



Research article

Optimal control of persuasive communication for emergency management

Wanglai Li, Hanzhe Yang, Huizhang Shen* and Zhangxue Huang

Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China

* **Correspondence:** Email: hzshen@sjtu.edu.cn; Tel: 86-13512171286.

Appendix

A.1. Proof of Proposition 1

When $R_0 < 1$, the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium point Q_0 , denoted as $J(Q_0)$, is given by:

$$J(Q_0) = \begin{pmatrix} -v & 0 & 0 & -\frac{k\varepsilon}{v} & -\frac{k\varepsilon}{v} \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & \frac{\alpha k\varepsilon}{v} & \frac{\alpha k\varepsilon}{v} \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & \frac{(1-\alpha)k\varepsilon}{v} & \frac{(1-\alpha)k\varepsilon}{v} \\ 0 & \beta_1 & \beta_2 & -v & 0 \\ 0 & 1-\beta_1-v & 1-\beta_2-v & 0 & -v \end{pmatrix} \quad (A1)$$

Due to the complexity of $J(Q_0)$, it is difficult to determine its definiteness by directly computing its eigenvalues. Therefore, this study uses the principal minor criterion to determine the sign-definiteness of $J(Q_0)$. The determinants of the principal minors are as follows:

$$\det(L_1) = -v < 0 \quad (A2)$$

$$\det(L_2) = v > 0 \quad (A3)$$

$$\det(L_3) = -v < 0 \quad (A4)$$

$$\det(L_4) = -k\varepsilon[\beta_1\beta_2 + (1-\alpha)(\beta_2(1-\beta_1-v) + \beta_2v) + \alpha(\beta_1(1-\beta_2-v) + \beta_1v)] + v^2 = -k\varepsilon[\alpha\beta_1 + (1-\alpha)\beta_2] + v^2 \quad (A5)$$

$$\det(L_5) = k\varepsilon v[1-v] - v^3 \quad (A6)$$

Next, we examine the sign of (A5) and (A6). Given that $R_0 < 1$, we have:

$$k\varepsilon[1-v] < v^2 \quad (A7)$$

Since $v > 0$, it follows that $\det(L_5) < 0$. Moreover, we have the following equation:

$$\alpha\beta_1 + (1-\alpha)\beta_2 < \alpha(1-v) + (1-\alpha)(1-v) = 1-v \quad (A8)$$

Therefore, $\det(L_4) > -k\varepsilon[1-v] + v^2 > 0$.

In summary, since $\det(L_1), \det(L_3), \det(L_5) < 0$, and $\det(L_2), \det(L_4) > 0$, according to the principal minor criterion, the matrix $J(Q_0)$ is negative definite. Thus, by the Routh-Hurwitz criterion, when $R_0 < 1$, the equilibrium point Q_0 of system (1) is locally asymptotically stable.

The proof is finished.

A.2. Proof of Proposition 2

When $R_0 > 1$, the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium point Q^* , denoted as $J(Q^*)$, is given by:

$$J(Q^*) = \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{\varepsilon}{U^*} & 0 & 0 & -kU^* & -kU^* \\ \frac{\alpha(\varepsilon - vU^*)}{U^*} & -1 & 0 & \alpha kU^* & \alpha kU^* \\ \frac{(1-\alpha)(\varepsilon - vU^*)}{U^*} & 0 & -1 & (1-\alpha)kU^* & (1-\alpha)kU^* \\ 0 & \beta_1 & \beta_2 & -v & 0 \\ 0 & 1-\beta_1-v & 1-\beta_2-v & 0 & -v \end{pmatrix} \quad (A9)$$

Due to the complexity of $J(Q^*)$, the principal minor criterion is again used. The determinants of the principal minors are as follows:

$$\det(L_1) = -\frac{\varepsilon}{U^*} < 0 \quad (A10)$$

$$\det(L_2) = \frac{\varepsilon}{U^*} > 0 \quad (A11)$$

$$\det(L_3) = -\frac{\varepsilon}{U^*} < 0 \quad (A12)$$

$$\det(L_4) = \frac{\varepsilon v}{U^*} - kvU^*[(1-\alpha)(\beta_2(1-\beta_1-v) + \beta_2v) + \alpha(\beta_1(1-\beta_2-v) + \beta_1v) + \beta_1\beta_2] \quad (A13)$$

$$\det(L_5) = kv^2U^*[1 - v] - \frac{\varepsilon v^2}{U^*} \quad (A14)$$

For (A13), substituting $U^* = \frac{v}{k(1-v)}$ and using equation $\alpha\beta_1 + (1 - \alpha)\beta_2 < 1 - v$, we obtain:

$$\det(L_4) = k\varepsilon[1 - v] - \frac{v^2}{(1-v)}[\alpha\beta_1 + (1 - \alpha)\beta_2] > k\varepsilon[1 - v] - v^2 \quad (A15)$$

Since $R_0 > 1$, it follows that $\det(L_4) > 0$.

