe, in the long run, will be positive, as Ukrainians actively integrate into the European labour market. An example of such integration into the labour market is the payment of taxes by Ukrainian migrants in Poland and Czechia (CMR, 2024) (UWC, 2023). Since the beginning of the full-scale war, according to the Centre for Migration Research, Ukrainians employed in Poland and Czechia have paid (about \$2.4 billion) in taxes, which exceeds the amount of assistance provided, although these amounts do not take into account the costs of education and health care.

Thus, we can confirm Hypothesis 1: «The economic development of European countries is driven by the migration of the Ukrainian population to Europe». This is due to:

- increased the purchasing power of EU citizens, which has deteriorated due to Russian aggression and caused inflation. Under these conditions, the contribution of Ukrainians has become tangible;
- increased tax payments due to Ukrainian refugees who were legally employed with temporary protection status.
- use of bank cards and ATM transactions. In March 2022 alone, about \$10 billion was withdrawn abroad (Visit Ukraine, 2024).
- rental housing by refugees who can pay for housing.

All these factors strengthen the economies of European countries and contribute to the growth of real estate prices, despite the costs of education, healthcare and adaptation, and increase the demographic composition of Europe.

#### 4.5. EU support for Ukrainian refugees

On 4 March 2022, the European Union granted Ukrainians the opportunity to obtain temporary protection status. All Ukrainians, as well as citizens of other countries who legally resided in Ukraine and entered the EU after 24 February 2022, are eligible for this status. It allows Ukrainians to live in any EU country, as well as to work legally, and have access to the education and healthcare systems on an equal footing with EU citizens. The period for which temporary protection status is extended also varies in most EU countries, it is extended for a year. The status of temporary protection was first extended until 2023, then until 2024, and now until 2025.

Examining some of the rules of the European Union's support for the largest migration from Ukraine to the EU countries in history (IAA, 2022; OECD, 2022), it should be noted that in April 2022, the recommendations on the EU's response to the movement of the migrant population from Ukraine were updated (Table 4).

The TPD sets minimum standards, so the Member States have considered more favourable protection conditions for covered persons, including taking into account specific vulnerabilities and capacity-building needs for refugee reception (European Commission, 2022b). Table 4 shows the supportive measures for Ukrainian migrants in the EU countries.

**Table 4.** Updated EU response to the displacement of people from Ukraine in 2022.

Measures	Persons/states to be assisted
Response measures for people fleeing Ukraine who are not under temporary protection	Third-country residents who fall outside the scope of the TPD have access to asylum and temporary residence permits in EU countries. For people who can safely return to their home countries, residence permits are crucial, allowing time to travel, access to embassies, and support on return
Assistance to people fleeing Russia	For those who are at risk of persecution in Russia, including human rights defenders, journalists, and lawyers in need of international protection. These people can enjoy all relevant guarantees under international refugee law and CEAS as prima facie refugees. The Member States support by providing safe and legal ways and information on how to get protected.
Access at the EU borders	All people fleeing Ukraine who are eligible to enter the EU in accordance with the national law should be able to leave the country for the EU and other neighbouring countries. It is essential to reduce congestion by relaxing border controls and issuing entry permits on humanitarian grounds.
Adequate funding and allocation to those best positioned to respond	Funding for staffing of asylum systems and civil society services provided by the EU countries. AMIF national programs for the funding period (2021–2027), which provide information and legal, social, medical, and psychological support. Funding from the AMIF and “Cohesion” funds by applying the partnership principle for civil society.
Support for EU agencies on access to territory and protection in the EU	All EU Member States bordering Ukraine require support from the EU Asylum Agency, including registration, implementation of reception systems, management and exchange of information, and other technical expertise. For those Member States that do not wish to continue to seek support from the

*Continued on next page*

Measures	Persons/states to be assisted
Inclusiveness/integration	EUAA, they should demonstrate to the European Commission the alternative response mechanisms they envisage. The principle of integration has come into play since the first day. Money allocated under the AMIF, Cohesion Funds (CARE), and REACT-EU is distributed quickly, with both Member States and the EC investing in staffing.
Solidarity contributions from across the EU	All Member States should offer support, including relocation where necessary, through the Solidarity Platform
Invest in wider asylum systems	All Member States should prioritize preparations for increased arrivals by strengthening their asylum and reception capacities, including the provision of information and legal aid.
Support humanitarian aid, peace, and justice in Ukraine	Humanitarian support should be provided to Ukraine and Moldova, neighbouring countries, with the requirement to ensure humanitarian law. The EU supports all forms of dialogue that lead to a ceasefire. Governments support efforts to collect evidence and testimonies relating to crimes under international law committed in Ukraine.

Source: Ecre (2022).

As can be seen from the table, the EU supports Ukrainian migrants and all those fleeing the war from Russia in various ways.

Initially, one of the most visible manifestations of broad support for Ukrainian refugees was the provision of housing, for example, by private households, non-governmental organizations, and businesses. Table 5 analyses support for Ukrainian migrants at the level of housing problems in different European countries in early 2022.

**Table 5.** Terms and conditions of housing programs in some countries, provided mainly by private households in early 2022.

Country	Name/description	Time/trends/expectations/duration	Compensation/	Magnitude (number/% of refugees or number/% of host families)
Finland	Home accommodation	Initially temporary, but long-term housing should be the aim	No	46% (includes housing in other private apartments)
France	Mobilisation of citizens willing to open their homes or provide accommodation	Compensation paid since 22 November 2022, but the initiative is now ‘running out of steam’: the number of French people who are ready and registered to house Ukrainians is lower every week, and only 1,000 of the expected 12,000 applications were received	Quarterly financial aid of €450 offered to host families	n.a.

*Continued on next page*

Country	Name/ description	Time/trends/expectations/ duration	Compensation/ duration	Magnitude (number/% of refugees or number/% of host families)
Ireland	Pledged accommodation	Declining: fewer places than expected (initially, 6,000–7,000 places were provided)	Yes, from the government	1,160 refugees as of April 2023
Latvia	State support for Latvian residents who host Ukrainian citizens in their homes free of charge	The accommodation provider was entitled to compensation for a period of accommodation of a maximum of 120 days (more if vulnerable people were placed); the scheme was temporary and lasted until 30 June 2023	Natural and legal persons are eligible; €100 per month for the first person accommodated and €50 per month for each additional person, up to a maximum of €300 per month	Data from Riga Municipality: between May and December 2022, reimbursement for voluntary accommodation was granted 910 times, resulting in 2,066 refugees being accommodated for four months
Lithuania	Compensation for providing housing for Ukrainian citizens	Compensation was to be paid until the end of 2023	Around 5,000 natural and legal persons in Lithuania received compensation 14,000 refugees have	14,000 refugees
Luxembourg	Reception with families	Lasting longer than expected, NGOs take in most of the refugees and take over from families if necessary	No	500 host families; can ask for support
Spain	Host Family Project	Initiated in April 2022; host families are required to host Ukrainian families for at least six months	No compensation, n.a. but training is provided for the host families	

Source: Eurofound (2024a).

As we can see, the provision of housing in different countries in early 2022 was widespread, for example, in many European countries, Ukrainian refugees were hosted by families with extra rooms in their homes, and others who had second homes/apartments that they provided to refugees. Today, some refugees are renting accommodation from friends. Many businesses provided their premises, which were converted into bedrooms and living quarters. In addition, non-governmental organisations play a significant role, for example, in Poland, thanks to the Ukrainian diaspora, which has also made a significant contribution to the resettlement of Ukrainian migrants. Lithuania, for example, has

established a National Voluntary Assistance Coordination Centre to help 33,000 people find housing. In Romania, Habitat for Humanity Romania converted the Edmond Centre office building into a refugees' accommodation and social centre.

To facilitate the initiatives of individuals hosting refugees from Ukraine, the EU launched the Safe Homes project in July 2022, which aims to support not only member states, but also their regional and local authorities and civil society representatives.