For (A14), substituting U^* as above, we obtain:

$$\det(L_5) = v^3 - vk\varepsilon[1 - v] \quad (A16)$$

Given $R_0 > 1$ and $v > 0$, it follows that $\det(L_5) < 0$.

In summary, since $\det(L_1), \det(L_3), \det(L_5) < 0$ and $\det(L_2), \det(L_4) > 0$, according to the principal minor criterion, the matrix $J(Q^*)$ is negative definite. Thus, by the Routh–Hurwitz criterion, when $R_0 > 1$, the equilibrium point Q^* of system (1) is locally asymptotically stable.

The proof is finished.

A.3. Proof of Proposition 3

From Equation (4), we have $\Delta = P^* - NP^* = \frac{(\varepsilon - vU^*)}{v}[2\alpha\beta_1 + 2(1 - \alpha)\beta_2 + v - 1]$

Let $\Delta_{part} = 2\alpha\beta_1 + 2(1 - \alpha)\beta_2 + v - 1$, then the original equation can be expressed as (A17).

$$\Delta = \frac{(\varepsilon - vU^*)}{v}\Delta_{part} \quad (A17)$$

Given that $R_0 = \frac{k\varepsilon(1-v)}{v^2} > 1$, the term can be derived as $\frac{(\varepsilon - vU^*)}{v} = \frac{k\varepsilon(1-v) - v^2}{k(1-v)v} > 0$; thus, the sign of Δ depends solely on the term Δ_{part} .

Because $\beta_1, \beta_2 \in [0, 1 - v]$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, so $\Delta_{part} \in [v - 1, 1 - v]$, indicating that the interval is symmetric about zero.

The partial derivatives of Δ_{part} with respect to α, β_1, β_2 are obtained as (A18).

$$\frac{\partial \Delta_{part}}{\partial \alpha} = 2(\beta_1 - \beta_2), \quad \frac{\partial \Delta_{part}}{\partial \beta_1} = 2\alpha, \quad \frac{\partial \Delta_{part}}{\partial \beta_2} = 2(1 - \alpha) \quad (A18)$$

It is found that when $\beta_1 > \beta_2$, $\frac{\partial \Delta_{part}}{\partial \alpha} > 0$, indicating that an increase in α enhances Δ_{part} ; conversely, when $\beta_1 \leq \beta_2$, $\frac{\partial \Delta_{part}}{\partial \alpha} \leq 0$, indicating that a decrease in α enhances Δ_{part} .

Moreover, the marginal impacts of β_1 and β_2 are moderated by α : higher α amplifies the effect of β_1 , whereas lower α elevates the influence of β_2 .

Since the sign of Δ depends on Δ_{part} , and Δ_{part} is governed by the values of α, β_1 and β_2 , the size relationship between P^* and NP^* depends on the values of the parameters α, β_1, β_2 .

The proof is finished.

A.4. The equilibrium sensitivity analysis of ε , k , v

There are different combinations of α , β_1 , β_2 , corresponding to the cognitions of the netizens and persuasion strategies. We choose eight combinations to test whether the changes in ε , k , v do not affect the relative sizes of equilibrium P^* and NP^* .

To represent different netizens' cognitions and persuasion strategies, we consider eight representative combinations of α , β_1 , β_2 . For each combination, we vary ε , k , and v over plausible ranges and examine whether such changes alter the relative sizes of the persuaded and not-persuaded groups. In numerical simulation, we use long-run values $P(\infty)$ and $NP(\infty)$ as proxies for the equilibrium values P^* and NP^* . The results are shown in Figures A1–A8.

(1) $\alpha = 0.2$, $\beta_1 = 0.2$, $\beta_2 = 0.8$




Figure A1. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.2$, $\beta_1 = 0.2$, $\beta_2 = 0.8$.