In December 2022, the European Commission allocated €5.5 million to a project managed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In addition, other funds under the initiative, such as the European Social Fund Plus, under the Cohesion program for refugees in Europe and the Flexible Assistance to Territories initiatives, as well as under the Asylum program, have contributed to supporting refugees.

Some countries have undertaken to compensate hosts who provided housing for refugees (Poland, Czechia, Germany, Slovenia). In particular, Finland did not pay compensation to hosts who accepted Ukrainian migrants, which is one of the reasons why Ukrainians were forced to move to another country.

As we can see, thanks to programs and initiatives to help refugees in new countries, Ukrainians were able to integrate much easier. The compensation schemes were aimed not only at incentivizing families who take in refugees but also at encouraging landlords to put their vacant properties up for sale. This helped to solve the problem of housing shortages, especially in countries where there was a lot of unoccupied real estate.

In particular, many countries have created websites that facilitate the search for host countries and refugees. These sites contain valuable information on safe housing, many of them created by non-governmental organizations. For example, in Romania, the Roof platform developed by Code for Romania helps identify places to accommodate refugees. However, one of the main challenges is the uncertainty surrounding the future of the country's 50/20 program. In Latvia, in 2022, a non-governmental organization called "I want to help refugees" created a portal for finding free housing and providing financial assistance to refugees from Ukraine. Czechia has also created its own Refugee Housing Assistance Program. However, the program is not without its drawbacks. The country had an insufficient amount of housing for refugees under this program, as the program contained some restrictions for homeowners, and not all of the indigenous population agreed with it.

According to the Eurofound, about three-quarters of EU member states have implemented Housing First programs. It remains unclear how effective such programs can contribute to solving housing problems for Ukrainian refugees. Furthermore, they have been largely successful in protecting people from homelessness.

As we can see, REH programs are able to provide housing for more than 1% of the homeless population in the country. Social housing often plays a vital role in preventing homelessness and solving the problem of homelessness.

Since 2023, some countries have revised the conditions of refugee stay for able-bodied, active, and vulnerable population with the aim of rapid integration into society (Eurofound, 2024). These countries have changed the conditions of stay; thus, refugees have faced uncertainty about the conditions under the new housing and integration program, as mentioned above. However, this did not prevent the economically active population of Ukrainian refugees from facing a new challenge, and those who intended to stay solved their housing problems on their own, as they were financially prepared for them. Thus, the EU countries have improved their economic position.

One of the conclusions of the Scandinavian research project indicates that Ukrainian refugees differ from other refugee groups. The researchers determined that Ukrainians are quick to adapt, persistent, and able to master educational programs through digital platforms, despite being in another country (Nord Forsk, 2024).

So, the results of the above data indicate that migrants from Ukraine have successfully integrated into European countries. Even though some countries have made changes to support them (reduction of social and housing assistance in 2023), they have successfully adapted to new living conditions, thus improving their living conditions and confirming their intention to stay in Europe. This happened thanks to the support of various programs and initiatives to help Ukrainian refugees by the European Union, which is substantiated by the data in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.

Therefore, we will confirm Hypothesis 2: «There has been a successful integration of Ukrainian refugees since the beginning of the war in Europe». This contributed to the economic development of European countries.

#### *4.6. Simplified legalisation program for Ukrainians*

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has activated the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants protection for a period of one year and can be extended if necessary. The maximum period of such protection is three years. On 19 October 2023, it was decided to extend the Directive for another year, until 4 March 2025 (CES, 2024a). Since all Ukrainians in the European Union are eligible for temporary protection status, as this status gives them the right to live, work, and get education and healthcare in all EU countries, the living conditions of Ukrainians in different EU countries vary significantly, and the labour situation in the EU is changing. Therefore, there is a need to create a new economic model in the EU that will determine in which sectors migrants are economically active and to reform the EU integration mechanism so that the EU can continue to effectively deal with new challenges posed by migration and these challenges do not in any way undermine the integrity of the EU and its development.