(2) $\alpha = 0.2$, $\beta_1 = 0.8$, $\beta_2 = 0.2$




Figure A2. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.2$, $\beta_1 = 0.8$, $\beta_2 = 0.2$.

(3) $\alpha = 0.8$, $\beta_1 = 0.2$, $\beta_2 = 0.8$




Figure A3. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.8$, $\beta_1 = 0.2$, $\beta_2 = 0.8$.

(4) $\alpha = 0.8, \beta_1 = 0.8, \beta_2 = 0.2$




Figure A4. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.8, \beta_1 = 0.8, \beta_2 = 0.2$.

(5) $\alpha = 0.2, \beta_1 = 0.2, \beta_2 = 0.2$




Figure A5. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.2, \beta_1 = 0.2, \beta_2 = 0.2$.

(6) $\alpha = 0.8, \beta_1 = 0.2, \beta_2 = 0.2$




Figure A6. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.8, \beta_1 = 0.2, \beta_2 = 0.2$.

(7) $\alpha = 0.2, \beta_1 = 0.8, \beta_2 = 0.8$




Figure A7. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.2, \beta_1 = 0.8, \beta_2 = 0.8$.

(8) $\alpha = 0.8, \beta_1 = 0.8, \beta_2 = 0.8$




Figure A8. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis under $\alpha = 0.8, \beta_1 = 0.8, \beta_2 = 0.8$.

According to the simulation results, although the absolute levels of $P(\infty)$ and $NP(\infty)$ vary, the changes in ϵ, k, v do not affect the relative sizes of $P(\infty)$ and $NP(\infty)$. Therefore, the findings reported in the main text are robust.

A.5. Proof of Proposition 5

Within the interval $[0, 1 - v]$, the expressions of optimal persuasions are shown in (A19) and (A20).

$$\beta_1^*(t) = \frac{1}{c_1} (\lambda_{np}(t) - \lambda_p(t)) I_1(t) \quad (\text{A19})$$

$$\beta_2^*(t) = \frac{1}{c_2} (\lambda_{np}(t) - \lambda_p(t)) I_2(t) \quad (\text{A20})$$

Let us identify the optimal level of the steady-state by the superscript “s”. By the definitions, the candidate steady-state conditions are $\dot{U}(t) = \dot{I}_1(t) = \dot{I}_2(t) = \dot{P}(t) = \dot{NP}(t) = \dot{\lambda}_p = \dot{\lambda}_{np} = 0$. The following conditions are obtained as in (A21).

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \varepsilon - kU^s(P^s + NP^s) - vU^s = 0 \\ \alpha kU^s(P^s + NP^s) - I_1^s = 0 \\ (1 - \alpha)kU^s(P^s + NP^s) - I_2^s = 0 \\ \beta_1 I_1^s + \beta_2 I_2^s - vP^s = 0 \\ (1 - \beta_1 - v)I_1^s + (1 - \beta_2 - v)I_2^s - vNP^s = 0 \\ \rho\lambda_p^s + 1 + \lambda_u^s kU^s - \lambda_{l_1}^s \alpha kU^s - \lambda_{l_2}^s (1 - \alpha)kU^s + \lambda_p^s v = 0 \\ \rho\lambda_{np}^s - 1 + \lambda_u^s kU^s - \lambda_{l_1}^s \alpha kU^s - \lambda_{l_2}^s (1 - \alpha)kU^s + \lambda_{np}^s v = 0 \end{array} \right. \quad (A21)$$

Some calculations yield the following steady-state in (A22), within the interval $[0, 1 - v]$.

$$\beta_1^s = \frac{2\alpha(k\varepsilon(1-v)-v^2)}{C_1(\rho+v)k(1-v)}, \quad \beta_2^s = \frac{2(1-\alpha)(k\varepsilon(1-v)-v^2)}{C_2(\rho+v)k(1-v)} \quad (A22)$$

In order to reflect the boundary $[0, 1 - v]$, the expressions are revised as in (A23).

$$\beta_1^s = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \frac{2\alpha(k\varepsilon(1-v)-v^2)}{C_1(\rho+v)k(1-v)}, 0 \right\}, 1 - v \right\}, \quad \beta_2^s = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \frac{2(1-\alpha)(k\varepsilon(1-v)-v^2)}{C_2(\rho+v)k(1-v)}, 0 \right\}, 1 - v \right\} \quad (A23)$$



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