Since some of the EU countries, such as Germany, provide substantial social benefits, while others, such as Poland, have low or no such benefits, it should be borne in mind that temporary protection will only be valid until March 2025, and some Ukrainians who have lost their homes have nowhere to return to. Another share of migrants believes that life in Europe offers more promising opportunities for their children than in Ukraine. Most importantly, the longer the war lasts, the more Ukrainians will find work abroad and adapt to life there, except for the elderly and people with lower levels of education, who are more likely to return.

Let us identify the major reasons why Ukrainian migrants will stay in European countries: deteriorating economic and security situation in Ukraine and high level of uncertainty; destroyed or damaged housing; economic motives; assimilation in the host country and desire to live abroad; students of foreign universities, workers, business owners abroad and those who are not working but looking for work; and men are less likely to return to Ukraine than women because of the fear that they will be punished for leaving illegally (CES, 2024a).

The non-return of Ukrainians would have a negative impact on the Ukrainian economy, which could lose between 3.9% and 6.3% of its GDP annually.

It should be noted that on May 14, 2024, at a meeting in Brussels, 27 member states approved the EU Migration Pact, which provides for the resettlement of 30,000 migrants annually. The distribution

will be based on the population and GDP of each member state. The purpose of the migration pact is to introduce common control rules at the external borders of the European Union. The pact also contains provisions for faster processing of asylum applications or faster expulsion of people who cannot claim international protection, as well as those related to improving the procedure for identifying migrants at the borders. The advantages of this pact are the distribution of migrant settlement across all EU countries evenly, which will reduce crime and social burden (as in Britain, Spain, and Germany, where the main migrants over the past decade have been nationalities of Arab countries, Africa, and Asia).

On the negative side, the pact does not take into account the peculiarities of the countries bordering Belarus, for example, which are facing increasing pressure from the so-called “hybrid war”.

The key and most controversial element of the pact is the principle of “mandatory solidarity”. Poland opposed the pact. It was supported by Hungary, Slovakia, and most countries. Czechia, Austria, and Malta abstained. The key and controversial element of the pact is mandatory solidarity, which involves the reception of migrants. Relocation can be replaced by a financial fee of approximately 20,000 euros for each person not accepted by that country. This provision will take effect in two years.

The current rule that the first EU country a migrant enters is responsible for processing their asylum application will be retained with some changes. However, a mandatory solidarity system has been created to help countries that receive large numbers of exiles, such as Italy, Greece, and Spain.

In parallel with this reform, which will take effect no earlier than 2026, the EU is increasing the number of agreements with countries of refugees’ countries of origin and transit (Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt) in an attempt to reduce the number of arrivals at its borders (Portal of Polish Radio SA, 2024). Such new rules will make it possible to evenly distribute the settlement of migrants around the EU.

Thus, it has been determined that UNHCR is an asylum system in Europe and the world that was created after the Second World War, developed and changed in the 20th and early 21st centuries, and is now hopelessly outdated and unable to withstand the current challenges. An example is the situation with refugees from Ukraine, which has once more demonstrated that the refugee procedure common in Europe is bureaucratic and outdated, as it became possible to shelter such a large number of people only when the temporary protection procedure was introduced, not the standard refugee procedure. This indicates that the asylum system in Europe is not working properly and needs reform.

Given that Ukrainian migration increases the economic development of European countries, Ukraine is planning to join the EU, and Europe is interested in migrants from Ukraine; Figure 8 shows a scenario of expected developments if Ukrainian migrants are supported through the created «Facilitated EU Legalization Program for Ukrainians». The direction of the program will form a new economic model for the EU reforms that have to be changed due to the impact of the largest wave of Ukrainian migration since World War II.

In order to implement these areas, since all of this requires funds, a budget needs to be allocated. For this purpose, we propose to receive assistance from the EU fund, which develops ties between the EU and Ukraine.

These areas are aimed at creating favourable conditions for the legalization and integration of Ukrainian migrants in the EU, which will contribute to the well-being of migrants and the development of host countries.

Thus, regulation of migration processes at the level of EU countries should be comprehensive and systematic and carried out in two directions:

- raising the level of socio-economic development of European countries and preserving and




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creating jobs with high-quality remuneration, as well as ensuring comfortable living conditions for the population in the regions.

- adopting a simplified legalisation program to streamline migration processes in European countries.

The above reasons substantiate the logic of the proposed «Programme of simplified legalisation in the EU for Ukrainians», which will provide benefits for both EU countries and Ukrainian migrants to gain freedom of movement and choice of residence on an equal footing with EU citizens. Such rights will allow Ukrainians who remain in the EU to apply for international protection.



**Figure. 8.** Scheme of generalized effectiveness of the implementation of the directions of the «Program of simplified legalization in the EU for Ukrainians» Source: Developed by the author.

## 5. Discussion

The economy of European countries is growing, and the economy of some countries is falling due to the migrants' needs. This can lead to destroying the unity of the EU states and national identity. Since these migration processes threaten the EU's public policy, the European Commission has developed a plan to assist Ukrainian refugees based on key reforms and investments that can contribute to sustainable economic growth and strengthen the growth potential of EU countries in the medium and long term (Ecre, 2022). Programs for protecting Ukrainian migrants will help boost Europe's economy and demographics. To do this, a more favourable protection status should be granted if Ukrainians want it.

Thus, numerous approaches and advanced methods to determine the impact of migration on the economic component of European countries have tried to analyse:

- the spread of irregular migration (Andersson, 2016). This is the reason for improving migration policy in Europe, which should be one of the main elements of economic, social, and demographic strategy;
- the interdependence of European countries on the migrant labour force, which confirms the importance of the migrants' inflow for the economies of recipient countries in Europe (Vergnano, 2024; Kersan-Skabic & Buric, 2022; Yamanlar, 2020);
- the interconnection between corruption and migration (Begu et al., 2019), which identified the reasons for the increased flows of migrants to Europe.
- the need for young migrants to receive education for better adaptation and work in skilled positions (Scalettaris et al., 2019);
- political economy, the relationship between migrants and politics in Europe, which pointed to the challenges associated with imperfect migration policies in Europe (Scalise, 2023; Freeman & Kessler 2008);
- depressive processes in the economic environment due to the popularity of international migration, which is characterized by zero GNP growth, which requires balancing this impact (Papadopoulos & Fratsea, 2024; Ganoczy, 2017);
- research on the ethnic Roma who rely only on social benefits in European countries and the economic challenges associated with this (Fiałkowska et al., 2024; Deneva, 2024);
- dependence of competitive equilibrium in European economies on the share of migrants in these countries (Aldieri et al., 2024; Parello 2019);
- positive consequences of the migration movement in the world, which are manifested in sharing professional experience, developing innovative technologies, and increasing labour productivity Antczak (2023).

Thus, the migration wave has revealed a number of internal problems in European countries of a political, institutional and social nature that have to be addressed in both the short and long term.

Migration policy should be one of the main elements of the economic, social and demographic strategy of European countries. Changes in the number of external and internal labour migrants should be taken into account when formulating forecasts and programs for the European countries' development.

Since the research was conducted by scientists in different time periods and in specific areas, using different methods, and did not take into account the need for changes in migration policy related to the largest wave of Ukrainian migration since the Second World War in Europe, the study focused

on determining the impact of Ukrainian migration on the economic component of European countries, which resulted in approval of the three tested hypotheses. The author also developed a scheme of generalized effectiveness of implementing the directions of the «EU Simplified Legalization Program for Ukrainians», which will allow determining the benefits for the EU from Ukrainian migrants; benefits of Ukrainian migrants from the European Union; and expectations for the EU from Ukrainian migration in the future; expectations for Ukrainian migrants from staying in European countries and proposed directions for the «EU Simplified Legalization Program for Ukrainians».

The practical significance of using the developed scheme of generalized efficiency of implementation of the directions of the «EU Simplified Legalization Program for Ukrainians» lies in its potential application when improving in the development strategies of European countries, as well as when developing EU development strategies.

## 6. Conclusions

Thus, this study is important in the context of determining the impact of migrants from Ukraine on the economic development of European countries, as well as promoting reconciliation and social integration. The study was conducted in several stages.

In the first stage, the study examined migration trends in Europe by researching organisations that assist refugees; the number of arrivals to Europe by country from 2015 to 2022; the nationalities among migrants; and the challenges associated with transport crossing the European border for migrants.

At the second stage of the study, the inflow of the largest migration wave since World War II—the Ukrainian population—was determined based on: the total number of Ukrainian refugees in the EU countries between 2022 and 2024; distribution of Ukrainian refugees by age segmentation; the number of Ukrainians who arrived in Europe by country; among European countries, Germany, Poland and Czechia provide the greatest support to Ukrainians.

At the third stage, the author examines the financial challenges of European countries due to: the fight against «economic migrants»; payment of taxes to the budget by employed Ukrainians; factors influencing migrant-related issues; taxes paid by Ukrainian migrants that exceeded the financial costs of their assistance; rising unemployment in Germany; determining the level of assistance to Ukrainian migrants in some countries.

The next stage identified the impact of migrants from Ukraine on the economic development of European countries by increasing the flexibility of the labour market and solving problems with the housing market; the impact of labour on the European economy; assessing the contribution of Ukrainian migrants to retail turnover; assessing the financial costs of accommodating Ukrainian refugees in the EU based on the distribution of fiscal needs and tax payments by Ukrainian migrants.

The article also examines the EU rules and programs of support for Ukrainian refugees, updates on the EU responses to population movements from Ukraine, and the creation of the EU Migration Pact, and determines that the conditions of stay in European countries vary, which affects the uneven distribution of migrant settlements across the EU.

Therefore, the study resulted in confirmation of the three tested hypotheses, which proved:

1H: There is an economic development of European countries due to the migration of the Ukrainian population to Europe;

2H: There has been a successful integration of Ukrainian refugees since the beginning of the war in Europe;

Based on this, the Scheme of generalised effectiveness of the implementation of the areas of the «Program of simplified legalization in the EU for Ukrainians» was developed, which identifies the benefits and expectations for the EU and Ukrainian migrants in the future; the areas of the EU Simplified Legalization Program for Ukrainians are presented.

Among the proposed areas of the «Program of simplified legalisation in the EU for Ukrainians» are the following:

- simplified admission of Ukrainian graduates of foreign schools to European universities; recognition of diplomas and titles of scientists;
- simplified reintegration of children to study in European schools; training and retraining programs;
- permission for long-term re-education in EU countries;
- organization of regional migration analytical centres that will shape migration flows in the interests of the EU;
- socio-economic passports of the territories and posting relevant information on the portals of migration services;
- equal rights to international protection on a par with EU citizens;
- separate packages of simplified legalization for different segments of the population: retirement age, families, and youth;
- support for entrepreneurship; preferential mortgage loans lending;
- provided healthcare; creation of social programs and events, information centres, and hotlines;
- support for public initiatives; engagement of the diaspora;
- launching national or regional integration and legalization programs; funding and grants for these programs.

To implement these areas, it is proposed to allocate a budget from the EU fund that develops relations between the EU and Ukraine.

Thus, the originality of the study is determined by the development of the «Scheme of generalized efficiency of implementation of the directions of the «Simplified Legalization Program in the EU for Ukrainians», the directions of which will enable a new economic model of reforms in the European Union, which will create favourable conditions for the legalisation and further integration of Ukrainian migrants in the EU, thereby contributing to both the well-being of the migrants themselves and the development of European countries.

### **Use of AI tools declaration**

The authors declare they have not used Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools in the creation of this article.

### **Conflict of interest**

All authors declare no conflicts of interest in this paper.

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